Assunta Mazzotta

Two brothers co-owned a family cottage and entered into a co-ownership agreement without legal advice.

When the plaintiff sought to sell his share, a dispute arose over the interpretation and validity of the buy-sell provision.

The plaintiff applied to enforce the provision or alternatively for a sale under the Partition Act, while the defendant applied for rectification of the agreement to match an earlier draft.

The Superior Court of Justice found the buy-sell provision void for uncertainty as it constituted an unenforceable agreement to agree.

The court dismissed the defendant's claim for rectification, finding no evidence of fraud or equivalent conduct.

Ultimately, the court ordered the sale of the property pursuant to the Partition Act and directed the net proceeds to be divided equally.

Two brothers filed competing applications regarding the buy-sell provision of a cottage co-ownership agreement.

One brother sought to enforce the written agreement, while the other sought rectification based on a prior draft.

The respondent argued the matter should proceed to trial due to factual disputes.

The court determined that the matter could not be resolved on a paper record due to conflicting evidence and credibility issues regarding the drafting and execution of the agreement.

The court ordered the applications consolidated and directed them to proceed to trial.

The applicant sought an order declaring a December 2014 will as the valid last will of the deceased, and invalidating a subsequent June 2015 will propounded by the respondent.

The respondent, who was the deceased's caregiver, had drafted the June 2015 will which named her as the primary beneficiary and estate trustee.

The court found that the respondent failed to prove due execution of the June 2015 will.

Furthermore, the court found significant suspicious circumstances surrounding the preparation of the will, including the deceased's isolation, dependency on the respondent, and the respondent's unauthorized use of the deceased's funds.

The respondent failed to rebut the presumption of invalidity with corroborating evidence.

The court declared the December 2014 will valid.

An international sale of goods dispute involving the purchase and delivery of frozen shrimp under a CIF contract.

The seller sought payment of the purchase price after the buyer refused to accept and pay for goods that could not clear Mexican customs.

The buyer argued the seller failed to provide proper import documentation and that the seller had a duty to mitigate by reselling the goods.

The Court of Appeal upheld the lower court's judgment for the full purchase price plus prejudgment interest at the contractual rate of 8%, finding that the duty to mitigate under the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods does not apply to actions for the price under Article 62, and that even if it did apply, the seller had taken reasonable mitigation measures given that the buyer retained title and possession of the goods.

The plaintiff brought an ex parte motion for default judgment in an action for goods sold and delivered.

The plaintiff sued the defendant as an individual doing business as a sole proprietorship.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the statement of claim was not properly served.

Because the defendant was identified as an individual, personal service was required under Rule 16.02(1)(a), but the affidavit of service indicated the document was left with an unidentified person at a place of business.

The plaintiff, Solea International BVBA, was the successful party on a motion for summary judgment and sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

The defendant, Bassett & Walker International Inc., opposed the substantial indemnity claim, arguing that Solea's offer to settle for the full claim amount was not a true "offer of compromise." The court found that Solea was entitled to rely on its offers and awarded costs on a substantial indemnity basis from the date of its offer.

The court also determined the calculation method for substantial indemnity costs for the second hearing.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment for the unpaid purchase price of a shipment of shrimp.

The Court of Appeal had previously directed a rehearing applying the Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG).

The defendant argued it was entitled to avoid the contract due to a defective Health Certificate and that the plaintiff's acceptance of the returned shrimp mitigated damages or constituted unjust enrichment.

The court found the defendant did not properly declare the contract avoided under the CISG and that there was no agreement excusing payment of the purchase price upon the return of the goods.

Summary judgment was granted to the plaintiff for the full purchase price plus 8% interest.

The defendant brought a motion for security for costs against the plaintiff, a foreign corporation suing for an unpaid invoice.

The plaintiff had previously obtained summary judgment, which was set aside on appeal solely because the application of the International Sales Conventions Act had not been considered.

The court dismissed the motion, finding it would be unjust to order security for costs given the plaintiff's prior success on the merits and the late stage of the proceeding.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment holding it liable for the full unpaid purchase price of frozen shrimp ($228,604.50 US) plus prejudgment interest.

The dispute arose from a contract between a Toronto-based company and a Belgian seafood trader for the purchase of shrimp from an Ecuadorian supplier.

The motion judge determined liability under Ontario common law without addressing whether the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods applied.

The Court of Appeal found that the proper law of the contract was a threshold issue that should have been addressed, as the Convention applies to international sales of goods between parties in different contracting states.

The court set aside the summary judgment and remitted the matter for a new hearing.

The plaintiff, Amgad, Inc., was previously granted summary judgment on its claim for $50,895.55 USD and the defendant's $1.0 million counterclaim was dismissed.

The plaintiff sought costs of $12,141.61 on an all-inclusive basis.

The defendant did not deliver any submissions opposing the request.

The court found the claim for costs to be overwhelmingly reasonable and awarded the requested amount.

Amgad, Inc., a diamond wholesaler, brought a summary judgment motion against Marquee Equity Inc. for $50,895.55 USD for unpaid diamonds.

Marquee admitted owing money but disputed the amount and filed a counterclaim for $1.0 million in damages for slander and intentional interference with contractual and business relations.

The court granted summary judgment to Amgad, finding the debt proven and Marquee's accounting discrepancy claims unsubstantiated.

The court dismissed Marquee's counterclaim, concluding that Amgad's statements about Marquee not paying its bills were truthful, thus providing a complete defence to defamation, and that no evidence supported claims of malice or economic harm.

Cashbloom Canada, ULC sought summary judgment against Ridgeway Design Centre Inc. and Jennifer Millar Giudice for an outstanding debt from a series of loan agreements.

The court dismissed unpleaded defences raised by the defendants regarding misleading agreements, contravention of the Unconscionable Transactions Relief Act, and criminal interest rates due to lack of pleading and evidence.

However, a genuine issue for trial was found regarding Mrs. Giudice's defence of innocent or negligent misrepresentation concerning her personal guarantee, as an email from Cashbloom suggested no impact on personal credit.

Summary judgment was granted against Ridgeway Design Centre Inc. for $119,200.44 plus interest and costs, but refused against Mrs. Giudice, with that part of the action proceeding to trial.

The action against Carmelo Giudice was dismissed on consent.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice and moved to admit fresh evidence demonstrating that the respondent was under administration in the UK after the statement of claim and in liquidation after judgment.

The appellant argued this fresh evidence showed the respondent was not entitled to pursue the claim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion to admit fresh evidence, finding it sufficiently clear from existing exhibits that the claim was a subrogated claim brought by the respondent's credit insurer and therefore not caught by bankruptcy proceedings.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

Solea International BVBA (Solea) brought a motion for summary judgment against Bassett & Walker International Inc. (BWI) for payment of a shrimp shipment.

BWI disputed liability, claiming Solea failed to provide proper import documents (a valid health certificate) for Mexican customs.

Solea countered that BWI's own actions prevented importation and that BWI had acknowledged payment responsibility.

The court applied the Hryniak v. Mauldin framework for summary judgment, finding no genuine issue requiring a trial.

The court determined there was no evidence of a deficient health certificate from Solea or that such a deficiency caused BWI's inability to import.

Instead, evidence suggested BWI failed to pay port fees.

The motion for summary judgment was granted in favour of Solea for $228,604.50 (U.S.), plus pre and post-judgment interest.

The plaintiff brought a motion for leave to examine a customer relations coordinator of the defendant tour operator under Rule 39.03(1) in advance of a pending summary judgment motion.

The underlying action involves a slip and fall at a resort in Cuba.

The plaintiff sought to examine the witness regarding the corporate relationship between the various defendants.

The court granted the motion, finding the threshold for such an examination is low and the plaintiff established the witness had relevant information that was more than a fishing expedition.

The appellant, a registered travel agency, appealed a decision by the Travel Industry Council of Ontario (TICO) denying six claims for compensation from the Travel Compensation Fund totalling $11,494.97.

The claims related to tickets purchased for Mexicana Airlines, which ceased operations and later declared bankruptcy.

TICO denied the claims due to insufficient documentation, specifically missing Billing and Settlement Plan (BSP) reports, to prove that the tickets were paid for and that refunds were not received.

The Licence Appeal Tribunal upheld TICO's decision, finding that the appellant failed to provide adequate evidence that it had submitted timely refund applications to the International Air Transport Association (IATA) and that it had not received refunds or credits for the claims in question.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant filed human rights applications alleging discrimination based on race and disability, and reprisal, against his former employer (Andorra), a client of the employer (TCSCC), his former family doctor (Dr. Chiu), and a hospital (Sunnybrook).

The respondents requested that the applications be dismissed at a summary hearing for having no reasonable prospect of success.

The Tribunal dismissed all allegations against Andorra, the TCSCC, and Dr. Chiu, finding no evidence linking their actions to the applicant's disability or race, or establishing an intent to retaliate.

The Tribunal also dismissed the reprisal allegation against Sunnybrook.

However, the Tribunal allowed the allegation that Sunnybrook failed to accommodate the applicant's mental health needs when it forcibly removed him from the hospital to proceed to mediation and a potential merits hearing.

The applicant travel agency brought a motion to stay the Licence Appeal Tribunal's decision directing the Registrar to revoke its registration under the Travel Industry Act, 2002, pending an appeal to the Divisional Court.

Applying the RJR-MacDonald test, the Tribunal found that the appeal raised a serious issue of statutory interpretation, that the applicant would suffer irreparable harm by being forced out of business if the stay were not granted, and that the balance of convenience favoured the applicant as the Registrar could continue to monitor its operations.

The motion for a stay was granted.

The applicant, a travel agency, appealed a Notice of Proposal by the Registrar to revoke its registration under the Travel Industry Act, 2002.

The Registrar argued that the applicant was associated with a bankrupt travel agency, MKI, because both were controlled by the same individual, Ron Greenwood.

The Registrar also argued that the applicant must reimburse the Compensation Fund for claims paid due to MKI's receivership, and that Greenwood's past conduct disentitled the applicant to registration.

The Licence Appeal Tribunal found that Greenwood was in de facto control of the applicant, making the companies associated.

The Tribunal held that the applicant was required to reimburse the Compensation Fund and that Greenwood's past conduct afforded reasonable grounds to believe the business would not be carried on with integrity and honesty.

The appeal was dismissed and the Registrar was directed to revoke the registration.

The plaintiff sought leave to appeal an order continuing a Mareva injunction on the condition that it post $50,000 as security for costs.

The plaintiff argued that the judge erred by using section 101 of the Courts of Justice Act to order security for costs instead of the specific regime under Rule 56.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding the judge had jurisdiction to impose the term under section 101 to do justice between the parties, especially given the plaintiff was an insolvent foreign resident whose undertaking as to damages was worthless.