Marisa Victor

The plaintiff sued police officers and the police board arising from a warrantless arrest at her residence, the force used during arrest and detention, subsequent charging decisions, and her treatment in custody.

The court held the arrest was unlawful under both the Trespass to Property Act and the Criminal Code, found excessive force against two officers, and found one arresting officer liable for negligent investigation.

The court also found breaches of ss. 7, 8, and 9 of the Charter, including unreasonable search, arbitrary detention, and a serious s. 7 breach arising from the removal of the plaintiff’s clothing and leaving her naked in a cell for over two hours.

The board was not directly liable for negligent training or supervision absent expert evidence, but was vicariously and statutorily liable for the tortious conduct of liable officers.

Damages were awarded for general damages, loss of earning capacity, expenses, and Charter breaches, but punitive damages were refused.

The plaintiffs sued the Ottawa Police Services Board and several officers for negligent investigation, false arrest, and Charter breaches following a dramatic police raid on their home.

The raid stemmed from a long-standing neighbourhood dispute over a drainage pipe, which led an investigating officer to obtain a public safety warrant and arrest the plaintiff for mischief and intimidation.

The court found the officer's investigation was negligent, as he failed to interview key witnesses or consider the lack of urgency.

The court also held the arrest was unlawful and the search violated section 8 of the Charter due to material omissions in the warrant application and the unreasonable use of a SWAT team.

The plaintiffs were awarded damages for false arrest, negligent investigation, wrongful seizure of firearms, and Charter breaches.

The plaintiff, a member of the university's men's varsity hockey team, brought a proposed class action against the university and its president after the entire team was suspended following sexual assault allegations against two players.

The defendants brought a motion to strike the claims of negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and misfeasance in public office under Rule 21.01(1)(b).

The court dismissed the motion to strike the negligence claim, finding a recognized duty of care between the university and its students.

However, the court struck the claims for breach of fiduciary duty and misfeasance in public office, as the university had multiple competing interests to balance and there were no facts pleaded to support bad faith or dishonesty.

This decision addresses costs arising from multiple motions in two related commercial actions involving contractual disputes and counterclaims between corporate parties.

The court evaluated costs under Rules 1.04(1.1) and 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, considering proportionality, complexity, success on the motions, counsel time and rates, and litigation conduct.

One party had obtained judgment without trial in the first action and succeeded on several motions, while the opposing party succeeded on certain procedural motions and defeated a motion to dismiss the second action based on a forum selection clause.

The court declined to award substantial indemnity costs and instead allocated partial indemnity costs reflecting divided success.

Specific cost awards were made payable between the parties depending on the particular motions and outcomes.

Montel brought a motion to strike the defendants' counterclaims and for judgment on unpaid invoices in Action No. 1.

The defendants sought to stay Action No. 1 and consolidate it with Action No. 2, which involved claims for breach of a distribution agreement.

Montel also moved to dismiss Action No. 2 based on a forum selection clause.

The court struck the counterclaims in Action No. 1 as duplicitous of claims in Action No. 2 and granted judgment to Montel for the unpaid invoices, refusing a stay.

The court dismissed Montel's jurisdictional motion, finding the validity of the agreement containing the forum clause was a triable issue.

Finally, the court allowed Kipawa to be added as a plaintiff in Action No. 2 but denied consolidation, ordering consecutive trials instead.

Following the striking of a statement of claim alleging conspiracy, defamation, misfeasance in public office, and related torts against numerous defendants, the court determined the quantum of costs payable on the successful pleadings motion.

Multiple defendant groups sought more than $205,000 in partial indemnity fees and over $20,000 in disbursements.

Applying Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the fairness principles articulated in Boucher, the court considered duplication of effort among separately represented defendants with similar interests.

The court concluded that substantial overlap existed between certain defendants’ legal work and therefore limited recovery to a single set of costs for those parties.

Reduced costs totalling $108,000 in fees plus $10,560 in disbursements were awarded, subject to HST.

The plaintiff, a former Member of Parliament and cabinet minister, sued the prime minister, his senior advisors, and others for conspiracy, defamation, and other torts following her removal from cabinet and the Conservative Party caucus.

The defendants brought a motion to strike the statement of claim.

The court granted the motion, finding that the decisions to remove the plaintiff from cabinet and caucus were protected by Crown prerogative and parliamentary privilege, respectively, and were therefore not justiciable.

The court also held that communications between the prime minister and his advisors were protected by absolute privilege, and that the Conservative Party of Canada, as an unincorporated association, lacked the capacity to be sued.

In a copyright appeal, the Court considered whether pre-existing sound recordings embedded in film and television soundtracks remain subject to equitable remuneration under s. 19 of the Copyright Act when the soundtrack accompanies a cinematographic work.

Applying modern statutory interpretation, the Court held that the soundtrack exclusion in the definition of sound recording captures pre-existing recordings in that context.

The Court found this reading consistent with the legislative scheme, parliamentary intent, and international obligations under the Rome Convention.

As a result, the proposed tariffs could not be certified for performances or communications of recordings when accompanying cinematographic works.