Samuel M. Robinson

The plaintiff sought a declaration that two life insurance policies had a cash surrender value exceeding $18 million and claimed damages for breach of contract and bad faith refusal to pay.

The insurer denied liability and counterclaimed, alleging the plaintiff participated in a fraudulent scheme with a senior company actuary to inflate policy values and withdraw funds far exceeding deposits.

After reviewing extensive accounting evidence and testimony, the court found the plaintiff’s evidence unreliable and accepted that the actuary had falsified documents and inflated values in exchange for bribes from the plaintiff.

The court concluded the plaintiff knowingly assisted a breach of fiduciary duty and committed civil fraud.

The policies were declared overdrawn and terminated, and the insurer was awarded damages equal to the misappropriated funds plus punitive damages.

The defendant brought a motion to stay the Ontario action on the basis that the court lacked jurisdiction and that Quebec was the more appropriate forum.

The court applied the presumptive connecting factors from Club Resorts Ltd. v. Van Breda and concluded that the defendant carried on business in Ontario through its involvement in developing and commercializing a titanium dioxide extraction process and its ownership interest in the patent-holding company.

The court therefore found a real and substantial connection sufficient to ground jurisdiction.

On the forum non conveniens analysis, although certain factors slightly favoured Quebec, most were neutral and the defendant failed to demonstrate that Quebec was clearly the more appropriate forum.

The plaintiff’s chosen forum was not displaced and the stay was refused.

The defendant insurer brought a motion to strike a jury notice in a complex insurance dispute involving allegations of fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and disputed policy values.

The plaintiff sought declarations regarding the validity and terms of two life insurance policies and their cash surrender values, while also claiming substantial damages.

The court held that the core issues concerned the legal status and interpretation of the insurance agreements, constituting declaratory relief within the meaning of s. 108 of the Courts of Justice Act, which mandates that such claims be tried without a jury.

The court further found that the extensive factual issues, competing expert actuarial and forensic accounting evidence, and complex legal doctrines rendered the case unsuitable for jury determination.

The jury notice was therefore struck.

The applicant, the former president and CEO of the respondent company, sought a declaration that the company's management information circular was not properly authorized and contained material misrepresentations regarding his departure.

He argued the circular falsely stated he 'stepped down' instead of being terminated without cause, and omitted his potential $1 million severance claim.

The court found the circular was validly authorized through retroactive ratification.

While the court agreed the disclosure was not entirely forthright, it dismissed the application because the applicant failed to prove the alleged misrepresentations were material to a reasonable shareholder voting on the election of directors.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their claim for indemnification under a commercial agreement due to failure to provide timely notice.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's interpretation that the 18-month notice requirement was a condition precedent to the right of indemnity.

The Court also rejected the argument that the notice provision was void under section 22 of the Limitations Act, 2002, holding that a contractual notice requirement does not vary or exclude a statutory limitation period, but rather acts as a condition precedent for a cause of action to accrue.

The appellants appealed a trial judge's finding that they owed the respondent commission under an oral contract for the sale of stone.

The appellants argued the trial judge ignored evidence that not all the stone had been sold, which was the triggering term for the commission.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error.

The trial judge's conclusion was supported by the respondent's evidence, which she found credible, and an admission by the appellants that commission was owed.

The Crown brought a motion under Rule 21.01(1)(a) to answer questions of law and dismiss the appellant's counterclaim regarding an option agreement.

The motion judge answered the questions and dismissed the counterclaim.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge erred by concluding no material facts were in issue.

The appellant had pleaded fundamental breach and bad faith, which were disputed by the Crown.

The Court held that it was not open to the motion judge to adjudicate disputed facts or questions of mixed law and fact without a proper evidentiary foundation.

The tenant appealed a judgment interpreting a commercial lease.

A purchaser agreed to buy all of the tenant's shares, constituting a change in control and a 'transfer' requiring the landlord's consent.

The landlord consented while reserving its rights, and argued that under clause 11.03(b) it was entitled to an amended lease with increased rent.

The tenant argued the landlord's only option was to terminate the lease.

The Court of Appeal upheld the applications judge's finding that the change in control triggered clause 11, obliging the tenant to sign a new lease with increased rental payments, as the tenant's interpretation would render much of the clause ineffective.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing his action against the respondents.

The appellant alleged that the respondents breached a duty of care by failing to properly trace a harassing phone call, which led to his implication.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding it unnecessary to decide the duty of care issue because there was no evidence that further investigation by the respondents would have produced exculpatory evidence for the appellant.