Pathik Bipinchandra Baxi

This case involved a family dispute over a corporation and real estate.

The applicants sought validation of a shareholder meeting and a declaration of beneficial ownership of a property.

The respondents cross-applied, disputing the applicants' shareholder status.

The court found in favour of the applicants, confirming their shareholder status, validating the meeting, and declaring them beneficial owners of the property.

The plaintiffs brought a motion seeking an order to retain in trust the sale proceeds of real estate properties sold under power of sale by non-parties Surendra Walia and MGP Capital Inc. The plaintiffs alleged that the mortgages held by Walia and MGP were not legitimate and were part of a scheme by the defendant Gurmeet Singh to defraud creditors.

The court dismissed the motion, finding insufficient evidence to support the claim that the mortgages were illegitimate.

The court affirmed that Mareva injunctions do not create proprietary interests and that secured creditors take priority over unsecured creditors.

Walia was permitted to disburse the sale proceeds in the usual course, while previously held funds ($400,000) remained in trust pending further order.

The appellants appealed a trial judge's decision that struck out a default judgment and statement of claim as an abuse of process, found overpayment on a mortgage due to fraud, and awarded damages.

The trial judge's decision relied in part on prior Financial Services Tribunal findings of fraudulent conduct by the appellant mortgage broker.

The appellants challenged the striking out of the judgment/claim, the trial judge's credibility findings, and alleged a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings, noting that the appellants' counsel had consented to the judge hearing the case despite prior dealings, and found no evidence of bias.

The appellants appealed an order enforcing a settlement agreement.

The motion judge had found a binding agreement existed despite the absence of formally executed minutes of settlement and rejected the appellant's claim of no intent to be bound.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's conclusion that the communications objectively reflected an enforceable agreement not conditional on signed minutes, and no error in declining to exercise discretion to not enforce the settlement.

The plaintiff mortgagee brought a motion seeking to examine the defendants' former lawyers and for a declaration that solicitor-client privilege had been waived.

The defendants, mortgagors, alleged they did not understand various mortgage-related documents they signed, claiming non est factum and forgery, thereby putting the legal advice received from their former counsel into issue.

The court granted the plaintiff's motion, finding that the defendants' assertions directly challenged the legal advice and their contemporaneous understanding of the documents, thus implicitly waiving solicitor-client privilege.

The former lawyers were ordered to attend examinations, and conditional solicitor and client costs were awarded to the plaintiff.

The appellants brought an appeal from a motion judge's decision dated December 6, 2018.

At the hearing, the appellants, who were self-represented, indicated their intention to withdraw the appeal.

After being advised of the consequences—that dismissal as abandoned would result in the motion judge's decision standing and the appeal not being heard—the appellants confirmed their understanding.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as abandoned and awarded costs to the respondent.

The plaintiff moved under Rule 37.14 to set aside an order by Master McGraw that had previously set aside a 20-year-old default judgment obtained by the plaintiff.

The court found that the defendants had failed to provide proper notice to the plaintiff for their motion to set aside the default judgment and had not made full and frank disclosure regarding their knowledge of the original action and the plaintiff's contact information.

Considering additional evidence, the court determined that Master McGraw's order ought not to have been issued.

The plaintiff's motion was granted, and the original default judgment and writ of execution were restored.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment in a family law matter following an uncontested trial that proceeded after the appellant's pleadings were struck due to non-compliance with court orders.

The appellant sought a declaration that the vesting order granting title of the matrimonial home was made in error and challenged the award of spousal support as a lump sum payment from the sale proceeds.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the vesting order was appropriate given the appellant's repeated failures to comply with court orders, and that the trial judge's reasons adequately explained the decision.

The husband sought an extension of time to file a notice of appeal from a final family law order, a stay of that order pending appeal, and relief regarding the matrimonial home.

The trial judge had struck the husband's pleadings for failure to comply with undertakings and court orders, resulting in an uncontested trial where the wife was awarded lump-sum spousal support of $248,734, an equalization payment, costs, and a restraining order.

The matrimonial home was ordered sold.

The husband delayed five months before seeking the extension of time, during which he attempted to frustrate the sale and develop a litigation strategy rather than prepare his appeal.

The Court of Appeal granted the extension of time but dismissed the stay request and awarded substantial indemnity costs to the wife.

The appellant, Sikh Spiritual Centre Toronto, appealed a motion judge's decision refusing to set aside a consent order dated February 4, 2016 that enforced a settlement agreement between three not-for-profit charitable corporations operating Sikh temples.

The settlement concerned repayment of loaned monies.

The appellant argued the settlement was entered into without proper authority and was improvident.

The motion judge found the Director who authorized the settlement had proper authority from the Board of Directors and that the settlement was reasonable.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no palpable and overriding errors and declining to interfere with the discretionary costs award.

A motion to reconsider an order by Justice Gloria Epstein dismissing an appeal for delay.

The appellant sought to challenge the dismissal, arguing inadequate notice and that the time for perfection should be extended.

The Court of Appeal upheld Epstein J.A.'s decision, finding no merit in the appellant's submissions and confirming that the entire history of the proceeding could be considered in assessing delay.

The appeal was properly dismissed for delay by the registrar.

The motion was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The defendants, Sharon Gooden-Allen and Desmond Allen, defaulted on a second charge on their property, which was subsequently transferred from Surrinder Jass to Sean Wilson.

Wilson then entered an Agreement of Purchase and Sale (APS) with Sean Brown.

The Allens challenged the validity of the assignment and the propriety of the sale, bringing a motion to stay the APS.

Wilson brought a cross-motion to have an order to continue the action made *nunc pro tunc*.

The court found the assignment of the charge to Wilson to be valid and the APS bona fide, dismissing the Allens' motion to stay the sale.

Wilson's motion for a *nunc pro tunc* order to continue was granted, allowing him to enforce the judgment and exercise his rights as chargee in possession.

The Superior Court of Justice issued a costs endorsement following an appeal and subsequent motion to reopen.

The appellant had appealed a building permit revocation, which was upheld by both the Superior Court and Divisional Court.

The appellant then successfully moved to reopen the appeal to introduce new evidence (Exhibit H), but the court found Exhibit H to be fraudulent.

The court dismissed the appellant's new arguments as *res judicata* and on their merits.

Due to the appellant's conduct, including presenting a fraudulent document and making unproven allegations, the court awarded full indemnity costs of $50,976.96 plus interest to the respondents.

The Defendants sought leave to appeal a series of interim decisions by Snowie J., which included granting injunctions against defamation and harassment, a publication ban, and substantial costs awards, in two separate actions brought by S.R. and V.B. against the Defendants.

The court granted leave to appeal on all issues, finding conflicting legal principles regarding defamation injunctions, uncertainty in the evolving torts of harassment and intrusion upon seclusion, and procedural irregularities and open court principle concerns regarding the publication ban.

The costs award was also subject to appeal as it flowed from the underlying decisions.

This Simplified Rules action involved a dispute between a creditor and debtors.

The plaintiffs moved to restore their action to the trial list after it was struck for delay in 2012.

The defendants brought a cross-motion to dismiss the action for delay.

The court applied the Carioca’s test for restoring an action, which requires a reasonable explanation for delay and no non-compensable prejudice to the defendants.

The court found the relevant delay period began in June 2014, when the defendants withdrew a previous motion to dismiss for delay.

The plaintiffs provided a reasonable explanation for the subsequent 14-month delay, primarily due to attempts to mediate.

The court also found the defendants failed to prove actual prejudice, rejecting bald assertions of fading memories and noting the defendants' own failure to prepare their case by taking witness statements.

Consequently, the plaintiffs' motion to restore the action was granted, and the defendants' motion to dismiss for delay was dismissed.

The defendant lawyers moved for summary judgment dismissing a professional negligence action on the basis that it was commenced outside the two‑year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The plaintiffs argued the claim was not discovered until evidence obtained during a later assessment hearing revealed the extent of the alleged negligence.

The court held that the plaintiffs already possessed the material facts necessary to discover their claim when they pleaded negligence in a statement of defence in earlier fee litigation.

The discoverability doctrine did not postpone the limitation period because no fundamentally new facts were discovered later.

Summary judgment was granted and the action was dismissed as statute‑barred.

Following competing family law motions, the court considered whether either party should receive costs.

Neither party had delivered an Offer to Settle under the applicable procedural rules.

Although the court found some of the responding party’s claims to be unreasonable, that party nevertheless achieved partial success on the motions, including an advance of funds for litigation expenses.

Because both parties achieved some measure of success and no settlement offers were made, the court concluded that neither side was entitled to a costs award.

In a family law motion arising from ongoing matrimonial litigation, the applicant sought contempt findings relating to a child travel order, variation of spousal support, and partition and sale of the matrimonial home.

The respondent sought a $400,000 interim advance toward equalization and litigation expenses, increased retroactive child and spousal support, and various financial and corporate controls over the applicant’s businesses.

The court declined to find contempt due to the criminal standard of proof but awarded the applicant costs associated with a cancelled trip.

The court partially granted the respondent’s request for an advance by ordering a $100,000 interim payment but refused most other relief, including variation of support and corporate control remedies.

The request for partition and sale of the matrimonial home was also refused pending trial.