Paul H. Le Vay

The applicant, a former Senior Manager, Compliance, sought court advice and direction regarding claims for solicitor-client privilege asserted by the Toronto-Dominion Bank and its subsidiaries over documents and information in her possession.

The applicant had previously initiated a wrongful dismissal claim and sent whistleblower reports to regulators using internal Bank documents.

The Bank asserted privilege over certain materials and applied redactions.

The court found that the documents and information in the applicant's possession were subject to solicitor-client privilege and should be returned or redacted.

The court also denied the applicant's request for her litigation counsel to review the privileged materials, finding no "absolute necessity," and rejected arguments that the privilege belonged to trust beneficiaries or was negated by a future crimes/fraud exception.

The application was dismissed in its entirety, and costs were awarded to the Bank.

In a CCAA proceeding, the Monitor sought leave to appeal an order dismissing its motion for a declaration that funds swept into a UK bank account were subject to a statutory trust under the Construction Lien Act.

The CCAA judge had found the funds were irreconcilably commingled and could not be traced.

The Court of Appeal refused to admit fresh evidence and denied leave to appeal, finding the proposed appeal was not prima facie meritorious and the decision was fact-specific and consistent with established jurisprudence regarding tracing.

David W. Fickel sought leave to appeal from a motion judge's order that stayed the execution of a summary judgment for payment on a promissory note, pending the final resolution of the main action.

The motion judge had granted summary judgment to Fickel on the promissory note but stayed its execution due to the interconnectedness of the claims arising from the same share purchase agreement.

The court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's discretionary decision to grant a stay under Rule 20.08, and that the proposed appeal did not involve matters of general or public importance beyond the immediate parties.

The representative plaintiff in a class action sought costs following a successful second motion under s. 5(1)(a) of the Class Proceedings Act and a subsequent consent certification.

The court awarded the plaintiff partial indemnity costs of $31,089 for the contested motion.

For the balance of the certification motion, the court ordered a hybrid costs award because the defendants did not communicate their consent in a timely fashion, fixing costs at $65,235, with one-third payable forthwith and two-thirds payable in the cause.

The moving party sought leave to appeal an interlocutory order holding that a class action statement of claim disclosed a viable cause of action for knowing assistance in breach of trust.

The motion judge had struck a claim for breach of fiduciary duty but allowed the knowing assistance claim to proceed under the test applicable to Rule 21 and s. 5(1)(a) of the Class Proceedings Act.

Applying Rule 62.02(4)(b), the court considered whether there was reason to doubt the correctness of the order and whether the proposed appeal raised matters of general importance beyond the interests of the parties.

The court held that the proposed appeal concerned only the application of well‑established pleading principles and did not raise issues of broader legal significance.

Leave to appeal was therefore denied.