ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
COURT FILE NO.: CV-15-534009
DATE: 20151030
BETWEEN:
NAGY RIAD
Applicant
– and –
ONTARIO COLLEGE OF PHARMACISTS
Respondent
Mr. Riad, on his own behalf
Karen Jones, for the Ontario College of Pharmacists
HEARD: October 23, 2015 and in writing
r.f. goldstein j.
[1] Mr. Riad is, or at least was, a pharmacist. He was licenced by the Ontario College of Pharmacists. The College revoked his licence in 2006. Mr. Riad applied for reinstatement in January 2010. A panel of the Discipline Committee of the College dismissed his reinstatement application. He has since re-applied for re-instatement. That application is outstanding. In the meantime, Mr. Riad applied to the Executive Committee of the College in January 2015 asking them to consider reinstating him. The Executive Committee also dismissed the application. Mr. Riad now seeks to appeal the decision of the Executive Committee to the Divisional Court.
[2] Mr. Riad faces an initial problem: there is a vexatious litigant order against. He needs leave from a Superior Court judge to commence any proceedings. In my view, the proposed proceeding is an abuse of process and there are no reasonable grounds for it.
[3] On October 23, 2015 I dismissed his application for leave to commence proceedings. I hand-wrote an endorsement but indicated that I would provide more extensive reasons. For convenience, this was my endorsement, less the costs portion:
October 23, 2015
Mr. Riad has asked for a very particular type of equipment from the Court of Appeal. That equipment has been tested and Mr. Maranczec, the accessibility coordinator, has confirmed that it is in good working order. My own research indicates that on numerous occasions Mr. Riad has been accommodated only to insist that the equipment does not work. I have reviewed Exhibit 1 to these proceedings, which is an auditory report. I accept that Mr. Riad has hearing loss. My interaction with him on the record, however, indicates that he is very selective about when he chooses to lose his hearing. I offered Mr. Riad the opportunity to make un-interrupted submissions. He declined. I am prepared to deal with this matter on the basis of the written submissions as it is quite clear to me that no accommodation offered by the court will satisfy Mr. Riad no matter what it is. Court resources are not unlimited. Mr. Riad asked for a particular type of FM system which he has used in the Court of Appeal. As I noted, that system is in use today and Mr. Riad insists he cannot use it. I do not believe him. I take into account the fact that Mr. Riad has wilfully misled other judges of this court on previous occasions as well as my own interactions with him.
My review of the written materials makes it quite clear that there is no jurisdiction for Mr. Riad’s appeal to proceed. Accordingly, there is no basis upon which to grant his motion for leave to bring a motion to file an application for an extension of time. No injustice will result. As I understand it, his application for reinstatement is still before the Discipline Committee of the College. Accordingly, Mr Riad’s application for leave is dismissed.
[4] The following are my more extensive reasons.
BACKGROUND:
[5] Mr. Riad filed an affidavit that included many assertions that have nothing to do with the narrow questions on this application. There is no reason why he should drag in issues around his matrimonial litigation, for example, except to conclusively demonstrate why it was right to declare him a vexatious litigant. The affidavit includes assertions that other judges have found to be misleading or factually inaccurate. I would use a different word: lies.
[6] In order to determine whether leave should be granted, I must examine the totality of the circumstances. It is therefore necessary to go into some detail to explain why the proposed proceeding is an abuse of process. I start with Mr. Riad’s family law proceedings, which eventually generated the vexatious litigant order.
(a) The Family Law Actions
[7] Mr. Riad has engaged in lengthy and difficult matrimonial litigation. He refused to accept the outcome of that litigation. He has victimized his former wife and her lawyer.
[8] Mr. Riad’s former spouse, Marlien Aziz, retained Daniel Weisman as her lawyer. At one point in his career Mr. Weisman shared office space with Mr. Riad’s criminal counsel. Mr. Riad alleged that this arrangement created a conflict of interest and repeatedly sought to have Mr. Weisman removed from the record. No judge ever found Mr. Weisman to be in a conflict of interest.
[9] Ms. Aziz obtained a divorce order in 2006. Mr. Riad launched an action against her in 2007 that was designed to circumvent that order. Chief Justice Strathy, then a member of this Court, stayed the action in 2011. He put it this way in his endorsement: “Mr. Riad refuses to recognize the validity of court orders… the primary victim of Mr. Riad’s conduct is his former spouse, the defendant Ms. Aziz, who has had to respond to multiple proceedings and motions, with attendant costs, which Mr. Riad has failed to pay.” See: Riad v. Aziz, 2011 ONSC 2945, 2011 CarswellOnt 2731, [2011] O.J. No. 1881.
[10] Mr. Riad also improperly obtained a certificate of pending litigation in that proceeding. Chief Justice Strathy summarized the sequence of events at para. 8:
After commencing this action, Mr. Riad engaged in further improper and abusive action. He appeared before Himel J. on a motion for leave to issue a certificate of pending litigation and was directed to bring the motion on notice to the defendant. Mr. Riad then appeared before Master Brott and, without informing her of the direction of Himel J., obtained a certificate of pending litigation, without notice. He proceeded to register the certificate of pending litigation. After this, having attempted to amend the legal description in the certificate of pending litigation, and having had that request denied by Master McAfee and Master Short, he appeared in Motions Court and, without informing the presiding judge of the previous direction of Master MacAfee that his endorsement was to be brought to the attention of any Master or Judge hearing a motion, he obtained an order correcting the legal description.
[11] Which brings me to the vexatious litigant order.
(b) The Vexatious Litigant Order
[12] In February 2012 Ms. Aziz obtained a vexatious litigation order from Salmers J. Lauwers J. (as he then was) dismissed a motion to set the order aside. The Court of Appeal dismissed Mr. Riad’s appeal.
[13] Mr. Riad nonetheless attempted to start or continue proceedings. In 2014 he sought orders to continue several matters in this Court. He also sought rescission of the vexatious litigant order. My colleague Justice Edwards, sitting in Newmarket, dismissed the application. He noted at least three places in Mr. Riad’s affidavit that were “factually inaccurate.” See: Riad v. Aziz, 2014 ONSC 5223, 2014 CarswellOnt 12772, [2014] O.J. No. 4366.
(c) The Law Society Complaints
[14] In his affidavit Mr. Riad asserts that the Law Society of Upper Canada “found Mr. Weisemann guilty of Conflict of Interest and Professional Misconduct”.
[15] That is a lie. Like Lenin, Mr. Riad appears to believe that “a lie told often enough becomes the truth” because he has repeated that particular whopper in several affidavits. Mr. Riad lodged multiple complaints against Mr. Weisman with the Law Society. All the complaints were dismissed. The Law Society has never found Mr. Weisman guilty of professional misconduct. He remains a member of the Law Society in good standing. Mr. Riad obviously knows that. His affidavit therefore contains a lie.
[16] This identical issue came up in the application before Justice Edwards (see paras. 5-7):
Mr. Riad deposes in his affidavit to a number of factual assertions that a review of the court record and other proceedings makes clear were factually inaccurate.
At paragraph five of Mr. Riad's affidavit he states that the Law Society found Mr. Weisman guilty of conflict of interest as well as professional misconduct. A review of the Law Society of Upper Canada Lawyer and Paralegal Directory states that Mr. Weisman has no discipline history.
Mr. Riad confirmed in his submissions to me that he had received correspondence from the Law Society confirming that there was in fact no record of a discipline history involving Mr. Weisman. Mr. Riad chose not to correct the assertion in his affidavit when it was filed with the court, leaving this court with a factually inaccurate record concerning Mr. Weisman's discipline history.
[17] Ms. Aziz and Mr. Weisman are not Mr. Riad’s only obsessions. He is also obsessed with the College, which I turn to next.
(d) Proposed Litigation Against The College And Its Employees
[18] In 2014 Mr. Riad attempted to sue the College and several employees of the College. He applied for leave to commence proceedings, as he has in this case. My colleague Justice Stinson heard the application and dismissed it: Riad v. Ontario College of Pharmacists et. al., 2014 ONSC 4618, 122 O.R. (3d) 315. Justice Stinson found that Mr. Riad had failed to persuade him that the proposed application was not an abuse of process. He noted that it was a collateral attack on the College’s proceedings. He also found that there were no reasonable grounds for the proposed proceeding. He made the following observation at para. 12:
According to the evidence filed in response to this application, Mr. Riad has been harassing and threatening the OCP since 2006, when his certificate of registration was revoked. He was provided with trespass to property notices by the OCP in 2006 and 2013. The OCP contacted the Toronto Police Services in 2006 and 2010 regarding Mr. Riad's threatening and harassing attendances, correspondence and telephone calls. Despite the issuance of trespass to property notices, Mr. Riad persisted in attending at the OCP personally to deliver documents. Mr. Riad has falsely told both Ms. Jones and the OCP that they have been found in contempt of court for failing to attend at court on May 26, 2014.
[19] Mr. Riad applied to set aside Justice Stinson’s order. Justice Whitaker dismissed that application in short order.
(e) Outstanding Costs Awards
[20] As noted, Mr. Riad has only paid $2,000.00 of the $10,000.00 costs award imposed by the College at the 2006 discipline hearing. In addition, Justice Stinson and Justice Whitaker ordered that he pay costs of $750.00 and $2,500.00 respectively. He has never paid those costs awards.
[21] I do not have a full record of the costs orders made in this Court and the Court of Appeal. In his endorsement in 2011 Justice Strathy noted that Mr. Riad was in default of several costs orders as a result of the family law proceedings. Which brings me to the current application.
(f) The Discipline Proceedings
[22] In 2001-2002 Mr. Riad pleaded guilty to professional misconduct before the College. He was also was criminally convicted of defrauding the Ontario Drug Benefit Program of almost $200,000.00. The College reprimanded Mr. Riad and imposed terms and conditions on his employment as a pharmacist. Mr. Riad was also ordered to pay costs in the amount of $10,000.00. He has only paid $2000.00.
[23] In 2006 a panel of the Discipline Committee of the College revoked Mr. Riad’s certificate. He failed to attend the discipline hearing. The panel was satisfied that he was properly served with notice. The hearing went ahead. The panel found Mr. Riad guilty of multiple acts of professional misconduct (although it dismissed some) relating to significant violations of the 2002 order.
[24] The panel also found Mr. Riad guilty of professional misconduct in relation to yet another criminal conviction. In 2003 the Ontario Court of Justice ordered Mr. Riad to surrender his passport. He did so on May 21, 2003. On May 22, 2003 Mr. Riad notified Passport Canada that his passport was lost. Passport Canada sent him a new passport. Mr. Riad was subsequently charged and convicted of two offences:
• Making a false statement to procure a passport contrary to s. 57(2) of the Criminal Code; and,
• Obstruction of justice contrary to s. 139(2) of the Criminal Code.
[25] In 2010 Mr. Riad applied to the College for reinstatement. The College scheduled a hearing for April 21, 2010. Mr. Riad did not appear. It seems he was in jail. The hearing was adjourned on terms.
[26] On June 18, 2012 a panel of the Discipline Committee of the College dismissed Mr. Riad’s application for reinstatement. The panel took several factors into account, including Mr. Riad’s governability:
We are of the view that much of Mr. Riad’s past conduct demonstrates a pattern of surreptitious, dishonest and unethical behaviour, showing him unsuitable to practice as a member of the profession. In particular, we agree with comments of a previous Panel of this Committee that Mr. Riad’s failure to abide by prior rulings of the Committee and Orders issued by the Ontario Superior Court of Justice illustrate his inability to be governed either within or outside the profession. Mr. Riad’s continuing to hold himself out as a licensed pharmacist, notwithstanding numerous written warnings not to do so, is another example of Mr. Riad’s ungovernability.
[27] In 2013, after a somewhat convoluted correspondence (including a Trespass to Property Notice, notifying Mr. Riad that he was prohibited from attending the premises of the College) a new request for reinstatement was referred to the Discipline Committee of the College. Mr. Riad retained a lawyer, Fred Hawa, to represent him. Routine litigation correspondence then ensued between Mr. Hawa and Karen Jones, the College’s counsel. Mr. Riad continued to contact the College directly despite Mr. Hawa’s attempts to prevent him from doing so.
[28] As I will deal with in more detail below, a regulated health professional (such as a pharmacist) may be reinstated by a panel of the Discipline Committee of the College after a hearing; alternatively, the Executive Committee of the College may reinstate the health professional without a hearing. Although Mr. Riad’s request for reinstatement was referred to the Discipline Committee of the College, Mr. Hawa made an application on Mr. Riad’s behalf to the Executive Committee to consider reinstatement. Mr. Hawa was specifically instructed by Mr. Riad to do so. On June 30, 2015 the Executive Committee dismissed Mr. Riad’s application. The Executive Committee found that it should only exercise its discretion to determine an application for reinstatement in exceptional cases. Mr. Riad’s case was not exceptional.
[29] Mr. Riad now seeks leave so that he may commence an appeal from that decision. As I noted, he needs leave from the Superior Court because he has been declared a vexatious litigant. Before turning to the analysis, however, I must describe the hearing that took place before me.
(g) Mr. Riad’s Hearing Impairment
[30] This matter was to originally have been heard on October 14, 2015. On that day the staff, aware of Mr. Riad’s hearing impairment, installed equipment in the courtroom for his use. Mr. Riad complained that the equipment was inadequate. We adjourned for lunch and the staff brought in new equipment. Mr. Riad complained that that equipment was also inadequate. He said that there was an FM system that he has used in the Court of Appeal. He asked if the Court could accommodate him by using that equipment. I made the following hand-written endorsement that day (which I reproduce for convenience):
Mr. Riad claims that the hearing equipment is not adequate and he cannot proceed. He and I had a conversation and I believe his hearing is adequate. Nonetheless, we will adjourn to October 23, 2015 at 12:00 pm in order to obtain another set of hearing equipment. I will remain seized. Costs deferred.
[31] On October 23, 2015 the staff installed the equipment requested by Mr. Riad. They tested it and indicated to me on the record that it was in good working order. There are three FM bands or the headphones can be plugged directly into the Court’s audio system. Nonetheless, Mr. Riad insisted that the application should be heard at 130 Queen Street West (Osgoode Hall) or 393 University Avenue (where most of the civil courtrooms are located). Mr. Riad indicated that he needed small distances in order to hear. The equipment was set up in Courtroom 7-1 at the Toronto Court House at 361 University Avenue. Courtroom 7-1 is a very small courtroom. The distance between the judge and the counsel table is not more than 20 feet, a tiny distance in courtroom terms. It is certainly much closer than the distance between counsel table in the Court of Appeal and the members of that Court. I note that in an endorsement dated August 16, 2011 Justice Rosenberg noted that this very same equipment was working for Mr. Riad in the Court of Appeal.
[32] I decided to hear the matter notwithstanding Mr. Riad’s complaints. Despite the lack of auditory equipment, he and I had a discussion on the record. He certainly appeared to hear much of what I was saying, as he reacted and responded. For example, at the conclusion of court on October 23, I told Mr. Riad that he would be unable to file material unless he had the prior written permission of the Regional Senior Justice. He asked me who that was. I told him that information was available on the Court’s website. He indicated to me that he understood.
[33] There were times, however, when Mr. Riad either ignored me or could not hear me. My observations are similar to those made by my colleague Justice Edwards (see paras. 2-4):
When the matter was called on September 8, 2014 Mr. Riad indicated that he had difficulty hearing and sought an adjournment of today's proceedings. He indicated that the voice enhancement equipment was not working to his satisfaction.
I had an opportunity to observe Mr. Riad and his ability to respond to enquiries from the bench. I allowed Mr. Riad to sit in the witness box adjacent to the court dais. Mr. Riad had no difficulty in understanding and hearing the dialogue between him and myself. I also had Mr. Weisman, counsel for the respondent, stand in front of Mr. Riad so that Mr. Weisman's submissions could be clearly understood.
At no time with the accommodations that I provided to Mr. Riad did he indicate any difficulty in hearing or understanding the court proceedings. I therefore refused any adjournment of Mr. Riad's application seeking the aforementioned relief.
[34] At the hearing before me Mr. Riad produced an auditory report dated August 13, 2013 from Melissa MacKay, an audiologist. I made the report Exhibit 1 to the proceedings. The report indicated that Mr. Riad has “permanent severe to profound hearing loss in both ears”. The report also indicated that assistive listening devices can help in the courtroom.
[35] The report is more than two years old. Mr. Maranczec, the Court’s disability coordinator, indicated that he had never seen it although he has dealt with Mr. Riad on many occasions. Ms. Jones, who has also dealt with Mr. Riad on many occasions at the College, also indicated that she had never seen the report. Mr. Riad did not explain why he had not produced it earlier.
[36] Although I accept that Mr. Riad has hearing impairment, even significant hearing impairment, I do not accept that his impairment is as severe as he claims, notwithstanding the audiology report. He appears to use hs impairment as an excuse when it is convenient for him. In my opinion, no accommodation would have satisfied Mr. Riad unless he thought it was convenient for him to be accommodated.
[37] It is absolutely critical that people requiring accommodation be accommodated. Justice is open to all, not just those with perfect hearing or 20/20 vision. That is why this Court has an accessibility co-ordinator. The law requires that a litigant be provided with reasonable accommodation, not unlimited choices and a veto.
[38] During the course of the hearing, I passed Mr. Riad a hand-written note indicating that if he simply talked, I would listen to his submissions without interruption. He declined to take up that offer.
[39] If I had granted Mr. Riad’s adjournment under those conditions it would have been manifestly unfair to the College, especially given that his application was devoid of merit on its face. The College must bear costs and yet has no realistic prospect that Mr. Riad will ever pay for this or future appearances, given his history.
[40] Furthermore, to allow Mr. Riad to play games – which is what he was doing – would be to trivialize the difficulties of other litigants with genuine hearing or other impairments.
ISSUES:
[41] In my view, there are two issues to be determined:
(a) Is the proposed proceeding an abuse of process?
(b) Are there reasonable grounds for the proposed proceeding?
ANALYSIS
[42] A person who has been declared a vexatious litigant may only commence a proceeding with leave of the Superior Court. The Court may only grant leave if it is satisfied that the proposed proceeding is not an abuse of process and that there are reasonable grounds for the proceedings: Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, s. 140(4)(a). The onus is on Mr. Riad to show that this particular proposed appeal is not an abuse of process: Bono General Construction Limited v. Susin, [2006] O.J. No. 4888, 2006 CarswellOnt 7754 (Sup.Ct.).
(a) Is the proposed proceeding an abuse of process?
[43] The College argues that the proposed appeal is an abuse of process because no appeal lies from a decision of the Executive Committee of the College to the Divisional Court. I agree. The Divisional Court is a branch of the Superior Court of Justice. It is a statutory court. As a statutory court, the jurisdiction must be found in a statute, in this case s. 19(1) of the Courts of Justice Act. See: Canady v. Tucci, 2009 ONCA 554, 97 O.R. (3d) 145 at para. 10. Quite simply the Courts of Justice Act does not provide an appeal route.
[44] The Health Professions Procedure Code regulates the procedures and activities of self-governing professional bodies like the College. The Code is found in Schedule 2 of the Regulated Health Professions Act, 1991, S.O. 1991, c. 18. There is an appeal route to the Divisional Court from a decision of the Health Professions Appeal and Review Board, but no appeal from a decision of the Executive Committee of the College.
[45] As there is no jurisdiction, the proposed appeal is on its face an abuse of process: Direk v. Argiris & Associates, [2009] O.J. No 6395, 2009 CarswellOnt 9692 (Sup.Ct.) at para. 44.
[46] Even if a statutory appeal were available (or Mr. Riad had challenged the decision by way of an application for judicial review under the Judicial Review Procedure Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. J. 1) I still would not grant leave. An application under s. 140(3) triggers a broad review that focuses to a large degree on the conduct of the vexatious litigant. The totality of the circumstances must be examined: Gaddam v. Eng, 2008 ONCA 240, [2008] O.J. No. 1250.
[47] Although the burden is on Mr. Riad to show that the proposed appeal is not an abuse of process, he chose not to take me up on my offer to make uninterrupted submissions. I therefore must rely on his written material. Even if an appeal were available, none of his written material persuades me that it would not be an abuse of process to institute proceedings. In fact, his material is excellent evidence that an abuse of process is exactly what an appeal would be.
[48] An abuse of process is a proceeding that is unfair to the point that it is contrary to the interests of justice: R. v. Power, 1994 126 (SCC), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 601. The Court has an inherent power to prevent an abuse of its procedures in a way that would be manifestly unfair to a party before it: Toronto (City) v. CUPE Local 79, 2003 SCC 63, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 77.
[49] Leaving aside the jurisdictional issue, there are many reasons why the proposed appeal would be manifestly unfair and contrary to the interests of justice. The bottom line, however, is that Mr. Riad’s conduct disentitles him from using the litigation process. He has lied to multiple courts, including on this application, about the discipline status of Mr. Weisman. He placed a certificate of pending litigation on property through the use of subterfuge and misled a judge and a master about what he was doing. He has failed to pay multiple costs orders. He has victimized litigants and counsel.
[50] Furthermore, and as I detail below, Mr. Riad still has an application pending before the Discipline Committee of the College. If Mr. Riad were a normal litigant it might still be an abuse of process to allow an appeal (if jurisdiction existed) where there was a pending application. But Mr. Riad is not a normal litigant. The “totality of the circumstances” would, undoubtedly, still militate against granting leave. I have taken pains to outline Mr. Riad’s litigation history. That history makes it likely that almost any proceeding he proposed would be without merit.
(b) Are there reasonable grounds for the proposed proceedings?
[51] If I understand Mr. Riad’s position correctly, he says in his Notice of Application that he should be permitted litigate the decision of the Executive Committee in the courts because s. 74 of the Code has never been challenged. In other words, he says his appeal has merit.
[52] I disagree for two reasons. First, as the College points out, a bald assertion that the appeal is meritorious does not mean that there are reasonable grounds for the proceeding. Second, Mr. Riad has to do more than show that he simply disagrees with a discretionary decision.
[53] Some explanation of the procedure for reinstatement is necessary. As noted, the Code regulates the activities of the College. The Code governs such matters as the discipline process, and the reinstatement process. There are two ways that a pharmacist can apply for reinstatement where a discipline panel of the College has revoked his or her certificate. The first way is through a hearing before the Discipline Committee of the College. Pursuant to s. 72(1) of the Code an applicant must apply to the Registrar of the College for a new certificate. Where the applicant was revoked on the basis of professional misconduct, as Mr. Riad was, the Registrar is required to refer the application to the Discipline Committee. A hearing is required, with all of the procedural safeguards that exist in the Code.
[54] The second way an applicant can be reinstated is through the Executive Committee of the College. The Executive Committee may order the Registrar to issue a new certificate without a hearing. The Executive Committee’s decision to dismiss Mr. Riad’s application is the decision he now seeks to appeal. As noted, section 70(1) of the Code is the only section dealing with appeals to the Divisional Court and it contains no provision. It provides for certain appeals from the Health Professions Appeal Review Board. It simply does not provide an appeal from a decision of the Executive Committee.
[55] Although it is not necessary for me to go further than this, I must say that even if Mr. Riad had sought to bring a judicial review rather than an appeal, I would still find that there are no reasonable grounds to bring one. The decision of the Executive Committee was a discretionary one. A reviewing court would consider whether there was a reasonable basis in law or on the evidence for the Executive Committee’s decision: Halifax (Regional Municipality) v. Nova Scotia Human Rights Commission, 2012 SCC 10, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 364 at para. 17.
[56] Mr. Riad would be very hard pressed to show that the decision on its face did not meet that standard. The Executive Committee had full written submissions before it (from a lawyer, not from Mr. Riad) and provided, in turn, a full written decision. The decision appears to have taken into account all relevant factors. The Executive Committee noted that it only exercises its discretion in exceptional cases. The leading author in the field points out that the s. 74 discretion is exercised in only limited circumstances: R. Steinecke, A Complete Guide To The Regulated Health Professions Act (Toronto: Canada Law Book), at p. 8:24.
[57] Most importantly, the Executive Committee noted that Mr. Riad’s application for reinstatement was pending before the Discipline Committee and would be heard in a full, transparent hearing.
DISPOSITION AND FUTURE APPLICATIONS BY MR. RIAD
[58] Mr. Riad’s application for leave to start a proceeding in the Superior Court of Justice is dismissed.
[59] As noted, Justice Salmer declared Mr. Riad to be a vexatious litigant. The following is a typed version of the salient part of my October 25, 2015 hand-written endorsement dealing with this question:
In the future, Mr. Riad will not be permitted to file any material in the Toronto Region unless he first writes to the Regional Senior Justice and obtains permission.
[60] I am aware that I have no stand-alone jurisdiction to order Mr. Riad declared a vexatious litigant of my own motion, and that there must be an application under s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act. There is, however, is not what I am doing. He has already been declared a vexatious litigant. The Court always has the ability to control its own process and procedures, and to protect itself from threats to the rule of law. I am therefore ordering that Mr. Riad may not file any materials with the Court in the Toronto Region without the specific written permission of the Regional Senior Justice. He may write a letter to the R.S.J. seeking permission to file materials. Any letter he writes to the R.S.J. must be limited to three pages or it will be returned to Mr. Riad, unread. I am satisfied that the inherent jurisdiction of the Court provides me with the authority to make this direction.
[61] Mr. Riad is no mere gadfly or nuisance. Justice Lauwers (then a member of this Court) called him “unreasonable and completely ungovernable”. There is no point in mincing words: he is a proven liar, a convicted fraudster, and a menace to the administration of justice. His attempts to game the system have real costs. His activities crowd out Court resources that could be used to deal with real litigants who have real issues.
[62] Mr. Riad should understand that it is the Court’s intention that the staff of the Superior Court of Justice will simply turn him away if he shows up at the counter to file any document. A copy of my order will be circulated to the counter staff in the Toronto Region. I will also send a copy of this decision to the office of the R.S.J. Madam Justice Baltman imposed this procedure in at least one other region of this Court: Rachiele v. Rachiele, [2009] O.J. No. 2798 (Sup.Ct.).
COSTS
[63] Various courts and discipline panels have ordered Mr. Riad to pay multiple costs awards. He has generally ignored these orders. There is little prospect that he will pay any order that I make. That said, the College is entitled to costs. On October 23, 2015 I made the following endorsement:
On the issue of costs, the College will submit a draft bill of costs and written submissions of no more than 1 page to me no later than the close of business on October 30, 2015. Mr. Riad will then have until the close of business on November 13, 2015, to reply in writing. His submissions will be no longer than 5 pages. He will submit the submissions to my attention at Judge’s Administration, 361 University.
[64] I will issue a separate endorsement once I receive the costs submissions of both parties.
R.F. Goldstein J.
Released: October 30, 2015
COURT FILE NO.: CV-15-534009
DATE: 20151030
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
NAGY RIAD
Applicant
– and –
ONTARIO COLLEGE OF PHARMACISTS
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
R.F. Goldstein J.