David S. Reiter

A former municipal councillor sought judicial review of an integrity commissioner’s report and council decision imposing a 90-day suspension of remuneration for breaching a municipal COVID-19 vaccination policy and refusing to disclose vaccination status.

The applicant argued, for the first time on judicial review, that the decision infringed freedom of expression by punishing her right not to speak.

The Divisional Court held that the commissioner had sufficiently considered the relevant Charter values through the privacy, autonomy, and silence arguments actually advanced, and had reasonably balanced those values against the statutory objectives of enforcing the code of conduct and maintaining a workable vaccination policy.

The court also held that it was reasonable to interpret the policy as requiring councillors to disclose vaccination status and that the maximum penalty was reasonable.

The application was dismissed with partial indemnity costs of $7,500.

This endorsement addresses three motions in a long-standing negligence action stemming from a 2010 explosion.

The Plaintiffs brought motions to strike the Defendants' pleadings for alleged non-disclosure of settlement agreements and for the recusal of the case management and trial judge due to a perceived apprehension of bias.

The Defendants brought a motion for directions concerning the scope of damage claims, specifically challenging a new "reinvestment claim" advanced by the Plaintiffs.

The court dismissed both of the Plaintiffs' motions, finding no change in the litigation landscape requiring disclosure of the agreements and no reasonable apprehension of bias.

The court granted the Defendants' motion for directions, ruling that the Plaintiffs' new reinvestment theory of damages was unpleaded, untimely, and would cause non-compensable prejudice to the Defendants.

The moving parties sought to review an order from a single judge of the Court of Appeal that dismissed their motion for a stay of two interlocutory orders from a Superior Court case management judge.

The interlocutory orders had vacated pre-trial and trial dates and allowed a motion for directions.

The Court of Appeal panel dismissed the review motion, finding no factual or legal errors by the motion judge, who correctly applied the RJR-MacDonald test for a stay.

The panel also noted that the stay motion was moot as the vacated dates were long past and the disputed motions had already been heard and were under reserve.

The moving parties sought a stay of interlocutory orders made by a case management/trial judge, which had set aside a pre-trial date and vacated a trial date to allow a motion for directions to proceed.

The moving parties had previously been denied leave to appeal these orders by the Divisional Court and were now seeking leave to appeal that denial to the Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the stay motion, finding that the moving parties failed to meet any prong of the RJR-MacDonald test, particularly noting that their motion for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal was unlikely to succeed as the Divisional Court had not mistakenly declined jurisdiction.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their motion to amend their statement of claim to advance personal claims for damages and increase the prayer for relief, stemming from an explosion in an apartment building they previously owned through a numbered company.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the motion judge's decision.

The court found the motion to amend was brought too late, would cause presumed non-compensable prejudice to the defendants by materially altering the factual framework and requiring new evidence, and that the proposed personal claims by shareholders lacked a proper legal foundation as they did not demonstrate a personal cause of action separate from the company's claims.

This appeal addressed a pre-contractual negligent misrepresentation and the interpretation of a commercial lease.

The trial judge found that the tenant (respondent) reasonably relied on the landlord's (appellant's) negligent misrepresentation regarding free, accessible, and convenient customer parking, and that the entire agreement provision in the lease did not preclude the tenant's claim for damages.

On appeal, the landlord argued the trial judge erred by failing to consider the lease as a whole, specifically articles related to parking, which it contended formed part of the "subject matter" of the lease.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's finding that customer parking was not the "subject matter" of the lease and that the entire agreement clause did not preclude the claim, applying a deferential standard of review for contractual interpretation.

The Integrity Commissioner applied for a determination that a municipal councillor contravened the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act by failing to declare a pecuniary interest and voting on a matter involving her own remuneration suspension.

The councillor admitted the contravention but argued for a lesser penalty, citing officially induced error and bias.

The court rejected these defences, finding the councillor's actions were not mere inadvertence given her experience and prior sanctions.

The court declared the councillor's seat vacant and issued a reprimand.

The Corporation of the Town of Lincoln applied for declarations and a permanent injunction against multiple respondents for violating a municipal bylaw concerning fill importation and site alteration.

The respondents had contravened permit conditions, breached a stop work order, and continued illegal dumping.

While the Shire respondents conceded liability for the declarations and injunction, they disputed the scale and quantum of costs.

The Cascio respondents did not appear.

The court granted the declarations and permanent injunction, finding clear bylaw breaches and no exceptional circumstances to refuse the injunction.

The Town was awarded partial indemnity costs of $54,898, with responsibility apportioned 25% to the Shire respondents and 75% to the Cascio respondents, primarily due to the Cascio respondents' profit motive and failure to cooperate in shortening the proceedings.

The plaintiff, Frank Miele, a failed mayoral candidate, brought a lawsuit alleging corruption and fraud against the entire municipal council and mayor of Vaughan, seeking $210 million in damages and disqualification from office.

Miele later admitted his allegations were baseless and apologized.

The defendants sought substantial indemnity costs, totaling over $1.2 million.

The court rejected Miele's arguments for reduced costs, finding his testimony inconsistent and his claims of lack of understanding incredible given his extensive municipal finance background.

The court ruled that bringing a meritless lawsuit is an abuse of process, not public interest litigation, and ordered Miele to pay substantial indemnity costs to the defendants, including $813,101.99 to the City of Vaughan.

This decision addresses procedural issues in a complex civil action involving claims for delayed delivery of residential lots and a right of first refusal.

The court considered whether a previously agreed-upon bifurcated trial could proceed given new limitations defences proposed by the defendant, and whether the action should remain under a "One Judge Model" case management pilot program.

The court ruled that a single trial was necessary to avoid the risk of inconsistent judgments due to overlapping evidence and credibility issues related to the limitations defences.

Furthermore, the action was removed from the pilot program because the parties consistently engaged in formal, contested interlocutory proceedings, contrary to the program's emphasis on informal dispute resolution.

The applicant municipal council sought an order under the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act to allow conflicted councillors to participate in litigation decisions.

A ratepayer had sued eight of the nine councillors personally for $210 million, leaving the council without a quorum to manage the litigation.

The court granted the order to ensure the municipality could function, but imposed a condition requiring the conflicted councillors to obtain judicial approval before agreeing to any settlement of the litigation, analogous to the process for parties under disability.

The applicant sought leave to appeal from a costs decision of the Superior Court awarding $121,892 to the respondent municipality.

The applicant also sought a stay of enforcement of the costs award pending disposition of the leave application.

The respondent sought dismissal of the motion or, alternatively, sought permission to conduct a judgment debtor examination and take steps to preserve the status quo, citing concerns about a potential fraudulent conveyance of the applicant's matrimonial home interest to his wife prior to the action.

The motions judge granted the stay of enforcement pending determination of the leave application.

The respondent was found in civil contempt for continuing to operate a parking lot in contravention of a zoning by-law and a court injunction.

The contempt was subsequently purged when the parking lot was shut down.

The court accepted a joint submission from the parties and ordered the respondent to pay a $25,000 fine, which removed any profit gained from the contemptuous operation of the lot.

This ruling addresses a costs application following the dismissal of an injunction application brought by the applicants against the respondent City.

The applicants had sought to prevent the destruction of municipal election records, alleging wrongdoing in the 2014 municipal election.

The injunction was initially granted on an interim basis, pending a pre-enquete hearing in the Ontario Court of Justice, which ultimately found no basis for charges.

The Superior Court then dismissed the injunction application.

The City sought substantial indemnity costs, while the applicants argued against liability for costs, claiming public interest litigant status.

The court found the applicants liable for costs due to their lack of success, the serious and unfounded nature of their allegations, and their vexatious conduct during litigation.

The court rejected the public interest litigant claim, particularly for one applicant who had sought a personal financial settlement to abandon the allegations.

Partial indemnity costs were awarded to the City, considering the in camera nature of the pre-enquete and the right of citizens to lay private informations.

The defendant, The Walt Disney Company, previously brought a motion to seal excerpted provisions of agreements it intended to rely on in a stay motion.

The plaintiff successfully opposed the motion and brought a cross-motion regarding redactions.

In this endorsement, the plaintiff sought substantial indemnity costs for the motion.

The court awarded the plaintiff partial indemnity costs, finding no improper conduct by the defendant to warrant a higher scale, but affirming the plaintiff's right to costs for successfully defending the open court principle and adding value to the hearing.

The appellants successfully appealed orders from the Superior Court of Justice that had reinstated a default judgment and permitted the sale of certain property.

The appeal was allowed because the respondent failed to make full and fair disclosure of material facts concerning the appellants' alleged default and participation in the action when attending before the court without notice to the appellants.

The appellants were self-represented throughout most of the proceedings and only retained counsel a few months before the appeal was argued.

The court awarded costs to the appellants on a partial indemnity basis, finding their claim for substantial or full indemnity costs to have no basis and their partial indemnity claim to be excessive and disproportionate.

The appellants appealed orders of the Superior Court of Justice dismissing their motion to set aside a reinstated default judgment and authorizing the sale of their property to satisfy the judgment.

The original action was commenced in 2001 and resulted in a default judgment of approximately $86,000.

The judgment was subsequently set aside, then reinstated by Brown J. in 2008 on an ex parte basis.

The appellants moved to set aside the reinstatement, but the motion judge dismissed their motion.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the respondent failed to make full and fair disclosure of material facts when appearing before Brown J. without notice to the appellants, which was a sufficient basis to set aside the judgment.

The appellant operated a commercial parking lot that was not in compliance with the applicable Zoning By-Law.

The appellant sought to establish that the property constituted a legal non-conforming use by demonstrating continuous operation of a commercial parking lot since the By-Law's passage in 1993.

The application judge found that the lot had been used as an accessory lot rather than a stand-alone commercial parking lot from 1993 through 1996, and therefore fell out of compliance when its use changed.

The application judge granted declaratory relief and an injunction restraining operation of the parking lot.

On appeal, the appellant failed to establish a palpable and overriding error.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The Applicants sought substantial indemnity costs after successfully obtaining a statutory injunction and declaratory relief against the Respondent for contravening a municipal zoning by-law.

The court denied substantial indemnity costs, finding the Respondent's conduct did not meet the "reprehensible" or "egregious" threshold required for such an award.

The court also rejected the argument that the public interest nature of by-law enforcement warranted higher costs.

Instead, the court awarded partial indemnity costs, fixing fees and disbursements based on the principles of reasonableness and proportionality, considering the complexity and importance of the matter.

The applicants sought a statutory injunction under section 380 of the City of Toronto Act to restrain the respondent from operating a commercial parking lot in contravention of a zoning by-law.

The respondent conceded the non-compliance but argued the parking lot was a legal non-conforming use.

The court found the applicants had standing as taxpayers and established a clear breach of the by-law.

The respondent failed to prove continuous use as a commercial parking lot since the by-law's passage, as the property was previously used as an accessory lot.

Finding no exceptional circumstances, the court granted the statutory injunction and related declaratory relief.