Sandra L. Secord

The plaintiff intends to bring a motion to order the sale of the subject property.

The defendants do not necessarily object to the sale, but there is no agreement on the terms.

The court established a timetable for the motion materials and scheduled a case conference to explore resolving the contested issues before the motion hearing.

The plaintiff and defendants were 50 percent owners of a corporation whose sole asset was a property intended for gas station development.

Following a breakdown in their relationship, the defendants sold the property to a third party without the plaintiff's consent.

The plaintiff brought a motion for an oppression remedy to remove the defendants from management, while the defendants sought to wind up the corporation.

The court dismissed both requests, finding no oppressive conduct and concluding that a winding up was not just and equitable at this stage.

The court granted a motion to rescind the sale of the property and ordered the return of the purchase funds held in court, less outstanding costs owed to the plaintiff.

The defendant in a defamation action sought leave to amend her statement of defence to add particulars of justification regarding the plaintiffs' alleged negligence in representing claimants.

The plaintiffs opposed the motion, arguing delay, prejudice, and abuse of process.

The court denied the substantive amendments, finding that the defendant had known the facts prior to an earlier discovery motion but withheld them to improperly gain broad documentary discovery.

The court held that allowing the amendments now would condone a questionable litigation tactic and constitute an abuse of process.

This defamation action involved a motion to set the terms of a discovery plan.

The defendant, Fay Brunning, sought broad documentary disclosure from the plaintiffs, including files related to numerous clients in "Cochrane Actions" and "IAP claims" based on a defence of justification.

The plaintiffs were willing to disclose documents related to a specific client (Claimant H) but argued that Brunning's justification defence was not sufficiently particularized to warrant broader disclosure.

The court found Brunning's request for disclosure overly broad and not supported by the pleadings, limiting disclosure to Claimant H's case and specific communications.

The court also set terms for oral discovery and awarded costs to the plaintiffs.

This appeal concerns whether a third party claim brought by defendants against a third party was statute barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The motion judge dismissed the third party claim based on issue estoppel and abuse of process, relying on a prior decision dismissing similar claims against a different third party.

The Court of Appeal held that issue estoppel did not apply due to lack of mutuality of parties, and that abuse of process was inappropriately applied given changes in the law and unfairness to the defendants.

However, the appeal was dismissed on the merits: the third party claim was statute barred because the defendants discovered their claim when served with the main action and it was not legally appropriate to delay commencing the third party claim pending resolution of a forum challenge.

A case conference was held to schedule documentary and oral discoveries.

The parties agreed to exchange Affidavits of Documents by September 30, 2019, and to conduct examinations for discovery in November 2019.

The court noted a potential issue regarding Schedule B documents that may require a further case conference if unresolved.

The Moving Parties sought costs for a successful motion to appoint an arbitrator.

The Responding Parties opposed the motion and the costs request, arguing for no costs or partial indemnity, citing a "chilling effect." The court found the Moving Parties were entitled to costs as they succeeded on their motion.

While the Moving Parties sought substantial or partial indemnity costs of $23,598.56 or $16,264.97 respectively, the court awarded fixed costs of $8,000 in fees plus disbursements and taxes, totaling $10,637.80, finding this amount fair and reasonable given the circumstances and the conduct of the Responding Parties.

In a defamation action arising from statements about the handling of Indian Residential Schools Settlement Agreement claims, the plaintiffs brought a motion to strike portions of the statement of defence or, alternatively, for particulars.

The court dismissed the motion to strike due to unexplained delay under Rule 2.02, noting it was brought eight months after pleadings closed.

The alternative request for particulars was also dismissed because the plaintiffs failed to show they were unable to plead their case without them.

The defendant Sherwin H. Shapiro brought a motion to strike new causes of action (knowing assistance in breach of fiduciary duty and knowing assistance in breach of trust) added by the plaintiff, Ontario Professional Fire Fighter’s Association (OPFFA), in a Fresh As Amended Statement of Claim.

Shapiro argued that these new claims were statute-barred by the Limitations Act and that the filing of the Fresh Claim constituted an abuse of process.

The court dismissed the abuse of process argument, finding the plaintiff's actions technically consistent with Rule 26.02(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court also dismissed the motion to strike based on limitation periods under Rule 21.01, reiterating that such issues, particularly those involving discoverability, are typically inappropriate for determination at the pleadings stage under Rule 21 and are better suited for summary judgment or trial after pleadings have closed.

The court found that the material facts necessary to support the new causes of action were implicitly present in the original claim, and it was not plain and obvious that the claims were statute-barred.

A case conference was held to address procedural issues following previous endorsements.

The court directed the parties to draft separate orders for six prior motions.

The court also scheduled a Rule 21 motion brought by the defendant Shapiro regarding the plaintiff's Fresh as Amended Statement of Claim, and scheduled the plaintiff's renewed motion for a Mareva injunction.

Finally, the court set a timetable for written submissions regarding the Atkinson defendants' request to pay outstanding costs orders from funds held in trust.

The defendants moved to enforce Minutes of Settlement, which the plaintiffs resisted, arguing the settlement was at an end due to non-compliance with a 30-day payment clause.

The court found that the 30-day clause applied only to the initial settlement option, not to the alternative options triggered by a negative tax opinion.

The court determined that the defendants' election to pay the full settlement amount within a reasonable time was valid, and that the plaintiffs' resistance stemmed from "settlement remorse." The motion to enforce the settlement was granted.

The defendants brought motions to dismiss the plaintiff trade union's action for lack of standing, to stay the action pending related criminal proceedings, and to strike the statement of claim.

The plaintiff union alleged the defendants misappropriated funds intended for the union's Retiree's Cancer Claim Fund.

The court found the plaintiff had standing as a trade union acting within its labour relations functions.

The court declined to stay the civil action, finding no extraordinary circumstances despite pending criminal charges against two defendants.

On the motions to strike, the court upheld most claims against the primary defendants but struck the claims against the defendant lawyer with leave to amend, finding insufficient material facts pleaded regarding his involvement.

The Team Lead-Civil in the Toronto Region issued an administrative endorsement assigning Justice P. Cavanagh as the case management judge for the actions and directed that a case conference be held as soon as possible.

This decision addresses the issue of costs following a motion brought by the defendant Brunning for document inspection and particulars, which was largely unsuccessful.

The plaintiffs sought substantial indemnity costs, while Brunning requested costs be reserved or no costs.

The court considered factors under s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, noting the plaintiffs' substantial success on the motion.

However, the court also acknowledged that the plaintiffs' initial refusals to provide requested information contributed to the necessity of the motion.

Finding that both parties had "dug in their heels" the court ordered the defendant Fay Brunning to pay the plaintiffs $6,197.40 in costs, inclusive of fees, disbursements, and HST, payable within 30 days.

The defendant in a defamation action brought a motion seeking an order for the plaintiffs to provide particulars of their statement of claim and to produce documents for inspection under Rule 30.04 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court partially granted the motion for particulars, ordering the plaintiffs to provide specific details regarding alleged defamatory comments and special damages.

However, the court dismissed the request to inspect documents, finding that the court has discretion to limit such requests based on relevance and proportionality, and that the requested documents were either already in the defendant's possession, publicly available, or not specific documents within the meaning of the rule.

The defendant, Fay Brunning, brought a motion to temporarily stay a defamation action commenced against her by the plaintiffs, James Wallbridge, Almeda Wallbridge, and Wallbridge, Wallbridge, seeking damages in excess of $15 million.

Brunning argued for a stay to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and inconsistent findings, citing ongoing Requests for Directions (RFDs) within the Independent Assessment Process (IAP) of the Indian Residential Schools Settlement Agreement (IRSSA) that raised similar issues regarding the plaintiffs' conduct.

However, the RFDs were subsequently dismissed by Justice Perell, eliminating the multiplicity concern.

Brunning also argued that confidentiality concerns related to IAP documents and solicitor-client privilege prevented her from adequately defending the defamation action.

The court dismissed the motion for a stay, finding no outstanding proceedings with common facts, and that mechanisms existed to address confidentiality concerns without preventing Brunning from defending herself.

The court also found that a stay would prejudice the plaintiffs' ability to seek a remedy for the alleged harm.

The plaintiff sued the defendant appraisers for professional negligence after an arbitrator rejected their real estate appraisal, resulting in the plaintiff receiving a lower buyout price for its property interest.

The defendants brought a third party claim against the plaintiff's former lawyers, alleging the lawyers negligently represented the plaintiff during the arbitration and caused the losses.

The lawyers moved to strike the third party claim, arguing it merely alleged a failure to mitigate and was barred by issue estoppel.

The defendants cross-moved to amend the claim and add another law firm as a third party.

The court struck the portions of the third party claim that amounted to a failure to mitigate the initial loss caused by the appraisal.

However, the court allowed the broader claims regarding the lawyers' negligent representation at the arbitration to proceed, finding they disclosed a tenable cause of action.

The court also granted the defendants leave to add the proposed third parties.

The plaintiffs brought an action for defamation against a lawyer and the law firm with which she practiced in association.

The defendant law firm brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the action against it, arguing it was not vicariously liable for the lawyer's actions.

The court found that the lawyer was not a partner or employee of the firm, and the firm did not control her practice.

The firm's letterhead and marketing materials clearly indicated she was 'Practicing in Association not in Partnership'.

The court granted summary judgment and dismissed the action against the law firm.

This endorsement addresses costs for several prior motions.

The plaintiffs (Nicholson Group) were awarded costs for a successful motion for leave to amend their statement of claim.

The Janza group and Horbatiuk defendants were awarded costs for their successful motions regarding abandoned motions and contempt proceedings.

Andrey Pinsky was awarded costs against the plaintiffs for successfully opposing an indemnity motion brought by Mr. Nicholson.

The court applied principles under the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01(1), declining substantial indemnity where no egregious conduct was found.

The moving parties sought summary judgment dismissing a solicitor's negligence and breach of retainer claim arising from a law firm breakup and the transfer of approximately 225 client files.

The responding party alleged the retainer required counsel to obtain charging orders against transferred files, but the court found no express or implied term to that effect in the written retainer or subsequent instructions.

Applying the summary judgment framework under Rule 20 and Hryniak, the court held the evidentiary record permitted a fair and proportionate adjudication without trial.

The motion was granted and the action dismissed.