Cheryl Gerhardt McLuckie

The plaintiffs brought a motion arising from a discovery dispute, seeking to exclude one co-defendant from the virtual discovery of the other and requesting costs thrown away for previously cancelled discoveries.

The court found that the risks of improper collaboration are heightened during virtual discoveries when co-defendants are in the same location without counsel present.

The court ordered that the co-defendants be examined in the absence of each other.

The request for costs thrown away was denied due to both counsel's failure to communicate effectively and agree on a discovery plan.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment finding it liable in nuisance and negligence for the migration of chemical contaminants from its property to the respondent's property.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge failed to assess incremental damage caused after the appellant had knowledge of the migration.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellant could not advance a fundamentally new theory of defence that was neither pleaded nor supported by evidence at trial.

The court also upheld the trial judge's discretionary award of prejudgment interest.

The plaintiffs, owners of a commercial property, sued the defendants for environmental contamination allegedly emanating from a neighbouring gas station.

Pending trial, the plaintiffs brought a motion for an order under the oppression remedy of the Business Corporations Act requiring the defendants to pay $8,000,000 into court as security, or alternatively, a Mareva injunction freezing the defendants' assets.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the plaintiffs, as potential creditors with an unliquidated claim, did not qualify as complainants under the oppression remedy.

The court also denied the Mareva injunction, concluding there was no real risk of asset dissipation.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal the order of Justice Robert Smith dated July 7, 2021.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the responding parties fixed at $10,000 all inclusive.

Following a judgment awarding the plaintiff damages for diminution in property value and engineering expenses due to environmental contamination, the parties disputed the calculation of prejudgment interest.

The plaintiff sought interest from the date the defendant was put on notice of the contamination at the presumptive rate of 1.3%, while the defendant argued for a later date and lower rate.

The court agreed with the plaintiff, finding no reason to depart from the presumptive rate or the date the cause of action arose, and awarded prejudgment interest accordingly.

Following a successful motion for class action certification regarding PFAS groundwater contamination, the plaintiffs sought costs against the unsuccessful defendant, the National Research Council of Canada (NRC).

A successful co-defendant, Carleton University, sought costs against the plaintiffs.

Applying the factors under Rule 57, the court ordered NRC to pay the plaintiffs $207,500 in costs on a partial indemnity scale.

The plaintiffs were ordered to pay Carleton University $20,000 plus HST in costs.

The plaintiffs brought a motion seeking an order under s. 248 of the Business Corporations Act requiring the defendants to pay $8 million into court as security for an environmental contamination claim.

Prior to the motion, the parties exchanged offers to settle.

While they agreed on the security amount, they disagreed on when and how the costs of the motion would be determined.

The defendants argued a settlement was reached and brought a motion to enforce it, claiming costs were a collateral issue.

The court found that costs were an essential term of the settlement offers and, because there was no unequivocal acceptance of all terms, no binding settlement was reached.

The motion to enforce the settlement was dismissed.

The plaintiff, former owner of a commercial property, sued the neighbouring property owner for environmental contamination caused by the migration of dry-cleaning solvents (PCE, TCE, DCE).

The defendant purchased the neighbouring property in 2007 and was put on notice of the contamination in 2010 but failed to take reasonable steps to investigate or remediate the issue, ignoring Ministry of the Environment requests until a Provincial Officer's Order was issued.

The court found the defendant liable in nuisance and negligence for allowing the continuing migration of contaminants after acquiring knowledge of the issue.

The plaintiff was awarded $1,291,307.21 in damages, representing the diminution in the property's market value and reasonable engineering expenses incurred to obtain a Record of Site Condition.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to certify a class proceeding against the National Research Council of Canada (NRC) and Carleton University, alleging that PFAS contaminants from NRC's National Fire Laboratory migrated into the groundwater of adjacent properties.

The court certified the class action against NRC for claims in strict liability, nuisance, negligence, and statutory breaches, finding that the pleadings disclosed causes of action and that a class proceeding was the preferable procedure.

The court dismissed the claim for punitive damages against NRC and refused to certify the common issues against Carleton University due to a lack of evidence connecting its activities to the contamination.

The appellant appealed a condition in its Environmental Compliance Approval that reduced the allowable spreading rate of septage at its disposal site.

The parties reached a settlement agreement to amend the condition to allow a higher weekly spreading rate while maintaining a reduced monthly maximum to protect groundwater.

The Environmental Review Tribunal found the settlement consistent with the Environmental Protection Act and in the public interest, directed the amendment of the condition, and dismissed the appeal upon its withdrawal.

The appellant, a secured creditor of a bankrupt renewable energy company, appealed the dismissal of its action against the Independent Electricity System Operator (IESO).

The appellant argued that the IESO wrongfully treated a renewable energy contract as terminated upon the debtor's bankruptcy, thwarting the appellant's attempt to assign the contract to a third party.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the contract automatically terminated upon bankruptcy, that this termination did not violate the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act stay of proceedings or the common law anti-deprivation rule, and that the IESO did not breach its contractual obligations or act negligently.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, the court determined the issue of costs.

The court awarded costs to the defendant on a partial indemnity basis, fixed at $5,898.75 plus disbursements and HST.

The costs were ordered payable only upon the final resolution of the action by judgment or settlement.

The appellant property manager appealed an interlocutory order dismissing its motion to strike a third party claim brought by the respondent developers.

The respondents sought contribution and indemnity from the appellant for alleged construction deficiencies and maintenance failures at a condominium.

The appellant argued the third party claim should be struck because the respondents did not assert an independent cause of action against it.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that a defendant does not need an independent cause of action against a third party to bring a claim under the Negligence Act, provided the defendant is exposed to joint and several liability for damages caused to the plaintiff.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to strike the defendants' statement of defence, either in its entirety or specific paragraphs, alleging breaches of pleading rules, irrelevance, scandalous, frivolous, vexatious, prolix, argumentative content, and improper allegations regarding the plaintiffs' motive.

The court also addressed a preliminary issue of settlement privilege concerning a letter.

The Master ruled the letter was protected by settlement privilege and ordered its removal from the record.

While declining to strike the entire statement of defence, the Master struck specific paragraphs (3, 50, 60, 67, 68, 71) with leave to amend, finding them to be scandalous, frivolous, and vexatious due to an absence of material facts, argumentative nature, bare allegations, inflammatory attacks, or bare conclusions and opinions.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' environmental contamination action on the basis that it was commenced after the expiry of the two-year limitation period.

The plaintiffs argued that the limitation period was tolled under s. 5(1)(a)(iv) of the Limitations Act because the ongoing involvement of the Ministry of the Environment constituted an alternative process, making a court proceeding inappropriate.

The court held that the Ministry's involvement did not toll the limitation period because it was not an alternative dispute resolution process with a reasonably ascertainable end date, and the plaintiffs' decision to delay litigation was tactical.

The motion for summary judgment was granted and the action was dismissed.

The plaintiff sought damages of approximately $4.8 million for breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of the duty of good faith arising from a renewable energy contract.

The plaintiff acquired the secured debt of a company that had a contract with the defendant to build a biomass energy facility.

When the company filed for bankruptcy, the defendant treated the contract as automatically terminated pursuant to its terms, requiring the plaintiff to seek a new agreement.

The court dismissed the action, finding that the contract unambiguously provided for automatic termination upon bankruptcy, the defendant did not act in bad faith, and the plaintiff failed to mitigate its damages and prove an enforceable agreement for the sale of the contract.

The appellants, who were volunteer directors of corporations within the insolvent First Leaside group, appealed a motion judge's refusal to dismiss negligence and breach of fiduciary duty claims against them.

The plaintiffs, investors in the group, alleged the directors owed them a duty of care regarding the financial stewardship of the corporations.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal and dismissed the actions against the appellants, holding that a director's duty of care is owed to the corporation, not to individual shareholders or investors, absent specific circumstances like fraud or independent tortious conduct, which were not pleaded.

Two appeals from a trial judgment concerning liability for environmental remediation of real property contaminated by dry cleaning solvents.

The trial judge found Fraser Hillary's Limited liable in nuisance and under section 99 of the Environmental Protection Act, awarding over $1.8 million in damages for remediation.

The action against David Hillary was dismissed.

Fraser appealed on grounds that the trial judge erred in finding it liable in nuisance and under the EPA.

The plaintiff appealed on grounds that the trial judge erred in failing to find negligence, failing to find the individual defendant liable in nuisance or negligence, and in assessing damages.

The appellate court dismissed both appeals, upholding the trial judgment.

Following a trial where the plaintiff was awarded over $1.8 million in damages for environmental contamination against one defendant but was unsuccessful against another, the court determined the costs payable by the unsuccessful defendant.

The court rejected the plaintiff's request for substantial indemnity costs, finding the defendant's conduct was not egregious.

The court applied a partial indemnity scale, reducing the fees by 10% to account for the successful co-defendant's involvement, and by a further 15% to reflect divided success on the issues and limited financial success compared to the amount claimed.

Total costs of $214,890.44 were awarded to the plaintiff.

The plaintiff brought a motion to strike out the defendants' Statement of Defence and Counterclaim, or specific parts thereof, alleging contravention of Rule 25 of the Rules of Civil Procedure by pleading evidence (especially technical opinion evidence), improper references to legal counsel, and argument.

The defendants argued their pleading contained material facts relevant to their defence and limitations.

The court found that many paragraphs contained opinion evidence, irrelevant references to legal counsel, or argument, and ordered specific paragraphs and sentences struck out with leave to amend, but declined to strike the entire pleading.