Brandin O’Connor

The appellant, a former employee, appealed the striking out of her statement of claim without leave to amend.

Her claim sought further compensation for alleged racial discrimination, arguing that correspondence with the CEO constituted a binding agreement, despite having signed a full and final release upon dismissal.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no error in the conclusion that the letters did not form an enforceable contract and that the elements of promissory estoppel were not pleaded.

The court reiterated that claims with no reasonable chance of success should be struck.

The plaintiff, a former employee of Torstar who signed a full and final release upon her dismissal in 2017, brought an action claiming that subsequent correspondence with the CEO in 2020 constituted a binding agreement to pay her compensation for alleged anti-black racism.

The defendants moved to strike the statement of claim.

The court granted the motion, finding it plain and obvious that the correspondence did not constitute an enforceable contract and the claim had no reasonable prospect of success.

The statement of claim was struck in its entirety without leave to amend.

The court continued a summary judgment motion in two wrongful dismissal claims.

In the Ratigan claim, full summary judgment was granted for $73,076.

In the Bouttier claim, partial summary judgment was previously granted, and the court now determined the method of payment for the remaining balance of $304,079.41, ruling it should be a lump sum.

The defendant failed to participate meaningfully despite adjournments.

Both plaintiffs were awarded substantial indemnity costs under Rule 49, totaling $10,000 for Ratigan and $15,000 for Bouttier, in addition to previously ordered costs.

This endorsement addresses two wrongful dismissal actions brought by Diane Ratigan and Thomas Bouttier against Premier Conferencing (Canada) Limited, heard together as summary judgment motions.

The core dispute revolved around the defendant's obligation to pay severance as a lump sum versus periodically, with mitigation having been waived as an issue.

The court granted full judgment to Ratigan for six months' severance and partial judgment to Bouttier for the first six months of his twelve-month entitlement, including salary, relocation, benefits, and RRSP contributions.

The remaining portion of Bouttier's motion was adjourned to determine the lump sum versus periodic payment for the latter six months, given the defendant's counsel's withdrawal and potential new counsel.

Following an order to merge two local unions into a larger local, the former locals attempted to amend their trust and building corporation documents to distribute assets pro rata to their members rather than transferring them to the merged local.

The court found these actions were taken without authorization, violated the union's constitution, and constituted a breach of fiduciary duty by the trustees and directors.

The court declared the amendments null and void, imposed a constructive trust, and ordered the assets transferred to the merged local.

In a civil procedure appeal, the appellants challenged orders permitting amendment of a statement of claim through a representation order after expiry of a limitation period.

The central issue was whether the order improperly added parties or merely corrected the naming of the legal entity represented by previously named individuals.

A majority held the request was properly treated as correction of a misnamed party, with members having notice before the limitation deadline and no demonstrated prejudice after extensive participation in the litigation.

The appeal was dismissed, with one dissenting judge who would have allowed it.

The respondent brought an action for wrongful dismissal against a union local and its directors.

The union pleaded that section 3(2) of the Rights of Labour Act precluded it from being named as a party.

After the limitation period expired, the union moved to dismiss the action on this ground.

The motion was dismissed.

The respondent then successfully moved for a representation order allowing individual defendants to defend on behalf of union members.

The appeal addressed whether an action improperly naming a union could be amended after the limitation period expired by obtaining a representation order.

The majority held that the action was not a nullity and that the representation order could be granted as a correction of the party's name under the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The dissent argued that section 3(2) created an absolute statutory requirement for a representation order and that the majority's approach created unacceptable uncertainty in the law.