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Affidavit paragraphs containing quality assurance information excluded from evidence on motion to stay.
The College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario brought a motion for directions regarding the admissibility of certain paragraphs in Dr. Chong's affidavit filed on a motion to stay.
The College argued that the paragraphs contained quality assurance information, which is protected under s. 83.1(6) of the Act.
The court agreed, ruling that the legislation does not permit quality assurance information to be referred to or treated as evidence.
The court excluded the paragraphs from evidence, noting that Dr. Chong's counsel could still refer to the information during argument as it was already in the record of proceedings.
Motion for stay of College's practice conditions pending judicial review dismissed for lack of irreparable harm.
The applicant physician sought a stay of an order by the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario imposing clinical supervision conditions on his practice, pending his application for judicial review.
The court applied the RJR-MacDonald test and found that while there may be a serious issue to be tried, the applicant failed to establish irreparable harm.
The court held that the financial cost of supervision did not amount to irreparable harm and that the balance of convenience favoured the College due to patient safety concerns.
The motion for a stay was dismissed.
Judicial review of Board decision dismissed; tribunal not required to address every allegation in reasons.
The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Health Professions Appeal and Review Board, which upheld the College of Physicians and Surgeons' decision to take no action on her complaint against a physician.
The applicant alleged the tribunal failed to address all her allegations.
The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the tribunal was not required to address every allegation and that its decision was reasonable based on the evidence.
Appeal dismissed; College investigator summons power is constitutional and delay did not constitute abuse of process.
The appellant physician was found guilty of professional misconduct involving sexual abuse of young boys.
He appealed the Discipline Committee's decision, arguing that the summons power under s. 76(1) of the Health Professions Procedural Code violated his s. 8 Charter rights against unreasonable search and seizure, and that the College's delay in prosecuting the case amounted to an abuse of process.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the summons power is constitutional in the regulatory context as it is properly constrained by relevance and privilege.
The Court also found that the delay was not inordinate given the concurrent criminal proceedings, and the appellant did not suffer significant prejudice.
