COURT FILE NO.: 82-2012
DATE: 2012/10/30
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
B E T W E E N:
BRENT HILLIER and MAVERICK PAINTBALL INC.
PLAINTIFFS
Brent Hillier, on his own behalf
No one appearing for Maverick Paintball Inc.
- and -
CRAIG (SANDY) HUTCHENS aka SANDY HUTCHENS aka SANDY CRAIG HUTCHENS aka CRAIG HUTCHENS aka
Michael R. Kestenberg, for Defendants Lorne Honickman and McCague Borlack LLP
MOISHE HUTCHENS aka CRAIG ALEXANDER aka MOISHE ALEXANDER aka MOSHE ALEXANDER aka MOISHE BEN AVAHAM aka MOISHE BEN AVOHOM aka BEN AVROHOM aka BEN AVRAHAM aka FRED HAYES aka ALEXANDER McDONALD aka ALEX McDONALD, DAVE MCDONALD aka MATHEW KOVEE, TANYA HUTCHENS aka TATIANA BRIK., TD CANADA TRUST, TD BANK FINANCIAL GROUP., DAVID MACENZIE, BARRY POULSON, ARSENEAU POULSON, MICHAEL SPIRO, LORNE HONICKMAN, MCGAGURE BORLACK LLP, ALVIN MEISELS, REZNICK PARSONS MEISELS TABERNER, BLANEY MCMURTRY LLP, JAN LUISTERMANS aka HERMAN LUISTERMANS, REALTY 1 REAL ESTATE SERVICES LTD., FIFTH AVENUE PRIVATE INVESTIGATORS AND PARALEGAL, GARY WHITE, TOM WARREN, NET PATROL, RABBI MENDEL KAPLAN AND SHABAD@FLAMINGO,JACOB GRYN, CO4 COMPUTING INC.
DEFENDANTS
Sandra L. Secord, for the Defendants
Alvin Meisels, Reznick Parsons Meisels, Taberner, Blaney McMurtry LLP
Charles Sinclair, for the Defendant
Michael Spiro
HEARD: August 22, September 26, 2012
Haines J.
Introduction
[1] There are three motions before the court where orders are sought to strike the statement of claim and dismiss the action.
[2] The first is a motion brought by the defendants Lorne Honickman and McCague Borlack LLP asking for an order that the statement of claim be struck pursuant to Rule 21.01(1)(b) as it discloses no reasonable cause of action against them.
[3] The second is a motion by Alvin Meisels, Reznick Parsons Meisels Taberner and Blaney McMurtry LLP requesting similar relief as well as an order striking the statement of claim pursuant to Rule 25.11 on the grounds that it is frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of process. These defendants also rely on Rule 15.01(2) which requires a corporation to be represented by a lawyer unless dispensation from that requirement has been granted by the court. Such leave has not been sought or granted in this action.
[4] The third motion is brought by the defendant Michael Spiro seeking essentially the same relief that is sought in the second motion but he also contends that the plaintiffs’ claim against him is statute-barred by operation of the Limitations Act, 2002 S.O. 2002, c.24, Sched. B
[5] All of these defendants are lawyers or law firms who have allegedly acted for their co-defendant Craig (Sandy) Hutchens, aka Sandy Hutchens, aka Sandy Craig Hutchens, aka Craig Hutchens, aka Moishe Hutchens, aka Craig Alexander, aka Moishe Alexander, aka Moshe Alexander, aka Moishe Ben Avaham, aka Moishe Ben Avohom, aka Ben Avrohom, aka Ben Afraham, aka Fred Hayes, aka Alexander McDonald, aka Alex McDonald. In these reasons I will refer to the defendant Craig (Sandy) Hutchens as Hutchens.
[6] The defendant Tanya Hutchens, aka Tatiana Birk, is married to Hutchens. I will refer to Ms. Hutchens as Tanya as that is how she is referred to throughout the statement of claim.
[7] The allegations against the defendants are very serious. The plaintiffs claim they are victims of an “advance fee loan scam” operated by Hutchens with the assistance of the other named defendants. They allege that Hutchens took and retained an advance fee for a proposed $4,000,000 loan to them without any intention of ever proceeding with the loan commitment and contend that there are hundreds of victims of this “scam”.
[8] The plaintiff Hillier seeks damages for emotional suffering, loss of reputation and loss of income resulting from the failure of Maverick Paintball Inc. which he attributes to the conduct of the defendants. Maverick Paintball Inc. claims damages for the financial loss that resulted from the failure of the business. Both plaintiffs claim punitive damages for the “criminal, high-handed and capricious conduct of the defendants.”
[9] I will deal with each of the motions in turn.
Honickman and McCague Borlack LLP
[10] McCague Borlack is a law firm located in Toronto and Lorne Honickman is a partner in that firm. They were retained by Hutchens to prosecute a defamation action against the plaintiff Brent Hillier. The allegations against them arise from that retainer and are found at paragraphs 86 through 89 of the statement of claim.
[11] It is alleged that:
a) Honickman wrote to YouTube, among others, threatening to commence legal proceedings if videos relating to Hutchens that were posted by Hillier on YouTube were not removed from their site;
b) Honickman acted negligently in advising YouTube that a court order prohibited the broadcast of Hillier’s videos on YouTube when Honickman knew or should have known that was false;
c) Honickman knew or should have known that by using his firm’s letterhead in writing to YouTube, it “would accept his assertion that the court order in question was valid and applied to Mr. Hillier’s postings on YouTube when it clearly did not”; and
d) The plaintiffs suffered damages as a result of Honickman’s conduct.
[12] In paragraph 90 of the statement of claim, the plaintiff pleads that the defendant lawyers, other than Honickman, committed the torts of fraud and deceit.
[13] The statement of claim containing these allegations was issued May 23, 2012. Honickman and McCague Borlack LLP served this motion on the plaintiffs by mail on June 28, 2012. The motion was returnable August 22, 2012. On August 21, 2012, the plaintiffs amended their statement of claim pursuant to Rule 26.02(a) which permits amendments without leave before the close of pleadings. In those amendments the plaintiffs withdrew the apparent admission that Honickman was not involved in the alleged fraud and deceit and include him as one of the lawyers who participated in that misconduct.
[14] Honickman and McCague Borlack LLP maintain that the amendment should not be considered in the determination of their motion because the motion was served before the amendments were made. They rely on Cosentino v. Dominaco Developments Inc., 2010 ONSC 208, [2010] O.J. No. 61 where MacKenzie J. followed Bruce v. John Northway and Son Ltd., [1962] O.W.N. 150 (H.C.J. – Master) and Pain Webber Mortgage Acceptance Corp. (Trustee of) v. Mundi, [2004] O.J. No. 1730 (S.C.) in holding that the rights of a moving party are determined as of the date of service of the motion and a plaintiff is not entitled to amend a statement of claim pursuant to Rule 26.02(a) when the sustainability of the pleading is being challenged by a defendant.
[15] I will, therefore, address the statement of claim in this matter as it was when this motion was served and will not consider the amendments made August 21, 2012.
[16] Rule 21.01(1)(b) provides that a party may move before a judge to strike out a pleading on the ground it discloses no reasonable cause of action. The test for striking out a statement of claim is well settled. Assuming that the facts pleaded can be proven, is it plain and obvious that the claim cannot succeed? The pleading must be read generously and allowances made for drafting deficiencies.
[17] The statement of claim alleges that Honickman acted negligently while representing Hutchens in the prosecution of a defamation action against Hillier when Honickman advised YouTube that there was a court order prohibiting the broadcast of Hillier’s videos about Hutchens. In order to establish negligence it would be necessary for the plaintiffs to demonstrate that these defendants owed them a duty of care that was breached. Honickman and McCague Borlack LLP contend that there is no legal authority in Ontario to support the proposition that a lawyer for one party owes a duty of care to the opposite party. They maintain, therefore, that there is no basis for a claim in negligence against them: see Hartmann v. Amourgis, [2008] O.J. No. 2388 (S.C.) at paras. 24-26, aff’d 2009 ONCA 33, [2009] O.J. No. 107, leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused, [2009] S.C.C.A. No. 65. I accept this submission.
[18] The imposition of a duty of care to the opposite party would give rise to an untenable conflict between a lawyer’s duty to the client and the need to protect themselves from potential lawsuits initiated by their client’s opponent. As has been observed in other cases the recognition of such a duty could lead to an endless re-litigation of disputes.
[19] In my view it is plain and obvious that the claims against Honickman and McCague Borlack, founded as they are in negligence, cannot succeed. The motion is granted and the claims against them are struck.
Meisels, Reznick Parsons Meisels Taberner and Blaney McMurtry LLP
[20] Meisels is a lawyer who is alleged to be a former partner at the firm of Reznick Parsons Meisels and Taberner and currently practices law at Blaney McMurtry LLP. It is alleged generally that he and his co-defendants Spiro and Poulson, who are also lawyers, represented that Hutchens was a legitimate lender, lent their professional credibility as lawyers to this fraudulent enterprise and assisted Hutchens in perpetrating the alleged advance fee fraud. In the allegations levelled specifically at Meisels in paragraphs 71 to 77, the plaintiffs claim that Meisels “purported to represent Hutchens under fictitious names when he knew that his client was actually Hutchens” and falsely represented that Moishe Alexander, one of the aliases used by Hutchens, was “a viable source of substantial lending capital at lower than market rates.” In paragraphs 76 and 77 the plaintiffs state:
Most egregious of all, Meisels represented Hutchens in a court action against an online company that exposed frauds. Meisels launched an action and brought an ex parte application for and injunction to have the site stop publishing that Hutchens and his companies were fraud artists. Meisels not only knew at the time that his client was a fraud artist, he was also a participant in his client’s fraud.
Despite this, Meisels went to court ex parte and obtained an injunction and then, knowing the injunction did not apply to the plaintiffs, used the injunction as a sword against the plaintiffs and sought to enjoin their activities on the internet where Mr. Hillier in particular was exposing the fraud, (or at least the extend [sic] of it that he knew at the time). After two years of using the injunction as a sword, the court overturned it.
[21] These defendants submit that this motion gives rise to the following issues.
a) Should the claim be struck as against these defendants for failing to disclose a reasonable cause of action against them?
b) Should the claim be struck against these defendants on the basis that it is frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of this court’s process?
c) Should the action by the corporate plaintiff Maverick Paintball Inc. be struck because it is unrepresented by a lawyer?
[22] The statement of claim is 26 pages and 136 paragraphs in length. Many of those pages recite, in general terms, the alleged misconduct of the defendant lawyers and their respective firms. In my view, the only potential causes of action against these defendants that are disclosed in those allegations are fraud and deceit. The issue then is whether they represent reasonable causes of action as pleaded.
[23] The statement of claim implicates these defendants in the alleged fraud committed by Hutchens and Tanya as follows:
a) “Each and every one of the defendants other than Hutchens and Tanya...assisted in perpetrating the fraud against the plaintiffs and others by either knowingly providing their expertise to the fraudulent enterprise or allowing themselves to be duped by Hutchens and Tanya into participating in the fraud scheme”; (para. 33)
b) “The plaintiffs plead that Poulson, Spiro and Meisels also assisted Hutchens and Tanya in perpetrating the fraud against both them and numerous other individuals and corporations”; (para. 64)
c) “Poulson, Spiro and Meisels (and their respective law firms) were also required to know the names, corporate or business identification numbers, addresses, phone numbers, scope, general nature of the type of business or activities engaged in by the companies, as well as the name, position, and contact information for each individual who provided the lawyer with instructions with respect to the matter on behalf of the corporation...”; (para. 66)
d) “At the time of events complained of herein, Meisels, Spiro and Poulson, had actual knowledge of the prior criminal history of Hutchens. They each also had knowledge that the shell corporations had collected substantial advance fees on loan commitments but without the ability or intent [sic] to fund such loans”; (para. 67)
e) “At various times, Meisels, Spiro and Poulson represented that Hutchens was a legitimate lender who had closed many deals. Each of them wrote letters or undertook other communications supporting Hutchens under one of his alieses [sic] and knew that Hutchens and Tanya were operating a criminal enterprise. Alternatively, they were wilfully blind to the conduct of Hutchens and Tanya as pleaded herein...”; (para. 69)
f) “Meisels represented that Moishe Alexander was a reputable businessman and a viable source of substantial lending capital at lower than market rates...”; (para. 72)
g) “He also falsely told many victims that Moishe Alexander had an ongoing joint venture with TD Canada Trust and that TD was a major source of his funding and that Moishe Alexander was a reputable businessman and a viable source of substantial lending capital...”; (para. 73)
h) “At various times, Meisels told victims that Hutchens’ and Tanya’s shell corporation had been involved for more than 25 years in the private mortgage lending and investment business in the Province of Ontario and that they had advanced millions of dollars in residential mortgage loans...”; (para. 73)
i) “Meisels representations took the form of reference letters that he wrote that falsely stated that some of the Hutchens shell corporations had closed mortgages that were in fact mortgages on properties owned by Hutchens and Tanya”; (para. 74)
j) “The plaintiffs plead that the lawyers, other than Honickman, committed the torts of fraud and deceit because they knowingly assisted in the fraud against the plaintiffs by spreading knowingly false information about the fraud scheme to assist Hutchens and Tanya in perpetrating the fraud. In exchange, the lawyers received unknown amounts of money from Hutchens and Tanya”. (para. 90)
[24] Meisels contends that the claim fails to plead the material facts and requisite elements of fraud, fraudulent misrepresentation and deceit. Rule 25.06 requires every pleading to include a concise statement of the material facts upon which the party relies for a claim or a defence and where fraud, misrepresentation, malice or intent is alleged the claim must include “full particulars”. Bald or conclusory allegations not supported by underlying facts are not acceptable.
[25] These defendants contend that the statement of claim fails to comply with Rule 25.06 in that:
The plaintiffs fail to identify the false statements allegedly made by these defendants, by whom, to whom, when and in what context they were made;
The claim fails to plead material facts to support the bald allegation that these defendants made representations knowing they were untrue;
The claim appears to allege that these representations were made with the intention that they would be acted upon by the plaintiffs when the law is clear that opposing counsel owes no duty of care to the opposite party and that this requirement of fraud can therefore not be met when the representation is allegedly made by opposing counsel;
The plaintiffs fail to identify specifically when and in what context they acted upon the representations and whether the representations were made to them, and, if so, when;
The claim fails to provide any details as to what damages the plaintiffs suffered as a result of these defendants’ alleged misrepresentations; and
The claim fails to connect the allegations of fraud to particular defendants.
For these reasons, these defendants submit that the pleadings of fraud and deceit in the statement of claim are so fundamentally deficient that they should be struck as disclosing no reasonable cause of action.
[26] I agree that the statement of claim is deficient to the extent that it fails to identify with the necessary specificity the false statements made by Meisels to advance the alleged fraud. I do not agree that Meisels position as a lawyer acting for Hutchens insulates him from a claim of fraud.
[27] These defendants acknowledge that the statement of claim alleges that the impugned representations were made with the intention that they would be acted upon by the plaintiffs but contend that this requirement of fraud cannot be met where the representation is made by opposing counsel because a lawyer owes no duty to an opposing party. That proposition is accepted with respect to allegations of negligent conduct, however, it does not extend to intentional torts. As is stated by Sharpe, J.A. in Lawrence v. Peel Regional Police Force, 2005 CanLII 3934 (ON CA), 250 D.L.R. (4th) 287, [2005] O.J. No.604 (C.A.) at para. 6
... intentional torts, unlike negligence, are not defeated by the rule that a lawyer owes no duty to the opposite party in litigation.
[28] Fraud is defined in Black’s Law Dictionary, 7th ed. as “a knowing misrepresentation of the truth or concealment of a material fact to induce another to act to his or her detriment.” The substance of the allegations against Meisels that can be garnered from the statement of claim are that Meisels knowingly misled the plaintiffs in order to assist Hutchens and Tanya in an unlawful scheme to benefit themselves at the expense of the plaintiffs.
[29] I am satisfied that the statement of claim does disclose a reasonable cause of action in fraud or deceit against Meisels but fails to do so with sufficient particularity to meet the requirement of Rule 25.06(8). I am not, however, prepared to strike the pleading at this time without affording the plaintiffs an opportunity to correct this defect and comply with the Rules. The plaintiffs are accordingly granted leave to amend the original statement of claim to include full particulars as to what was done and said by whom, to whom, when and in what context. Those particulars should identify the representations made by Meisels that the plaintiffs acted upon and the details of the damages sustained as a result of that reliance. Those amendments must be made within 30 days.
[30] In paragraphs 76 and 77 of the statement of claim, quoted in paragraph 20 of these reasons, the plaintiffs take issue with Meisels’ conduct as counsel for Hutchens on an ex parte injunction application. It is clear that absolute privilege usually applies to counsel’s conduct in judicial proceedings for a number of sound policy reasons: see Royal Bank of Canada v. Tehrani, [2009] O.J. No. 3153 (S.C.) at paras. 18 and 19. The exception is where malice and bad faith are properly pleaded: see Law Society of Alberta v. Krieger et al, 2002 SCC 65, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 372, 168 C.C.C. (3d) 97 at para 51.
[31] I am satisfied on a generous reading of the pleadings that malice and bad faith are implicit in the allegations in paragraphs 76 and 77 which include the assertion that Meisels knew Hutchens was a “fraud artist” and that Meisels was a participant in the fraud. Immunity cannot extend to counsel acting in a legal proceeding that was brought to suppress information about a fraud to which that counsel was a party as is alleged in this case. I would, accordingly, not strike these allegations.
[32] The bald allegation of conspiracy among Hutchens, Tanya and “many of the other defendants” found in paragraph 46 of the statement of claim fails to address the necessary elements and material facts required to maintain such an action and, perhaps most significantly, fails to identify which defendants have allegedly conspired with Hutchens and Tanya. That allegation is, therefore, struck, with leave to amend, to identify the “many other defendants” by name and to plead the necessary elements and material facts relied on to support the conspiracy claim. Those amendments must be made within 30 days.
[33] These defendants also rely on Rule 25.11. They submit that the plaintiffs’ action is frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of the court’s process. I agree that the statement of claim does contain inflammatory language as well as allegations that are irrelevant to this action. I refer, in particular, to the several references to the extent of the alleged fraudulent activities such as those found in paragraphs 39 and 40. This is not a class action and reference to this “scam” being perpetrated “hundreds of times” and “leaving many victims in its destructive path” are both inflammatory and irrelevant to the plaintiffs’ action.
[34] The focus of the argument on this motion was on the issue of whether the statement of claim disclosed a reasonable cause of action. Although submissions were made about the inflammatory nature of some of the allegations, the statement of claim was not reviewed for the purpose of identifying each allegation that these defendants contend should be struck for this reason. If the parties are unable to agree I will hear further argument on the Rule 25.11 issue.
[35] In the result, the motion is granted in part. The claims against Reznick Parsons Meisels Taberner and Blaney McMurtry LLP are struck and the action against them dismissed. It is plain and obvious that the claims against these law firms, cannot succeed. The motion to strike the claim against Alvin Meisels is dismissed subject to the plaintiffs providing particulars as ordered. There will also be an order striking paragraph 46 with leave to amend on the terms provided above.
[36] That leaves the issue of the corporate plaintiff being unrepresented. Rule 15.01(2) provides that a corporation “shall be represented by a lawyer, except with leave of the court.” Maverick Paintball Inc. is not represented by counsel and has not obtained leave of the court. These defendants submit that the claim by Maverick Paintball Inc. should, therefore, be struck. Clearly, the corporate plaintiff must comply with the Rules. In the event Maverick Paintball Inc. continues to be unrepresented and no motion has been brought for leave pursuant to Rule 15.01(2) within 30 days, Meisels may move, without notice to the plaintiffs, to strike the claim of Maverick Paintball Inc. for failure to seek the leave required.
Spiro
[37] Spiro is a real estate lawyer who was retained in 2008 to represent 308 Elgin St. Inc. on a mortgage loan to an individual named Pugliese. Pugliese was intending to enter into a business venture with the plaintiff Hillier to develop and expand the business of Maverick Paintball Inc.
[38] The plaintiffs allege 308 Elgin St. Inc. was a corporate vehicle used by Hutchens and Tanya to perpetrate the “advance fee loan scam” and that Spiro knowingly assisted Hutchens and Tanya in the commission of that fraud.
[39] Spiro moves to strike out the statement of claim for failing to disclose any reasonable cause of action against him and on the basis it is frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of process. He also claims the action is statute barred.
[40] I propose to deal with the last ground first.
[41] The statement of claim indicates that the plaintiffs entered into negotiations with Hutchens in the summer of 2008. On November 17, 2008, Hillier filed a written complaint with The Law Society of Upper Canada relating to Spiro’s conduct on the 2008 transaction. Complaints were filed by Hillier with the Canadian Association of Accredited Mortgage Professionals and the Financial Services Commission of Ontario on November 20, 2008 and December 4, 2008 respectively.
[42] In this correspondence Hillier sets out essentially the same allegations of Spiro facilitating fraudulent conduct that the plaintiffs have made against him in the statement of claim. Hillier claimed among other things:
a) that Spiro wrote a “reference letter dated March 24, 2008...posted on the Canadian Funding Corporation website” in which he claimed that he had closed approximately 40 transactions for Moishe (Hutchens);
b) that Spiro stated that he had worked with “Moishe Alexander” for 3½ years when Hutchens had been using that alias for only 1½ years; and
c) that Spiro was the lawyer who worked with Hutchens on the subject transaction and received a $10,000 advance deposit in legal fees as well as a 1% commission for acting as mortgage broker on the transaction.
[43] This action was commenced May 23, 2012. The conduct complained of occurred in 2008. Any civil action was required to be commenced by the second anniversary on which the claim was discovered. Section 4 of the Limitations Act, 2002 provides:
Unless this Act provides otherwise, a proceeding shall not be commenced in respect of a claim after the second anniversary of the day on which the claim was discovered.
Section 5 states:
A claim is discovered on the earlier of,
(a) the day on which the person with the claim first knew,
(i) that the injury, loss or damage had occurred,
(ii) that the injury, loss or damage was caused by or contributed to by an act or omission,
(iii) that the act or omission was that of the person against whom the claim is made, and
(iv) that, having regard to the nature of the injury, loss or damage, a proceeding would be an appropriate means to seek to remedy it; and
(b) the day on which a reasonable person with the abilities and in circumstances of the person with the claim first ought to have known of the matters referred to in clause (a).
[44] The plaintiffs realized there was an issue relating to the limitation period and in their statement of claim sought to address it at paragraphs 35 and 36;
At first blush, many of the claims pleaded herein appear to be statute barred as having not been commenced within the applicable limitation period. The plaintiffs plead that it was simply impossible to appreciate the involvement of each defendant in this vast fraud network until a Mareva injunction was granted over the assets of Hutchens and Tanya on March 18, 2011. The fruits of that injunction revealed that Hutchens and Tanya had established a network of participants in their fraud scheme and that each defendant to this proceeding in some way helped to ensure that the fraud scheme of Hutchens and Tanya would be successful.
The plaintiffs plead that the limitation period against each of the defendants only started to run, at a minimum, after the plaintiffs became aware of the Mareva Injunction and the documents that were generated as a result after March 18, 2011.
[45] Notwithstanding the foregoing, it is apparent from the record that Hillier had sufficient knowledge of Spiro’s alleged misconduct to complain to three different regulatory bodies in November and December of 2008. The allegations in those complaints are, in many respects, strikingly similar to the allegations against Spiro in the statement of claim. Hillier may have learned more as a result of the “Mareva injunction” granted in March 2011, but it is apparent from a review of his complaints to the regulatory bodies that by at least the end of 2008 he knew all that he needed to know, as contemplated by s. 5 of the Limitations Act, 2002, to commence the action against Spiro that was eventually started in May 2012, well outside the limitation period provided for under that Act.
[46] In the result I am satisfied that the claim against Spiro is statute barred and the action against him is dismissed.
[47] Having reached this conclusion I see no reason to address the other issues raised on this motion.
Costs
[48] The parties may make brief written submissions with respect to costs within 30 days.
Justice R. J. Haines
Released: October 30, 2012
COURT FILE NO.; 82-2012
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BRENT HILLIER and MAVERICK PAINTBALL INC.
Applicants
- and –
CRAIG (SANDY) HUTCHENS aka SANDY HUTCHENS aka SANDY CRAIG HUTCHENS aka CRAIG HUTCHENS aka MOISHE HUTCHENS aka CRAIG ALEXANDER aka MOISHE ALEXANDER aka MOSHE ALEXANDER aka MOISHE BEN AVAHAM aka MOISHE BEN AVOHOM aka BEN AVROHOM aka BEN AVRAHAM aka FRED HAYES aka ALEXANDER McDONALD aka ALEX McDONALD, DAVE MCDONALD aka MATHEW KOVEE, TANYA HUTCHENS aka TATIANA BRIK., TD CANADA TRUST, TD BANK FINANCIAL GROUP., DAVID MACENZIE, BARRY POULSON, ARSENEAU POULSON, MICHAEL SPIRO, LORNE HONICKMAN, MCGAGURE BORLACK LLP, ALVIN MEISELS, REZNICK, PARSONS MEISELS TABERNER, BLANEY MCMURTRY LLP, JAN LUISTERMANS aka HERMAN LUISTERMANS, REALTY 1 REAL ESTATE SERVICES LTD., FIFTH AVENUE PRIVATE INVESTIGATORS AND PARALEGAL, GARY WHITE, TOM WARREN, NET PATROL, RABBI MENDEL KAPLAN AND SHABAD@FLAMINGO, JACOB GRYN, CO4 COMPUTING INC.
Defendants
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
HAINES J.
Released: October 30, 2012