Sandra L. Secord

The defendant in a defamation action sought leave to amend her statement of defence to add particulars of justification regarding the plaintiffs' alleged negligence in representing claimants.

The plaintiffs opposed the motion, arguing delay, prejudice, and abuse of process.

The court denied the substantive amendments, finding that the defendant had known the facts prior to an earlier discovery motion but withheld them to improperly gain broad documentary discovery.

The court held that allowing the amendments now would condone a questionable litigation tactic and constitute an abuse of process.

This defamation action involved a motion to set the terms of a discovery plan.

The defendant, Fay Brunning, sought broad documentary disclosure from the plaintiffs, including files related to numerous clients in "Cochrane Actions" and "IAP claims," based on a defence of justification.

The plaintiffs were willing to disclose documents related to a specific client (Claimant H) but argued that Brunning's justification defence was not sufficiently particularized to warrant broader disclosure.

The court found Brunning's request for disclosure overly broad and not supported by the pleadings, limiting disclosure to Claimant H's case and specific communications.

The court also set terms for oral discovery and awarded costs to the plaintiffs.

This appeal concerns whether a third party claim brought by defendants against a third party was statute barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The motion judge dismissed the third party claim based on issue estoppel and abuse of process, relying on a prior decision dismissing similar claims against a different third party.

The Court of Appeal held that issue estoppel did not apply due to lack of mutuality of parties, and that abuse of process was inappropriately applied given changes in the law and unfairness to the defendants.

However, the appeal was dismissed on the merits: the third party claim was statute barred because the defendants discovered their claim when served with the main action and it was not legally appropriate to delay commencing the third party claim pending resolution of a forum challenge.

The Moving Parties sought costs for a successful motion to appoint an arbitrator.

The Responding Parties opposed the motion and the costs request, arguing for no costs or partial indemnity, citing a "chilling effect." The court found the Moving Parties were entitled to costs as they succeeded on their motion.

While the Moving Parties sought substantial or partial indemnity costs of $23,598.56 or $16,264.97 respectively, the court awarded fixed costs of $8,000 in fees plus disbursements and taxes, totaling $10,637.80, finding this amount fair and reasonable given the circumstances and the conduct of the Responding Parties.

In a defamation action arising from statements about the handling of Indian Residential Schools Settlement Agreement claims, the plaintiffs brought a motion to strike portions of the statement of defence or, alternatively, for particulars.

The court dismissed the motion to strike due to unexplained delay under Rule 2.02, noting it was brought eight months after pleadings closed.

The alternative request for particulars was also dismissed because the plaintiffs failed to show they were unable to plead their case without them.

The defendant Sherwin H. Shapiro brought a motion to strike new causes of action (knowing assistance in breach of fiduciary duty and knowing assistance in breach of trust) added by the plaintiff, Ontario Professional Fire Fighter’s Association (OPFFA), in a Fresh As Amended Statement of Claim.

Shapiro argued that these new claims were statute-barred by the Limitations Act and that the filing of the Fresh Claim constituted an abuse of process.

The court dismissed the abuse of process argument, finding the plaintiff's actions technically consistent with Rule 26.02(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court also dismissed the motion to strike based on limitation periods under Rule 21.01, reiterating that such issues, particularly those involving discoverability, are typically inappropriate for determination at the pleadings stage under Rule 21 and are better suited for summary judgment or trial after pleadings have closed.

The court found that the material facts necessary to support the new causes of action were implicitly present in the original claim, and it was not plain and obvious that the claims were statute-barred.

The defendants moved to enforce Minutes of Settlement, which the plaintiffs resisted, arguing the settlement was at an end due to non-compliance with a 30-day payment clause.

The court found that the 30-day clause applied only to the initial settlement option, not to the alternative options triggered by a negative tax opinion.

The court determined that the defendants' election to pay the full settlement amount within a reasonable time was valid, and that the plaintiffs' resistance stemmed from "settlement remorse." The motion to enforce the settlement was granted.

The defendants brought motions to dismiss the plaintiff trade union's action for lack of standing, to stay the action pending related criminal proceedings, and to strike the statement of claim.

The plaintiff union alleged the defendants misappropriated funds intended for the union's Retiree's Cancer Claim Fund.

The court found the plaintiff had standing as a trade union acting within its labour relations functions.

The court declined to stay the civil action, finding no extraordinary circumstances despite pending criminal charges against two defendants.

On the motions to strike, the court upheld most claims against the primary defendants but struck the claims against the defendant lawyer with leave to amend, finding insufficient material facts pleaded regarding his involvement.

The defendant in a defamation action brought a motion seeking an order for the plaintiffs to provide particulars of their statement of claim and to produce documents for inspection under Rule 30.04 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court partially granted the motion for particulars, ordering the plaintiffs to provide specific details regarding alleged defamatory comments and special damages.

However, the court dismissed the request to inspect documents, finding that the court has discretion to limit such requests based on relevance and proportionality, and that the requested documents were either already in the defendant's possession, publicly available, or not specific documents within the meaning of the rule.

This endorsement addresses costs for several prior motions.

The plaintiffs (Nicholson Group) were awarded costs for a successful motion for leave to amend their statement of claim.

The Janza group and Horbatiuk defendants were awarded costs for their successful motions regarding abandoned motions and contempt proceedings.

Andrey Pinsky was awarded costs against the plaintiffs for successfully opposing an indemnity motion brought by Mr. Nicholson.

The court applied principles under the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01(1), declining substantial indemnity where no egregious conduct was found.

Multiple defendants brought motions to strike or dismiss claims arising from an alleged advance-fee loan fraud scheme.

The court held that claims against certain lawyer defendants were statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002 because the plaintiffs discovered the alleged wrongdoing in 2008 but commenced the action in 2012.

Another defendant successfully moved to dismiss the claim under Rule 57.03(2) for failure to pay outstanding court-ordered costs.

Additional defendants obtained an order striking the claim for fraud and deceit under Rule 21.01(1)(b) because the pleading failed to set out the necessary elements or particulars required by Rule 25.06.

The action against those moving defendants was dismissed.

The defendant lawyers moved for summary judgment dismissing a professional negligence action on the basis that it was commenced outside the two‑year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The plaintiffs argued the claim was not discovered until evidence obtained during a later assessment hearing revealed the extent of the alleged negligence.

The court held that the plaintiffs already possessed the material facts necessary to discover their claim when they pleaded negligence in a statement of defence in earlier fee litigation.

The discoverability doctrine did not postpone the limitation period because no fundamentally new facts were discovered later.

Summary judgment was granted and the action was dismissed as statute‑barred.

The plaintiffs brought an action alleging they were victims of an advance fee loan scam perpetrated by the main defendant with the assistance of several lawyers and law firms.

Three groups of defendant lawyers brought motions to strike the statement of claim.

The court struck the negligence claims against one lawyer and his firm, finding opposing counsel owes no duty of care to the opposite party.

The court struck the claims against two other law firms but allowed the fraud claim against their partner to proceed, subject to the plaintiffs providing better particulars.

Finally, the court dismissed the claim against a third lawyer, finding it was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002, as the plaintiffs had sufficient knowledge of the alleged misconduct more than two years before commencing the action.

Following dismissal of a motion for an interlocutory injunction relating to alleged breaches of non‑competition and confidentiality obligations, the court determined costs.

The defendants sought substantial partial indemnity costs exceeding $93,000, while the plaintiff argued the amount was excessive and that costs should be in the cause.

The court reviewed principles governing costs under s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, emphasizing reasonableness, proportionality, and the reasonable expectations of the paying party.

While finding the defendants substantially successful, the court held the claimed hours and staffing levels excessive and reduced the award.

Partial indemnity costs were fixed at $40,000 plus HST and disbursements, payable forthwith.

The plaintiff former employer moved for an interlocutory injunction to enforce non-competition and confidentiality clauses against a former employee who invented a specialized technology.

The court applied the heightened 'strong prima facie case' standard for restrictive covenants in employment contracts.

While the court found a strong prima facie case that the employee breached non-competition provisions, it dismissed the injunction because the plaintiff failed to demonstrate irreparable harm, as damages could be quantified.

However, the court granted a preservation order regarding the disputed technology and related electronic records.