Mark Strychar-Bodnar

The defendants brought a motion to set aside an order striking their Statement of Defence and Counterclaim and a default judgment, arguing their failure to appear was due to their former lawyer's negligence and mental health issues.

The court applied Rule 37.14 and Rule 19.08 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, finding that the defendants' failure to appear was an "accident or mistake" attributable to their lawyer, and that the delay in bringing the motion was excusable given the circumstances.

The court emphasized that the "sins of the lawyer should not be visited upon the client" and that the defendants had a meritorious defence.

The motion was granted, setting aside both orders, conditional on payment of substantial indemnity costs to the plaintiff.

The plaintiff brought motions to discontinue the action against an individual defendant, to certify the action as a class proceeding, and for partial summary judgment.

The court approved the discontinuance as it did not prejudice the class and secured the corporate defendant's consent to certification.

The court certified the class action against the remaining defendants, finding that the pleadings disclosed causes of action under the Consumer Protection Act and Competition Act, and that a class proceeding was the preferable procedure.

However, the court dismissed the plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment, concluding that the nature of the relationship between the defendants and the interpretation of the statutory provisions raised genuine issues requiring a full trial.

Hydro One brought a motion for an interim and interlocutory injunction to prevent the defendants from interfering with the completion of the Niagara Reinforcement Project (NRP).

The defendants, asserting indigenous rights and jurisdiction, had blocked access to the construction site.

The court applied the RJR-MacDonald test, finding a strong prima facie case of trespass, irreparable harm due to potential financial losses and safety risks, and that the balance of convenience favoured granting the injunction.

The court also held that as a private entity, Hydro One owed no duty to consult.

The injunction was granted.

The appellant, a property developer, appealed the dismissal of its application to quash an Interim Control By-Law (ICBL) enacted by the Township of Muskoka Lakes.

The ICBL restricted permitted uses within a designated area to those lawfully existing on the date of enactment and required such uses to be conducted entirely within existing buildings.

The appellant had obtained 11 building permits for a 43-unit condominium development with recreational amenities, had commenced construction, and had undertaken extensive site servicing work, all with Township approval.

The application judge dismissed the appeal, finding the property was not exempt under the Planning Act.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the development should be viewed as an integrated whole and that the issuance of 11 building permits for constituent elements of the development provided protection under section 34(9)(b) of the Planning Act.

The court found no genuine planning justification for the ICBL and noted it appeared designed to appease local opposition rather than serve legitimate planning purposes.

The Law Society of Ontario applied under s. 49.13 of the Law Society Act for an order to disclose confidential financial records of Rasik Behari Mehta to the Ontario Securities Commission's Joint Serious Offences Team (JSOT) for an investigation into alleged frauds by David Singh.

The court considered whether the s. 49.13(2) restrictions on disclosure applied, finding that the financial records were not "oral or written statements" and were not subject to solicitor-client privilege.

Applying a three-part test from Deloitte & Touche LLP, the court balanced the public interest in disclosure against confidentiality concerns, concluding that the public interest in investigating and prosecuting serious fraud outweighed any remaining confidentiality issues.

The application was granted.

A lawyer and human rights advocate sued for defamation after a charitable organization published articles accusing him of supporting terrorists.

The plaintiff had met with the father of an alleged Palestinian terrorist, expressed sympathy for the father whose home was demolished, and posted about the matter on social media.

The defendant moved to dismiss the action as a SLAPP (Strategic Litigation Against Public Participation) under section 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The motion judge dismissed the action, finding the defendant had valid defences of fair comment, justification, and qualified privilege.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge erred in applying the wrong legal standard and that the plaintiff had met his burden under section 137.1(4)(a)(ii) by showing a reasonable trier could conclude none of the defences would succeed.

The court also found the balancing test under section 137.1(4)(b) favoured the plaintiff.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to extend the time for service of their statement of claim and to validate service, after serving the claim approximately six months past the deadline.

The defendants opposed the motion, arguing the delay was tactical and prejudiced their ability to defend the action.

The court applied the test from Rowland v. Wright Medical Technology Canada Ltd., finding that the plaintiffs met their onus to demonstrate no prejudice resulted from the brief delay, as relevant documents were preserved and witnesses remained available.

The motion was granted, service was validated, and the plaintiffs were awarded costs of $10,000.