Samuel M. Robinson

The Penfound Parties moved to lift a permanent stay of their claims and counterclaims, which had been imposed after they improperly accessed the Sprott Parties' privileged documents.

They sought the appointment of a litigation receiver and manager, arguing this constituted a material change in circumstances that would detoxify the litigation.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the proposed remedy was not a new circumstance but an argument that could have been raised during the original stay motion.

The court held that issue estoppel precluded relitigating the appropriate remedy, and regardless, a receiver could not effectively cure the prejudice caused by the moving parties' knowledge of privileged information.

The plaintiff sought a contempt order against the defendant May Anis and her company BNP Advisors Inc. for giving false evidence and breaching court orders.

The court found May Anis in contempt on two of four issues: failing to disclose her ownership interest in a Nova Scotia property and providing falsified tax returns.

The court deferred the decision on the appropriate penalty, including striking the statement of defence and imprisonment, to a subsequent hearing.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued a costs endorsement following an appeal.

The appellant, Assignment Credit Corp., was ordered to pay costs to several respondents (MCAP Financial Corporation, Dorr Capital Corporation, and Cherniak Law Professional Corporation).

The court rejected the appellant's argument that prior costs agreements should stand, as they were made before the appellant's non-disclosure of a material fact (that the Mesbur Judgment was obtained on consent) was revealed.

This non-disclosure, which impacted the second issue of the appeal, justified an elevated costs award on a solicitor-client basis for the affected respondents.

The 167 respondents were denied costs due to their own failure to disclose the consent judgment and their underlying financial obligations.

This appeal concerned the priority of various creditors in a garnishment hearing involving payments owed by the City of St. Catharines and Region of Niagara to 1671379 Ontario Inc. under a Brownfield Tax Increment Based Incentive Grant Program Agreement (BTIG).

The primary dispute was between MCAP Financial Corporation, holding a perfected General Security Agreement (GSA), and Assignment Credit Corp. (ACC), asserting priority based on an assigned consent judgment (Mesbur Judgment).

The Court of Appeal affirmed the motion judge's finding that MCAP's perfected GSA had priority for its shortfall judgment over ACC's claim, finding no inconsistency in MCAP's position.

However, the court remitted the issue of priorities among ACC and other unsecured judgment creditors to the motion judge, as it was revealed post-hearing that the Mesbur Judgment was a consent judgment, a fact not disclosed to the motion judge or other creditors, raising new legal arguments regarding the Personal Property Security Act and the Assignments and Preferences Act.

The applicant sought to set aside an arbitral award and a costs award, and for leave to appeal, under sections 45 and 46(1)6 of the Arbitration Act, 1991.

The application alleged procedural unfairness, exceeding jurisdiction by the arbitrator, and insufficient/non-independent reasons.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the arbitration process was fair, the parties had ample opportunity to present their cases, the arbitrator did not exceed jurisdiction by not conducting a mediation (as the parties had moved to adjudication), and the reasons for the award were adequate and independent.

This is an appeal from a Superior Court order staying proceedings due to the appellants' unauthorized possession and review of the respondents' privileged documents.

The parties were involved in a failed joint venture to establish a Schedule 1 bank.

The appellants, particularly Scott Penfound, obtained and accessed voluminous privileged emails and legal strategy documents belonging to the respondents from a shared file server.

The motion judge found a rebuttable presumption of prejudice, which the appellants failed to rebut by not providing evidence of the scope of their review.

The Court of Appeal upheld the stay, finding no error in the motion judge's conclusion that significant, ongoing prejudice existed that could not be cured by a lesser remedy, especially given the client's direct access to the information and lack of transparency.

The moving parties (Sprott Parties) sought to stay the responding parties' (Penfound Parties) claims as an abuse of process after discovering the responding parties had unauthorized access to and reviewed privileged emails and documents belonging to the moving parties.

The court found that the responding parties obtained access to confidential and privileged information and failed to rebut the presumption of prejudice.

Concluding that allowing the action to proceed would be manifestly unfair and bring the administration of justice into disrepute, the court permanently stayed the responding parties' claims.

The plaintiff sought leave under s. 138.8(1) of the Securities Act (OSA) to bring a claim for secondary market misrepresentation against the defendant.

The claim alleged that the defendant's November 29, 2018 Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) misrepresented material facts regarding a 220,000 square foot construction project.

The defendant issued a corrective disclosure on January 8, 2019, stating the project would be completed in 2019, but this was buried in a positive press release.

Subsequent press releases on February 6 and 7, 2019, revealed the collapse of the project's financing and partnership, leading to a significant market impact.

The court granted leave, finding a reasonable chance the action would succeed, emphasizing that materiality must be assessed contextually, considering the full business circumstances, not just immediate market reaction to a decontextualized disclosure.

This continued case conference endorsement addresses the plaintiff's request to adjourn a multi-day leave motion in a proposed class action until an in-person hearing is possible, due to concerns about conducting a complex hearing virtually during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The defendant was prepared to proceed virtually.

The court, acknowledging the evolving confidence in virtual hearings and the need for courts to operate, ordered the motion to proceed by videoconference on the previously scheduled dates of June 23 and 24, 2020, finding that remote procedures are not inherently unfair and practical issues can be addressed through cooperation.

In a proposed class action, the defendant sought to proceed with a two-day leave motion virtually via videoconference due to COVID-19 court suspensions.

The plaintiff opposed, citing logistical difficulties for a complex motion with a voluminous evidentiary record, including the inability for counsel teams to be together.

The court, while acknowledging the desire to avoid delay, declined to compel the plaintiff to proceed virtually, prioritizing due process concerns and the plaintiff's ability to present their case effectively.

The leave motion was rescheduled for an in-court hearing.

The representative plaintiff in a class action sought costs following a successful second motion under s. 5(1)(a) of the Class Proceedings Act and a subsequent consent certification.

The court awarded the plaintiff partial indemnity costs of $31,089 for the contested motion.

For the balance of the certification motion, the court ordered a hybrid costs award because the defendants did not communicate their consent in a timely fashion, fixing costs at $65,235, with one-third payable forthwith and two-thirds payable in the cause.

The plaintiff, a unit-holder in a real estate investment trust (REIT), brought a proposed class action alleging that the REIT's former CEO and trustees breached their fiduciary duties and duties of trust by entering into an undisclosed related-party transaction.

On a bifurcated certification motion to determine if the pleadings disclosed a reasonable cause of action under s. 5(1)(a) of the Class Proceedings Act, the court struck the breach of fiduciary duty claims, finding that the defendants owed duties to the REIT but not to the unit-holders.

However, the court allowed the breach of trust claims against the trustees and the knowing assistance claim against the former CEO to proceed, while striking the knowing assistance claims against the vendor and the vendor's solicitors.

The defendants moved to stay the plaintiffs' action for wrongful dismissal and oppression under the CBCA, arguing the dispute was subject to a broad arbitration clause in a unanimous shareholders agreement.

The plaintiffs argued the arbitration clause did not cover employment matters and that forcing arbitration would be oppressive.

The court applied the Mantini test, found the arbitration clause was broad enough to cover the dispute, and held that proceeding to arbitration would not be oppressive as all remedies sought could be pursued there.

The motion to stay the action was granted.

The defendant brought a motion to stay the Ontario action on the basis that the court lacked jurisdiction and that Quebec was the more appropriate forum.

The court applied the presumptive connecting factors from Club Resorts Ltd. v. Van Breda and concluded that the defendant carried on business in Ontario through its involvement in developing and commercializing a titanium dioxide extraction process and its ownership interest in the patent-holding company.

The court therefore found a real and substantial connection sufficient to ground jurisdiction.

On the forum non conveniens analysis, although certain factors slightly favoured Quebec, most were neutral and the defendant failed to demonstrate that Quebec was clearly the more appropriate forum.

The plaintiff’s chosen forum was not displaced and the stay was refused.

The applicant, the former president and CEO of the respondent company, sought a declaration that the company's management information circular was not properly authorized and contained material misrepresentations regarding his departure.

He argued the circular falsely stated he 'stepped down' instead of being terminated without cause, and omitted his potential $1 million severance claim.

The court found the circular was validly authorized through retroactive ratification.

While the court agreed the disclosure was not entirely forthright, it dismissed the application because the applicant failed to prove the alleged misrepresentations were material to a reasonable shareholder voting on the election of directors.