Paul H. Le Vay

The defendants, a law firm and one of its partners, brought a motion to strike the plaintiffs' statement of claim for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants breached an ad hoc fiduciary duty and aided and abetted a breach of an undertaking and a breach of the Business Corporations Act while representing a corporation in an employment matter.

The court granted the motion to strike without leave to amend, finding no facts to support a fiduciary relationship and holding that the claims for aiding and abetting were contrary to public policy as they would interfere with the lawyer-client relationship.

The applicant, a former Senior Manager, Compliance, sought court advice and direction regarding claims for solicitor-client privilege asserted by the Toronto-Dominion Bank and its subsidiaries over documents and information in her possession.

The applicant had previously initiated a wrongful dismissal claim and sent whistleblower reports to regulators using internal Bank documents.

The Bank asserted privilege over certain materials and applied redactions.

The court found that the documents and information in the applicant's possession were subject to solicitor-client privilege and should be returned or redacted.

The court also denied the applicant's request for her litigation counsel to review the privileged materials, finding no "absolute necessity" and rejected arguments that the privilege belonged to trust beneficiaries or was negated by a future crimes/fraud exception.

The application was dismissed in its entirety, and costs were awarded to the Bank.

The plaintiff, a disbarred lawyer, brought an action against the Law Society of Ontario and several of its employees, alleging various torts and Charter breaches related to his disciplinary proceedings.

The LSO defendants brought a motion to strike the Statement of Claim.

The court granted the motion, finding that the LSO defendants were protected by statutory immunity under the Law Society Act and that the plaintiff failed to plead material facts to support his claims of bad faith, misfeasance in public office, Charter breaches, intrusion upon seclusion, and defamation.

The court also found the action to be an abuse of process as a collateral attack on the disciplinary tribunal's decisions.

The Statement of Claim was struck without leave to amend.

In a CCAA proceeding, the Monitor sought leave to appeal an order dismissing its motion for a declaration that funds swept into a UK bank account were subject to a statutory trust under the Construction Lien Act.

The CCAA judge had found the funds were irreconcilably commingled and could not be traced.

The Court of Appeal refused to admit fresh evidence and denied leave to appeal, finding the proposed appeal was not prima facie meritorious and the decision was fact-specific and consistent with established jurisprudence regarding tracing.

The plaintiffs obtained a Mareva injunction against the defendant, Dr. Al Jabri, requiring him to disclose his worldwide assets and submit to cross-examination.

During the cross-examination, disputes arose regarding the scope of permissible questions, particularly concerning assets held prior to the Mareva order, assets gifted to his son, and assets transferred to others.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for directions.

The court held that the plaintiffs are entitled to examine the defendant on former assets, gifted assets, and transferred assets to test whether he retains any continuing interest in or control over them, as such assets would be captured by the Mareva order.

The court provided a framework for the permissible scope of cross-examination and ordered the defendant to re-attend.

The Ontario Securities Commission approved a settlement agreement between Staff and The Toronto-Dominion Bank regarding allegations of supervisory inadequacies in TD's foreign exchange trading business from 2011 to 2013.

Staff alleged that TD failed to promote a culture of compliance, allowing traders to inappropriately share confidential customer information with competitors.

TD acknowledged the conduct and agreed to a voluntary payment of $9,300,900 and $800,000 in costs.

The Commission found the settlement to be in the public interest, noting TD's significant remediation efforts and exemplary cooperation.

David W. Fickel sought leave to appeal from a motion judge's order that stayed the execution of a summary judgment for payment on a promissory note, pending the final resolution of the main action.

The motion judge had granted summary judgment to Fickel on the promissory note but stayed its execution due to the interconnectedness of the claims arising from the same share purchase agreement.

The court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's discretionary decision to grant a stay under Rule 20.08, and that the proposed appeal did not involve matters of general or public importance beyond the immediate parties.

The representative plaintiff in a class action sought costs following a successful second motion under s. 5(1)(a) of the Class Proceedings Act and a subsequent consent certification.

The court awarded the plaintiff partial indemnity costs of $31,089 for the contested motion.

For the balance of the certification motion, the court ordered a hybrid costs award because the defendants did not communicate their consent in a timely fashion, fixing costs at $65,235, with one-third payable forthwith and two-thirds payable in the cause.

The moving party sought leave to appeal an interlocutory order holding that a class action statement of claim disclosed a viable cause of action for knowing assistance in breach of trust.

The motion judge had struck a claim for breach of fiduciary duty but allowed the knowing assistance claim to proceed under the test applicable to Rule 21 and s. 5(1)(a) of the Class Proceedings Act.

Applying Rule 62.02(4)(b), the court considered whether there was reason to doubt the correctness of the order and whether the proposed appeal raised matters of general importance beyond the interests of the parties.

The court held that the proposed appeal concerned only the application of well‑established pleading principles and did not raise issues of broader legal significance.

Leave to appeal was therefore denied.

In a bifurcated class action certification motion, the court considered whether unit-holders of a publicly traded real estate investment trust had pleaded viable causes of action arising from an allegedly conflicted property transaction that was later rescinded, causing a sharp drop in unit value.

The court held it was plain and obvious that officers and trustees did not owe fiduciary duties directly to unit-holders in the circumstances pleaded, and struck the fiduciary duty claims.

However, the breach of trust claims against certain trustees, grounded in the declaration of trust and the arguable ability of unit-holders to sue for dishonest or negligent breach of trustee obligations, were allowed to proceed.

The knowing assistance claim survived only against the former CEO, while similar claims against the vendor parties and their solicitors were struck for failure to plead active assistance in the trustee's breach.

Certification was dismissed as against the vendor parties and their solicitors.

The plaintiff, a unit-holder in a real estate investment trust (REIT), brought a proposed class action alleging that the REIT's former CEO and trustees breached their fiduciary duties and duties of trust by entering into an undisclosed related-party transaction.

On a bifurcated certification motion to determine if the pleadings disclosed a reasonable cause of action under s. 5(1)(a) of the Class Proceedings Act, the court struck the breach of fiduciary duty claims, finding that the defendants owed duties to the REIT but not to the unit-holders.

However, the court allowed the breach of trust claims against the trustees and the knowing assistance claim against the former CEO to proceed, while striking the knowing assistance claims against the vendor and the vendor's solicitors.

The appellant law firm performed collection work for the respondent bank under a written agreement.

Following the termination of the agreement, the parties disputed the interpretation of a provision regarding invoicing for services performed up to the termination date.

The motion judge agreed with the respondent's interpretation and granted summary judgment dismissing the action.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error or extricable question of law in the motion judge's interpretation of the contract.

The court also held that the general duty of honesty in contractual performance recognized in Bhasin v. Hrynew did not affect the interpretation.

Following the dismissal of an action on cross-motions for summary judgment concerning contractual interpretation, the successful defendant sought costs exceeding $134,000 on a partial indemnity basis.

The court assessed the costs under Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, considering proportionality, time spent, and the result achieved.

The judge reduced senior counsel’s claimed hourly rate and disallowed recovery for an expert where no expert report had been served under Tariff A. Applying the principles from appellate authorities governing fair and reasonable costs awards, the court fixed partial indemnity costs inclusive of HST.

The unsuccessful plaintiff was ordered to pay the adjusted costs within 30 days.

A law firm sought partial summary judgment seeking a declaration that it was entitled to invoice a bank for commissions relating to debtor payments received after the termination of a debt collection services agreement.

The bank brought a cross‑motion for summary judgment asserting that all amounts owed had already been paid under the agreement’s contingency‑based compensation structure.

The dispute turned on the interpretation of a termination clause allowing the firm to invoice for services performed up to the date of termination.

Applying established principles of contractual interpretation and considering the commercial context and factual matrix, the court held that compensation was limited to commissions on payments actually received before the termination date.

The plaintiff’s interpretation would have radically altered the agreed compensation methodology and was inconsistent with the contractual language and commercial sense.

The appellants, former officers of Coventree Inc., appealed a decision of the Ontario Securities Commission finding that they authorized, permitted, or acquiesced in Coventree's failure to disclose material changes in its business, contrary to section 75 of the Securities Act.

The Commission had found that changes to credit rating criteria and a subsequent disruption in the asset-backed commercial paper market constituted material changes requiring immediate disclosure.

The Divisional Court applied a reasonableness standard of review, concluding that the Commission applied the correct legal tests, based its findings on sufficient evidence, and reasonably exercised its public interest jurisdiction in sanctioning the appellants.

The appeals were dismissed.

The appellants appealed a decision certifying a class action regarding the Bre-X gold mine fraud.

The motion judge had restricted the common issues to conspiracy and fraud, declining to certify negligent misrepresentation as a common issue, and limited the class to shareholders who held shares on the date the possible fraud was publicly disclosed.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, agreeing that negligent misrepresentation claims require individual inquiries into reliance and causation, making a class action not the preferable procedure for those claims.

The court also upheld the temporal restriction on the class, as shareholders who sold before the disclosure date could not have suffered losses caused by the misrepresentations.