CITATION: R v. A.W. M, 2026 ONSC 1251
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
B E T W E E N:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
Shazin Karim, for the Crown
-and-
A.W. M.
Zachary Al-Khatib, for the accused
HEARD: January 5-9, 2026
UNDER S. 486.4 OF THE CRIMINAL CODE, ANY INFORMATION WHICH WOULD IDENTIFY THE COMPLAINANT IS BANNED FROM PUBLICATION
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
D.E. HARRIS J.
1These reasons for judgment deliberate on the guilt or innocence of the accused A.W.M. on a five-count indictment charging him with sexual assaults between May 21 and May 25, 2022 allegedly committed against F.M., a congregant in his Islamic centre.
2This was a two-witness case. The complainant F.M. testified for the Crown that the accused sexually assaulted her on several occasions as outlined in the indictment. The accused A.W.M. testified in his own defence and denied the allegations. As is generally the case, both agree that there was no one else present at the time of the alleged sexual assaults. The verdict in this case therefore hinges more or less exclusively on the credibility\reliability of F.M. and A.W.M., the two witnesses. In approaching this issue, our law tilts the playing field decisively in favour of the accused. The Crown has the burden of proving guilt to a very high degree of certainty, beyond a reasonable doubt.
3In most sexual offence credibility cases of this kind, there are generally substantial points of agreement or commonality between the complainant and the accused. Inevitably, they part company when it comes to the core of the allegations themselves. In this instance, there was diametric opposition between the witnesses on many factual questions leading up to and through the sexual assaults There was a stark difference in the testimony both on the preliminaries and with respect to the heart of the allegations.
4Every trial where credibility is the main issue is generally a story told from several perspectives. This trial was no exception. There were two perspectives, those of the complainant and that of the accused. They were radically different. But a trial judge’s job in a criminal trial is not simply to relate the details of the different stories but to stay on task and determine whether the Crown has proved the accused’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. It is easy to get caught up in the seemingly infinite details of the story, potentially distracting from the main task. Some evidentiary details may not only fail to assist with determining reliability and credibility but actively divert the focus. In this instance, if the whole story of each of the witnesses were recounted in detail, the result would be a lengthy, discursive judgment failing to grapple with the main issue of whether the Crown has proven its case.
5For this reason, I propose to carefully examine only certain aspects of the evidence which are salient to my ultimate factual findings and conclusions.
OVERVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE
6F.M., 42 years old, was in difficult and quite dire circumstances in the year 2022 and reached out in about February to an Islamic centres for help. She had recently fled an abusive relationship with her husband. Her two pre-teen children, a son and a daughter, are both autistic, the son severely so. In addition, she has multiple sclerosis. A.W.M. is the imam of one of the places F.M. approached. He called her back. F.M. testified that she spoke about getting help for her son and his complex needs. Mr. M., 44 years old at the time of trial, called back and they eventually spoke.
7F.M. was adamant that she did not request financial help but that Mr. M. offered it. Mr. M. in his evidence testified that she did directly request financial help or zakat as is known in the community in their very first conversation. In the total evidentiary context of the trial, the difference may not have been that important. But it was indicative of the stark divide between the two witnesses on matters large and small. One of them was not telling the truth, either deliberately or because of memory deficiencies. The latter is a distinct possibility as, after all, the trial took place more than three years after the events which were the subject of the evidence.
8F.M. and Mr. M. did agree however that zakat was provided on several occasions. There was some dispute about how much, with F.M. saying it was a few hundred dollars and Mr. M. saying it was a few thousand dollars. F.M. said that Mr. M. said it was his own money; he testified that he never said this and that it was money from the community for the specific purpose of helping those in need.
9It was quite a while before the two actually met. Their friendship grew originally through texting and phone calls. After they finally met in her home, Mr. M. began courting Ms. M. According to her, she was not looking to get involved in a relationship. She was not yet divorced according to Islamic law. He offered to contact the religious board that could make official her divorce. He said that he would find her a wealthy, handsome man. And they both agreed that he told her that he had a dream in which she was his wife. He told her that he was ugly and poor and he would find her someone else.
10In her evidence, F.M. clearly resented Mr. M.’s advances, feeling they were inappropriate for a religious leader. He conveyed the impression that she owed him something for the help that he had provided. She certainly did not want to marry him. The distinct impression conveyed by his evidence, on the other hand, was that F.M. was willing to get married. The relationship progressed gradually and slowly, because she wanted it that way. He was patient and never pressed things. At all times, the relationship was amiable.
11Both agree that there was a marriage ceremony in F.M.’s house on May 19, 2022. Video evidence was adduced from Ms. M’s security camera of her front porch showing the witnesses going into the house. There were four men. Ms. M. testified that she did not know that the wedding was about to happen. She tried to delay it. She did not want to get married. Ms. M. had been at Sick Kids Hospital in Toronto with her son for over several days. She testified that Mr. M. said he would bring the witnesses to the hospital if necessary and conduct the ceremony there.
12Ms. M. prepared food for the wedding ceremony and put it on tables. Her account of the wedding was that she was upstairs with her son and was called down to the main floor. Mr. M. said, repeat after me, “I am giving myself to Mr. M.” She repeated it and that was the entirety of the ceremony. She immediately went back upstairs. The men stayed for a while. She could hear them downstairs, talking and eating. After they left, Mr. M. called her back downstairs. That is when the first alleged sexual assault took place, on May 19, 2022.
13Mr. M. told a completely different story of the lead up to the wedding. Ms. M. unequivocally agreed to the marriage although originally when it first came up, she was not yet ready. At all times he was respectful of her wishes. Later, she said it was a good idea but said that she wanted to talk to her father about it. She also said that she would have to wait for three menstrual cycles, until about May 10. Eventually she said that May 19 was a good time now that her son was home from the hospital. She said that she wanted to cook food to serve her guests and make sure that they were looked after. He asked if she was too tired after being with her son at the hospital for several days and she said that she was fine. The planning, contrary to Ms. M’s evidence that the wedding was foisted on her, had been in place for some considerable period of time.
14Mr. M., in his evidence disagreed with Ms. M.’s version of how the marriage ceremony was conducted. Ms. M. had put on a special heavily embroidered dress for the occasion. When Ms. M. was present, he explained to his brothers—the four friends who were there as witnesses—how the ceremony was going to proceed. Fahad, a scholar, one of the witnesses, was well acquainted with the process. He did the short sermon at the beginning and then Mr. M. did a very short recitation of verses from the Koran. Mr. M. then told Ms. M. what to say for the official part. She repeated his father’s name and said that she gave herself to him. There was an offer and an acceptance. Then, at the end, Ms. M. excused herself to put the kids to bed.
15Mr. M. and the witnesses ate the food including the desserts which had been made and then talked for about 20-30 minutes. The food was very tasty. The witnesses then left.
16Ms. M. testified that when the witnesses left, Mr. M. forcibly kissed her, pushing her up against a wall. She resisted. He bit her lower lip. He tried to bring her on top of him on the couch. She was able to get away and run upstairs. She later came down and he forcibly kissed her again. These events were charged in count 3. Later, Mr. M. called. He said that he knew he had been quite aggressive and did not take into account her trauma at the hands of her husband. He hoped Allah would forgive him. He also said he liked her food. Mr. M. testified that there was no lack of consent in the kissing and disagreed with much of Ms. M’s evidence with respect to these allegations. Both agree that he left afterwards.
17The two saw each other next on May 21. Mr. M. went upstairs to her bedroom. In the midst of her attendance to her son’s needs, he pulled her on to the bed. He was wearing pants but nothing on his upper body. She resisted and he said that this was insane, she was his wife. He got her partially on the bed and tried to remove her undergarments. She was asking him to stop. He said that he was not going to eat her, that she must compromise, she was being stubborn and this was no way to pay him back. He kissed her chest, face and breasts. She pushed him away. And then he left. He called after to apologize and asked for forgiveness, saying he had messed up. Mr. M. in his evidence denied that this incident occurred without Ms. M’s consent. This was count 4. Mr. M. denied all these allegations.
18On May 22, Ms. M. testified that she reluctantly let him in to her home. Again, the sexual assault happened in her bedroom. He removed her underwear and had sexual intercourse with her without her consent and ejaculated. She tried covering up her body. He left her home and later called and texted. She did not answer the calls. The texts said that he was harmless. I should add that no texts were adduced from either side at trial but I draw nothing one way or the other from that. Again, Mr. M.’s version was that the sexual intercourse took place but that it was with full consent. This was count 5.
19On May 24, Ms. M. texted Mr. M. in the morning. He said according to her, as he had before, that she was his wife, she had no choice. She said that she did not want him in her home and that despite promising that he would not touch her, he had. She said that she did not feel comfortable. He replied that this was “insane”, he would stay on the couch and not touch her.
20Her version was that he texted around midnight, saying he was in her driveway. He had promised that he would not come anymore. She texted back that he was abusing her and he replied that she was abusing him. He said that she was his wife, she had no rights or say in the matter. She became panicked and thought she and her kids might be killed. He asked for the zakat back and the gifts he had sent her and his clothes that he had stored there at her house.
21He rang the bell and she opened the door a crack. He pushed to get in and she pushed to prevent it. This conduct was charged in count 1 as break and enter and commit sexual assault. Even on the complainant’s evidence, proof of this allegation is questionable. Mr. M. in any case, denied that he had forced his way in. Once inside, it was Ms. M.’s allegation that he pushed her up against the wall and kissed her and grabbed her breast against her will. This was the final count, count 2. She fell to the floor. He tried to put a chocolate in her mouth but she refused to open her mouth. He left. She went to complain to the police the next day. Again, he denied all these allegations.
CONCLUSIONS
22F.M. was quite convincing in her evidence. She answered questions in chief and cross-examination directly and without inappropriate digressions. F.M. was responsive. She was quite composed although had some difficulties continuing at times, not surprising in light of the highly emotional nature of a sexual assault case and this case in particular.
23However, her account of the wedding ceremony lacked plausibility. She portrayed the wedding and the marriage being was forced on her of a sudden. It was her evidence that she did not know the wedding ceremony was going to happen on the night that it did. The wedding was sprung on her. She was forced to go through it.She testified in effect that the ceremony itself was a sham. She was exceedingly reluctant and her words and actions that she testified clearly conveyed this. So too was the sexual activity forced.
24Despite this, she agreed that she made preparations and cooked food for the witnesses. She acknowledged that talk of the wedding took place over the course of at least several days. In my view, it made little sense that she would have undertaken the preparations and the preparation of the food in particular but at the same time did not know the wedding was going to happen. Also, she did not voice clear objections according to her evidence. Although that might not be expected in the circumstances, in my view on the whole of her evidence, she was at the very least substantially exaggerating both her reluctance and the perfunctory nature of the ceremony.
25The wedding was a central event of this trial. Her reluctance was pronounced, a reluctance and a lack of consent which was then repeated throughout each incident charged in the indictment. Her inconsistent and implausible evidence about the wedding weighs against her credibility and reliability.
26She had a potential motive to exaggerate based on a moral or ethical judgment, which may have been at least partially justified, that a religious leader ought not to get involved romantically with a congregant. Furthermore, the admitted abuse and trauma committed by her husband on her made her particularly vulnerable and could have led her to misgivings about her relationship with Mr. M; a second guessing, in retrospect. Also, similarly, she may simply have changed her mind about the relationship for any number of reasons.
27Turning to Mr. M.’s evidence, the Crown’s cross-examination did not turn up any significant inconsistencies which could lead to a rejection of his denials. Nor in closing submissions, was anything of real weight referenced. There was a discrepancy in Mr. M.’s evidence about the basement in Ms. M.’s home which he was shown early in the relationship and specifically whether there was a separate apartment down there or whether it was accessible to her. By any realistic measure, this was a trivial matter and was immaterial. Deliberate falsehoods on minor matters can still lead to negative credibility findings. But here any discrepancy could not be afforded any real weight. It could have no possible impact on credibility or reliability.
28To sum up, Ms. M’s evidence was not without significant flaws. The accused’s evidence was not perfect either—I have some lingering suspicions with respect to it--but ultimately it was not successfully impugned. That F.M. was a very vulnerable woman and Mr. M. was a religious leader and a person in authority, cannot, needless to say, prove the case.
29The Crown’s burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is a heavy one. After applying the various steps in the definition of beyond a reasonable doubt, a trial judge must be “sure” that the Crown has proved the case. In this context and with this final scale, the complainant’s evidence must be accepted beyond a reasonable doubt and the accused’s evidence must be rejected; that is, not only disbelieved but found not to leave the judge in a reasonable doubt.
30In the leading case defining the phrase, “ beyond a reasonable doubt”, R. v. Lifchus, 1997 CanLII 319 (SCC), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 320, Cory J. said,
34 It is only after proper instructions have been given as to the meaning of the expression “beyond a reasonable doubt” that a jury may be advised that they can convict if they are “certain” or “sure” that the accused is guilty. [Emphasis in original]
31The draft charge suggested by Cory J. later in the judgment uses the word “sure” not “certain.” The word “certain” in a jury charge could confuse the jury and lead them to believe that mathematical or absolute certainty is required. That is wrong in law and contradicted by the standard instruction in jury charges that absolute certainty is not required. Nor would it be correct or wise to use “certain” in a judge’s reasons for judgment either. Nonetheless, the inclusion of the word “certain” in the reasons of the Supreme Cout does emphasize the importance of upholding the very high degree of certainty required before a finding of guilt can be made in a criminal case.
32In the case of Mr. M., the necessary degree of certainty has not been achieved by the Crown. The complainant’s evidence on its own does not rise to this level. The accused’s evidence cannot be rejected. As the legal consequence of these two conclusions, the accused Mr. M. must be found not guilty of all counts on the indictment, counts 1 through 5. I will endorse the indictment accordingly.
D.E. HARRIS J.
Released: March 3, 2026
CITATION: R v. A.W. M., 2026 ONSC 1251
COURT FILE NO.: CR 24-457
DATE: 2026 03 02
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
B E T W E E N:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
- and -
A.W. M.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
D.E. HARRIS J.
Released: March 2, 2026