Zachary Gaston Talal Al-Khatib

In a judge-alone criminal trial involving allegations of sexual assault by a religious leader against a congregant, the case turned almost entirely on credibility and reliability.

The court found the complainant generally responsive and convincing, but concluded that significant implausibilities and exaggeration in her account of the wedding ceremony undermined the reliability of her evidence on a central event.

The accused's evidence was not perfect, but the Crown did not expose material inconsistencies sufficient to reject his denials.

Applying the beyond a reasonable doubt standard from Lifchus, the court held the complainant's evidence did not attain the necessary degree of certainty and acquitted on all counts.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and assault, challenging the trial judge's credibility assessments on multiple grounds: failure to consider the complainant's motive to fabricate, failure to address inconsistencies in testimony, failure to consider evidence of collusion and tainting between the complainant and her daughter, and erroneous assessment of the appellant's credibility.

The Court of Appeal found no errors in the trial judge's comprehensive credibility analysis and dismissed the appeal.

The respondents sought to enforce a Utah default judgment against the appellant.

During discovery, the appellant refused to answer several questions, and an Associate Judge ordered him to answer them.

The appellant appealed the Associate Judge's decision, arguing the questions breached solicitor-client privilege or related to a coerced Stipulation of Fact.

The Superior Court allowed the appeal in part, striking one question that sought the content of legal advice, but upholding the orders to answer questions about the steps taken to secure legal advice, whether lawyers were paid, and which portions of the Stipulation of Fact were true, as the appellant had put these matters in issue in his pleadings.

The plaintiff, a disbarred lawyer, brought an action against the Law Society of Ontario and several of its employees, alleging various torts and Charter breaches related to his disciplinary proceedings.

The LSO defendants brought a motion to strike the Statement of Claim.

The court granted the motion, finding that the LSO defendants were protected by statutory immunity under the Law Society Act and that the plaintiff failed to plead material facts to support his claims of bad faith, misfeasance in public office, Charter breaches, intrusion upon seclusion, and defamation.

The court also found the action to be an abuse of process as a collateral attack on the disciplinary tribunal's decisions.

The Statement of Claim was struck without leave to amend.

The applicant, a municipal councillor, sought judicial review of a city council decision and an integrity commissioner's report finding he engaged in sexual misconduct and obstructed an investigation.

The integrity commissioner recommended, and the city council imposed, a 90-day suspension of pay, a formal reprimand, and other remedial actions.

The Divisional Court upheld the integrity commissioner's findings and process, finding no breach of procedural fairness and that the investigation was properly commenced.

The court upheld most of the remedial actions imposed by the city council but quashed one measure that restricted the councillor to communicating with the public solely via his city email address, finding it overly broad and unreasonable.

The plaintiffs obtained a Mareva injunction against the defendant, Dr. Al Jabri, requiring him to disclose his worldwide assets and submit to cross-examination.

During the cross-examination, disputes arose regarding the scope of permissible questions, particularly concerning assets held prior to the Mareva order, assets gifted to his son, and assets transferred to others.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for directions.

The court held that the plaintiffs are entitled to examine the defendant on former assets, gifted assets, and transferred assets to test whether he retains any continuing interest in or control over them, as such assets would be captured by the Mareva order.

The court provided a framework for the permissible scope of cross-examination and ordered the defendant to re-attend.

This decision concerns the costs of a successful motion brought by the plaintiffs.

The court reviewed the parties' submissions, considering factors such as the nature and complexity of the motion, the amount claimed in the action, the defendant's conduct (including fulfilling undertakings and making concessions), and the proportionality of the requested costs.

While finding the plaintiffs wholly successful, the court determined that the quantum of costs requested was disproportionately large and applied a discount to the partial indemnity costs.

The respondent, a re-elected city councillor, filed a supplementary financial statement showing he exceeded the allowable campaign spending limit for expressions of appreciation.

Under s. 88.23(2) of the Municipal Elections Act, this triggered automatic forfeiture of his office.

The application judge granted relief from forfeiture, finding the error was inadvertent.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that there is no jurisdiction to grant relief from forfeiture under s. 98 of the Courts of Justice Act because s. 88.23(2) is a statutory penalty and the legislative scheme deliberately precludes such relief.

X.C., charged with sexual assault, sought directions on whether he needed to bring a s. 278.93 application under the Criminal Code to adduce WeChat text messages with the complainant, D.Z., at trial, and on the timing of any such application.

The court analyzed the Bill C-51 amendments to ss. 276, 278.1, and 278.92, distinguishing between messages with and without sexual content, and assessing the complainant's reasonable expectation of privacy.

The court ruled that some non-sexual messages and messages discussing past sexual activity directly related to the charge did not require pre-screening.

For other sexual messages, pre-screening was required, but the application could be brought mid-trial after the complainant's testimony, to protect the accused's right to make full answer and defence.