James S. Schacter

The plaintiff brought a motion for contempt against the defendant for breaching a Mareva order.

The defendant had drawn approximately $950,000 from lines of credit secured against her properties, contrary to the order.

The defendant admitted to the breach and claimed she had been defrauded in a cryptocurrency investment scheme.

The court found the defendant in contempt but imposed a fine of $7,500 rather than imprisonment, considering the defendant's personal circumstances, remorse, and the fact that the contemptuous conduct was complete.

Costs were fixed at $50,000.

The defendants brought a motion to vacate a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) registered against a luxury property by the plaintiff, a construction project manager.

The plaintiff claimed damages for breach of contract and unjust enrichment, seeking a constructive trust after allegedly financing the construction out-of-pocket.

The defendants argued the CPL should be vacated because the property had been sold, it was not unique, and damages were an adequate remedy.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the plaintiff had a reasonable claim for a constructive trust and that a monetary remedy would be illusory since the defendants had relocated to Hong Kong and appeared to have no other assets in Canada.

The respondents sought to enforce a Utah default judgment against the appellant.

During discovery, the appellant refused to answer several questions, and an Associate Judge ordered him to answer them.

The appellant appealed the Associate Judge's decision, arguing the questions breached solicitor-client privilege or related to a coerced Stipulation of Fact.

The Superior Court allowed the appeal in part, striking one question that sought the content of legal advice, but upholding the orders to answer questions about the steps taken to secure legal advice, whether lawyers were paid, and which portions of the Stipulation of Fact were true, as the appellant had put these matters in issue in his pleadings.

The plaintiff alleged breach of contract, misrepresentation, bad faith, willful misconduct, personal injury, and negligence in breach of fiduciary duty against her insurance company, CAA, stemming from the handling of multiple car damage claims between 1993 and 2004, and subsequent alleged harassment.

The court found no evidence to support the plaintiff's claims of improper conduct by CAA or its employee, Joe Jansen, in the administration of the insurance claims or in post-claim interactions.

Expert evidence regarding the car damage and the plaintiff's medical condition did not establish a link between CAA's conduct and any alleged harm or losses.

The action was dismissed.

The court determined pre-judgment interest and costs following a jury verdict in a personal injury action.

Pre-judgment interest on general damages was reduced from 14 to 10 years due to plaintiff-occasioned delays.

The applicable rate for past loss of income was confirmed at 2.8%.

Plaintiffs were awarded partial indemnity costs to December 8, 2015, and substantial indemnity costs thereafter, totaling $727,290.00.

The defendant Upright, having made a better offer than the jury verdict, was awarded partial indemnity costs of $210,000.00 from the defendant Janandee.

The plaintiffs' costs were apportioned between the defendants based on their respective liability findings (Janandee 94%, Upright 6%).

The moving party sought leave under Rule 26.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to amend her amended statement of claim in an action alleging breach of an automobile insurance policy and related civil wrongs.

The responding insurer opposed the amendments on multiple grounds, including improper pleading of evidence, lack of particulars, untenable claims, statute‑barred causes of action, and improper withdrawal of prior admissions.

The court conducted a detailed line‑by‑line review of the proposed pleading, striking numerous allegations for vagueness, irrelevance, improper argument, or lack of material facts, while permitting certain allegations to stand or to be re‑pleaded with specified particulars.

The court also refused leave to withdraw an earlier admission regarding damage caused by third parties, finding the moving party failed to meet the test for withdrawing an admission.

Costs of the motion were reserved to the trial judge.

The plaintiff brought a motion under Rule 37.14 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to set aside a registrar’s order dismissing the action as abandoned under Rule 48.15 and to extend and validate service of the statement of claim.

The action arose from a motor vehicle collision and had been dismissed after no defence was filed within the prescribed period.

The court applied the contextual approach from appellate authorities governing registrar’s dismissals and considered the Reid factors, including explanation for litigation delay, inadvertence, promptness of the motion, and prejudice to the defendants.

Although the motion was not brought promptly, the failure to comply with Rule 48.15 was found to be inadvertent, the litigation delay was adequately explained, and the plaintiff rebutted the presumption of prejudice despite the expiry of the limitation period.

The dismissal was set aside and service validated, but the plaintiff was ordered to pay the defendants’ costs due to counsel’s repeated inattention in attempting service and advancing the proceeding.