David B. Cousins

The applicants challenged three Part VI authorizations to intercept private communications, arguing a lack of reasonable and probable grounds and investigative necessity.

The court found that the Information to Obtain (ITO) relied almost entirely on unproven tipsters, lacked sufficient detail and corroboration, and contained misleading information regarding applicant travel.

The court also found that investigative necessity was not established as other reasonable investigative methods were not adequately explored.

Consequently, the authorizations were deemed invalid, and the intercepted communications were excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

In a criminal bribery prosecution, the appellant international financial organization challenged a third party production order and subpoenas issued in support of a Garofoli wiretap challenge.

The Court held that archival and personnel immunities under the Bretton Woods and Related Agreements Act applied to records and investigators of the organization’s integrity unit, and no waiver was established.

The Court further held that, in the Garofoli context, third party production requires a reasonable likelihood of probative value to the affiant-knowledge issues, not broad relevance to trial truth.

Because that threshold was not met, the production order was set aside.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision dismissing her complaint of discrimination against a university.

The adjudicator had dismissed the complaint under s. 34(11) of the Human Rights Code because the applicant had an outstanding civil action against the university regarding the same essential factual content—the inclusion of a failed academic year on her official transcript.

The Divisional Court found the adjudicator's interpretation of s. 34(11) to be reasonable, confirming that the provision requires an applicant to choose between the Tribunal and a concurrent civil action at the time the application is filed.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision that dismissed her request to add the University of Windsor as a party to her complaint against the Law Society, dismissed her complaint against the Law Society, and declared her a vexatious litigant regarding her attempts to pursue allegations against the University over her official transcript.

The Divisional Court held that the standard of review was reasonableness and found that the HRTO had ample authority to control its processes and prevent abuse.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The applicant, a 76-year-old family physician, sought judicial review of an order by the College of Physicians and Surgeons' Quality Assurance Committee requiring him to practice under clinical supervision.

The order followed peer assessments that identified critical deficiencies in his practice posing an immediate risk to patient safety.

The applicant argued he was denied procedural fairness because he did not receive a copy of the final review before the Committee's initial letter, and that the Committee failed to consider his responses.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding no breach of procedural fairness when the process was viewed as a whole, and concluding that the Committee had properly considered the applicant's submissions.

The applicant regulatory body brought a motion seeking a finding of contempt against the respondent for breaching a prior court order prohibiting him from representing himself as a chiropractor or performing controlled acts associated with chiropractic practice.

The respondent had previously admitted breaches of the same order in earlier contempt proceedings and agreed to comply with settlement terms requiring immediate cessation of practice and removal of promotional materials.

Evidence including patient files, appointment records, and affidavits from patients established beyond a reasonable doubt that the respondent continued operating a chiropractic practice and using the title “doctor” or “D.C.” in connection with providing health services.

The court found the respondent knowingly and wilfully breached the 2006 order and continued to hold himself out as a chiropractor.

A finding of contempt was entered, with a further hearing to determine penalty and costs.

Accused charged with bribery of foreign public officials sought production of investigative records from the World Bank’s Integrity Vice Presidency in support of a Garofoli challenge to wiretap authorizations.

The World Bank asserted immunity as an international organization and refused to produce additional materials.

The court held that by initiating and actively assisting the Canadian criminal investigation, the organization had impliedly waived immunity and must accept the procedural burdens of a criminal prosecution.

The applicants established likely relevance under the first stage of the O’Connor framework.

Production was ordered for certain investigative materials for judicial review.

The applicant physician sought a stay of an order by the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario imposing clinical supervision conditions on his practice, pending his application for judicial review.

The court applied the RJR-MacDonald test and found that while there may be a serious issue to be tried, the applicant failed to establish irreparable harm.

The court held that the financial cost of supervision did not amount to irreparable harm and that the balance of convenience favoured the College due to patient safety concerns.

The motion for a stay was dismissed.

The College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario brought a motion for directions regarding the admissibility of certain paragraphs in Dr. Chong's affidavit filed on a motion to stay.

The College argued that the paragraphs contained quality assurance information, which is protected under s. 83.1(6) of the Act.

The court agreed, ruling that the legislation does not permit quality assurance information to be referred to or treated as evidence.

The court excluded the paragraphs from evidence, noting that Dr. Chong's counsel could still refer to the information during argument as it was already in the record of proceedings.

The moving party, Dr. Sazant, sought an extension of time to bring a motion under s. 21(5) of the Courts of Justice Act to challenge an order of a single judge.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding that the moving party failed to provide a reasonable explanation for the delay and that the delay prejudiced the respondents.

The court emphasized that resort to s. 21(5) should not become routine and that the justice of the case did not require granting the extension.

The appellants appealed their assault convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in his jury charge regarding eyewitness identification, including the failure to give Chartier and Vetrovec warnings, and the handling of in-dock identification and photo lineups.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding the trial judge gave a well-crafted and balanced charge that adequately highlighted the frailties of the identification evidence.

One appellant's sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the three-year sentence was within the appropriate range given his significant criminal record.

The applicant physician sought judicial review of a decision by the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario restricting his practice to surgical assisting for six months.

The restriction followed a peer review and a Physician Review Program (PREP) assessment.

The Divisional Court found that the College breached procedural fairness by failing to refer a second peer assessment to a Review Panel, providing selective information to the PREP director, and refusing to disclose the PREP test and video recordings to the applicant.

The decision imposing conditions on the applicant's certificate of registration was quashed.

The appellants appealed a finding of liability in a medical malpractice case, seeking to introduce fresh evidence that the respondent's trial expert witness had subsequently pleaded no contest to professional misconduct.

The Court of Appeal declined to decide whether to admit the fresh evidence, finding that even without the expert's testimony, the other evidence on record—including the respondent's own testimony and other medical evidence—supported the trial judge's conclusions on causation and informed consent.

The appellants called no evidence at trial to refute this.

The court also upheld the quantum of damages and dismissed the appeal with costs.