Pathik Bipinchandra Baxi

The applicant property owner sought an order declaring an Occupancy Agreement and Option to Purchase Agreement null and void, and a Writ of Possession.

The respondent occupant had entered into a rent-to-own arrangement and attempted to exercise the option to purchase.

The applicant argued the respondent failed to strictly comply with the notice and deposit requirements of the option.

The court found the agreements constituted a bilateral contract, meaning strict compliance was not required and substantial performance was sufficient.

The court held the respondent substantially complied with the ambiguous terms of the agreement and dismissed the application.

The applicant property owners sought a writ of possession and the removal of a caution to complete the sale of a commercial unit to a third-party purchaser.

The respondent tenant, who had been overholding since the expiration of the original lease, claimed a First Right of Refusal (FRR) to match the purchase offer.

The court found that the FRR expired with the original lease and did not carry over into the overholding period.

The application was granted, the caution was ordered removed, and a writ of possession was issued.

The applicant mortgagee sought to vacate three instruments, including certificates of pending litigation, registered by the respondent against the mortgaged property.

The mortgagee had entered into an agreement of purchase and sale under its power of sale, and the purchaser requisitioned the removal of the instruments.

The court held that the application was premature, as section 35 of the Mortgages Act extinguishes subsequent encumbrances upon the completion of the sale by statutory declaration, making a court order unnecessary at this stage.

The application was adjourned until after the sale closes.

The defendant appealed a consent order authorizing the court-supervised sale of a property owned by his sister.

Following the consent order, the mortgages on the property went into default, and the first mortgagee exercised its power of sale, rendering the court-supervised sale moot.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding it was moot, futile, and that the defendant failed to seek or establish grounds for leave to appeal a consent order under section 133(a) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The applicants (vendors) brought an application for a declaration that the respondent (purchaser) repudiated two agreements of purchase and sale for a property to be severed.

The agreements required a second deposit upon severance approval.

The applicants obtained approval but delayed notifying the purchaser for months, then demanded the second deposit on unreasonably short notice while the purchaser was out of the country.

When the deposit was not paid by the deadline, the applicants terminated the agreements.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the applicants failed to act in good faith and set an unreasonable deadline, and therefore could not rely on the 'time is of the essence' clause to terminate the contract.

The appellants brought an appeal from a motion judge's decision dated December 6, 2018.

At the hearing, the appellants, who were self-represented, indicated their intention to withdraw the appeal.

After being advised of the consequences—that dismissal as abandoned would result in the motion judge's decision standing and the appeal not being heard—the appellants confirmed their understanding.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as abandoned and awarded costs to the respondent.

The moving defendants sought partial summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's action to recover an unpaid loan and lease payments, arguing they had no knowledge of the loan and that the claim was statute-barred.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that conflicting evidence regarding the parties' business relationships and an alleged payment that could extend the limitation period raised genuine issues requiring a trial.

The court declined to use its fact-finding powers, concluding that a trial was necessary to properly assess credibility and avoid the risk of duplicative proceedings or inconsistent findings.

The plaintiff moved under Rule 37.14 to set aside an order by Master McGraw that had previously set aside a 20-year-old default judgment obtained by the plaintiff.

The court found that the defendants had failed to provide proper notice to the plaintiff for their motion to set aside the default judgment and had not made full and frank disclosure regarding their knowledge of the original action and the plaintiff's contact information.

Considering additional evidence, the court determined that Master McGraw's order ought not to have been issued.

The plaintiff's motion was granted, and the original default judgment and writ of execution were restored.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment in a family law matter following an uncontested trial that proceeded after the appellant's pleadings were struck due to non-compliance with court orders.

The appellant sought a declaration that the vesting order granting title of the matrimonial home was made in error and challenged the award of spousal support as a lump sum payment from the sale proceeds.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the vesting order was appropriate given the appellant's repeated failures to comply with court orders, and that the trial judge's reasons adequately explained the decision.

Following a successful appeal that dismissed the plaintiffs' action against the moving defendants, the issue of costs for four summary judgment motions was returned to the motion judge.

The moving defendants sought substantial indemnity costs, arguing the plaintiffs alleged fraud and failed to accept a walk-away offer.

The court rejected these arguments, finding no fraud was pleaded and the communication was not a formal offer to settle.

Applying the principle of reasonableness and noting duplication of effort among multiple defence counsel, the court awarded partial indemnity costs fixed at a total of $235,000.

The husband sought an extension of time to file a notice of appeal from a final family law order, a stay of that order pending appeal, and relief regarding the matrimonial home.

The trial judge had struck the husband's pleadings for failure to comply with undertakings and court orders, resulting in an uncontested trial where the wife was awarded lump-sum spousal support of $248,734, an equalization payment, costs, and a restraining order.

The matrimonial home was ordered sold.

The husband delayed five months before seeking the extension of time, during which he attempted to frustrate the sale and develop a litigation strategy rather than prepare his appeal.

The Court of Appeal granted the extension of time but dismissed the stay request and awarded substantial indemnity costs to the wife.

The appellants, who were volunteer directors of corporations within the insolvent First Leaside group, appealed a motion judge's refusal to dismiss negligence and breach of fiduciary duty claims against them.

The plaintiffs, investors in the group, alleged the directors owed them a duty of care regarding the financial stewardship of the corporations.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal and dismissed the actions against the appellants, holding that a director's duty of care is owed to the corporation, not to individual shareholders or investors, absent specific circumstances like fraud or independent tortious conduct, which were not pleaded.

The appellant, Sikh Spiritual Centre Toronto, appealed a motion judge's decision refusing to set aside a consent order dated February 4, 2016 that enforced a settlement agreement between three not-for-profit charitable corporations operating Sikh temples.

The settlement concerned repayment of loaned monies.

The appellant argued the settlement was entered into without proper authority and was improvident.

The motion judge found the Director who authorized the settlement had proper authority from the Board of Directors and that the settlement was reasonable.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no palpable and overriding errors and declining to interfere with the discretionary costs award.

The appellants appealed interlocutory orders granting defamation and harassment injunctions, a publication ban, and substantial costs against them.

The dispute arose after the appellants created websites and online petitions expressing concern about their adult son's relationship with an older man, including hyperlinks to articles about online exploitation.

The Divisional Court found the motions judge applied the wrong test for defamation injunctions and that the websites alone were not clearly defamatory.

However, the court held that hyperlinking to the articles effectively identified the respondents, constituting publication.

The defamation injunction was narrowed to only require removal of the hyperlinks.

The harassment injunction and publication ban were set aside for lacking legal and evidentiary foundation.

The appeal was granted in part, with costs awarded to the appellants.

The moving party, a religious corporation, brought a motion to set aside a consent order that enforced a settlement agreement regarding unpaid loans.

The moving party argued the settlement was executed by a rogue director without board authorization and that its former counsel consented to the order against instructions.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the director had consulted the board and obtained approval, the counsel acted on valid instructions, and there was no material change in circumstances or clear injustice to warrant setting aside the final order.

Following summary judgment motions brought by nine defendants, which were largely dismissed but resulted in the narrowing of the plaintiffs' claims, the court determined the issue of costs.

The plaintiffs sought $182,725 on a partial indemnity basis, while the defendants sought $289,249.

The court found that the plaintiffs were generally successful as the actions were not dismissed, but granted the defendants a 25% credit ($72,000) for their partial success in narrowing the issues.

The plaintiffs were awarded net costs of $100,000.

A motion to reconsider an order by Justice Gloria Epstein dismissing an appeal for delay.

The appellant sought to challenge the dismissal, arguing inadequate notice and that the time for perfection should be extended.

The Court of Appeal upheld Epstein J.A.'s decision, finding no merit in the appellant's submissions and confirming that the entire history of the proceeding could be considered in assessing delay.

The appeal was properly dismissed for delay by the registrar.

The motion was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The defendants, Sharon Gooden-Allen and Desmond Allen, defaulted on a second charge on their property, which was subsequently transferred from Surrinder Jass to Sean Wilson.

Wilson then entered an Agreement of Purchase and Sale (APS) with Sean Brown.

The Allens challenged the validity of the assignment and the propriety of the sale, bringing a motion to stay the APS.

Wilson brought a cross-motion to have an order to continue the action made *nunc pro tunc*.

The court found the assignment of the charge to Wilson to be valid and the APS bona fide, dismissing the Allens' motion to stay the sale.

Wilson's motion for a *nunc pro tunc* order to continue was granted, allowing him to enforce the judgment and exercise his rights as chargee in possession.

The Superior Court of Justice issued a costs endorsement following an appeal and subsequent motion to reopen.

The appellant had appealed a building permit revocation, which was upheld by both the Superior Court and Divisional Court.

The appellant then successfully moved to reopen the appeal to introduce new evidence (Exhibit H), but the court found Exhibit H to be fraudulent.

The court dismissed the appellant's new arguments as *res judicata* and on their merits.

Due to the appellant's conduct, including presenting a fraudulent document and making unproven allegations, the court awarded full indemnity costs of $50,976.96 plus interest to the respondents.

The Defendants sought leave to appeal a series of interim decisions by Snowie J., which included granting injunctions against defamation and harassment, a publication ban, and substantial costs awards, in two separate actions brought by S.R. and V.B. against the Defendants.

The court granted leave to appeal on all issues, finding conflicting legal principles regarding defamation injunctions, uncertainty in the evolving torts of harassment and intrusion upon seclusion, and procedural irregularities and open court principle concerns regarding the publication ban.

The costs award was also subject to appeal as it flowed from the underlying decisions.