Court File and Parties

Court File No.: CV-24-00719618-0000
Date: 2025-05-26
Court: Ontario Superior Court of Justice

Applicant: William Malamas a.k.a. Vasilos Malamas
Respondents: The Office of the Independent Police Review Director and the Attorney General for Ontario

Before: Robert Centa
Counsel:

• William Malamas, self-represented applicant
• No one appearing for the respondents

Heard: 2025-05-23

Endorsement

Background

[1] On August 13, 2012, Newbould J. declared that William Malamas was a vexatious litigant pursuant to s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43. The order provided, in part, that “no new application…may be initiated in any court by William Malamas…without leave of a judge of the Superior Court of Justice.”

[2] Mr. Malamas applies for leave to commence an application for judicial review. For the reasons that follow, the application is dismissed.

[3] On December 12, 2023, Mr. Malamas attempted to initiate an application for judicial review without first seeking leave of the court. Mr. Malamas sought to quash decisions of the Office of the Independent Police Review Director dated November 23, 2023. Mr. Malamas alleged that certain statements contained in affidavits sworn by William S. O’Hara on November 27 and 29, 2017, were not true. Mr. Malamas sought orders “in the nature of mandamus” compelling the OIPRD to make certain investigations and take action to determine whether Mr. O’Hara authored certain letters in October 2017.

[4] On February 13, 2024, Charney J. quashed the application for judicial review because, contrary to the order of Newbould J., Mr. Malamas had not obtained leave of the court pursuant to s. 140(3) of the Courts of Justice Act before commencing the application for judicial review: Malamas v. Attorney General (Ontario), 2024 ONSC 929.

[5] On May 3, 2024, Mr. Malamas issued a notice of application seeking leave of the court to commence his application for judicial review challenging the decisions of the OIPRD. On May 23, 2025, the application was assigned to me for determination.

The Test for Leave

[6] The test for leave is set out in s. 140(4)(a) of the Courts of Justice Act:

Where an application for leave is made under subsection (3),
(a) leave shall be granted only if the court is satisfied that the proceeding sought to be instituted or continued is not an abuse of process and that there are reasonable grounds for the proceeding;

[7] I may only grant leave to Mr. Malamas to commence the application for judicial review if he proves both that the proceeding is not an abuse of process and that there are reasonable grounds for the proceeding: Falardeau v. Owen Sound Police Service Board, 2021 ONSC 6180, paras. 49-50; Chavali v. Law Society of Upper Canada, para. 17; Riad v. Ontario College of Pharmacists, 2015 ONSC 6736, para. 42; Ferenczi v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., para. 17; Hart v. Fullarton, 2021 ONSC 2559, para. 9; Bono General Construction Ltd. v. Susin, [2006] O.J. No. 4888 (S.C.), para. 14; Deep v. Canada Revenue Agency (Canada Customs and Revenue Agency), 2011 ONSC 5660, para. 16; Hainsworth v. Attorney General of Canada, 2011 ONSC 2642, paras. 10-11; Lindhorst v. Centennial College, 2016 ONSC 2678, para. 4; Ibrahim v. Ontario, 2022 ONSC 6339, para. 7.

Nature of the Application

[8] This application is not an appeal. I am not to review the correctness or reasonableness of the decision of Newbould J. to declare Mr. Malamas a vexatious litigant or the fairness of the process that led to that decision: Falardeau, at para. 69. A vexatious litigant order is a prospective case management step, designed to limit the costs imposed on the system and the other litigants, not a punitive measure: R v. Coote, 2011 ONSC 858, para. 63; Ironside v. Roskam, 2017 ONSC 7416, para. 20; Hok v. Alberta, 2016 ABQB 651, para. 37.

Analysis and Decision

[9] Mr. Malamas has not satisfied me that the proposed proceeding is not an abuse of process and that there are reasonable grounds for it. The application is dismissed.

[10] First, I am not satisfied that the proposed application for judicial review is not an abuse of process. In the proposed application for judicial review, Mr. Malamas wishes to raise matters intrinsically linked to the litigation that caused Newbould J. to issue the vexatious litigant order. Even if the specific issue to be addressed on the application for judicial review has not been determined previously, Mr. Malamas wishes to continue to litigate aspects of the earlier disputes that prompted the vexatious litigant order.

[11] It is a general characteristic of vexatious proceedings that grounds and issues raised tend to be rolled forward into subsequent proceedings and repeated and supplemented: Lang Michener Lash Johnston v. Fabian (1987), para. 19. This is not a case, for example, where Mr. Malamas seeks leave to commence an action resulting from a motor vehicle accident entirely unrelated to the prior action that resulted in the vexatious litigant order. Rather, Mr. Malamas seeks permission to open a new front in an old war. Mr. Malamas has not satisfied me that his proposed application for judicial review is not an abuse of process.

[12] Second, I am not satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for the proposed proceeding. Mr. Malamas has not satisfied me that there is even an arguable case that the decision of the OIPRD was made in a procedurally unfair way or that it was unreasonable. Mr. Malamas obviously disagrees with the decision, but he has not satisfied me that his application for judicial review has any chance of success.

[13] I dismiss the application for leave to institute the application for judicial review without costs.

Robert Centa
Date: 2025-05-26