Karen Jones

The moving parties sought leave to appeal a CCAA judge's decision dismissing their motion to reinstate other post-employment benefits (OPEBs) to retirees of U.S. Steel Canada Inc. The CCAA judge had dismissed the motion but ordered a one-time payment of $2.7 million towards benefits.

The Court of Appeal applied the stringent test for leave to appeal in CCAA proceedings and found no prima facie merit to the appeal.

The court emphasized the broad discretion of the CCAA judge and the fact-specific nature of the decision, which did not raise issues of significance to insolvency practice.

Leave to appeal was denied with costs fixed at $2,500.

The applicant, U.S. Steel Canada Inc. (USSC), sought approval for a second key employee retention plan (KERP 2), while a group of unions and representative counsel (Moving Parties) sought an order to terminate the suspension of other post-employment benefits (OPEBs).

The court granted the KERP 2 motion, finding it fair and reasonable for business stability and restructuring efforts.

The OPEB motion was denied, as the court found no fundamental improvement in USSC's profitability to warrant OPEB reinstatement, and that USSC's proposed one-time contribution of $2.7 million to a transition fund for retired employees appropriately balanced competing interests during the ongoing sales and investor solicitation process (SISP).

Following the dismissal of an application for leave to appeal from a decision of a professional regulator, the court determined the issue of costs.

The applicant had previously been declared a vexatious litigant and filed submissions that did not address the costs issue and failed to comply with the court’s directions.

Applying the principle that costs should be fair and reasonable in the circumstances, the court found the regulator’s request for $3,500 to be reasonable and significantly less than the actual costs incurred.

The court awarded the requested amount of costs to the regulator.

A vexatious litigant sought leave under s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act to commence an appeal to the Divisional Court from a decision of the Executive Committee of a professional regulatory college refusing to reinstate his licence.

The court held that no statutory right of appeal exists from such a decision under the governing legislation, rendering the proposed proceeding an abuse of process.

The applicant’s extensive history of abusive litigation conduct, unpaid costs orders, and misleading statements to courts was also considered in assessing whether leave should be granted.

The court found there were no reasonable grounds for the proposed proceeding and that allowing it would be contrary to the interests of justice.

Leave to commence the proceeding was refused and further filing restrictions in the Toronto Region were imposed.

The applicant regulatory body brought a motion seeking a finding of contempt against the respondent for breaching a prior court order prohibiting him from representing himself as a chiropractor or performing controlled acts associated with chiropractic practice.

The respondent had previously admitted breaches of the same order in earlier contempt proceedings and agreed to comply with settlement terms requiring immediate cessation of practice and removal of promotional materials.

Evidence including patient files, appointment records, and affidavits from patients established beyond a reasonable doubt that the respondent continued operating a chiropractic practice and using the title “doctor” or “D.C.” in connection with providing health services.

The court found the respondent knowingly and wilfully breached the 2006 order and continued to hold himself out as a chiropractor.

A finding of contempt was entered, with a further hearing to determine penalty and costs.

The applicant, who was previously declared a vexatious litigant, sought leave under s. 140(3) of the Courts of Justice Act to commence a civil proceeding against the Ontario College of Pharmacists and its employees.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the proposed proceeding was an abuse of process as it constituted an impermissible collateral attack on final disciplinary decisions.

Furthermore, the applicant failed to establish reasonable grounds for the proceeding, and the claims were statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.