John D. Dempster

The defendants brought motions to strike the plaintiff's statement of claim, which sought contribution and indemnity, damages, and disgorgement arising from the defendants' alleged involvement in a Ponzi scheme operated by Golden Oaks.

The court struck the claims for contribution and indemnity without leave to amend, finding no common liability to third parties and no viable duty of care owed to the unsecured creditors.

The claims for damages were struck with leave to amend to properly plead the losses suffered by the company.

The claims for disgorgement and accounting were permitted to proceed.

The Trustee in Bankruptcy sought costs after successfully prosecuting seventeen lawsuits against individuals and companies who received payments from a bankrupt entity.

The court determined reasonable costs, discounting for settled actions and applying Small Claims Court caps where applicable, ultimately awarding $232,500 in total costs and allocating them among the defendants.

The Trustee in Bankruptcy of Golden Oaks Enterprises Inc., a company that operated a Ponzi scheme, brought 17 actions against various investors to recover payments made to them prior to the bankruptcy.

The Trustee sought recovery under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act for preferential payments and transfers at undervalue, and under the common law for unjust enrichment regarding usurious interest and commission payments.

The court found that Golden Oaks was a Ponzi scheme and was insolvent when the payments were made.

The court granted the preference claims against certain defendants who were not dealing at arm's length with the company.

The court also granted the unjust enrichment claims for the return of usurious interest payments, finding that the promissory notes providing for criminal rates of interest were illegal and did not constitute a juristic reason for the enrichment.

The claims for return of commission payments were dismissed, as the referral agreements did not violate the Securities Act and provided a juristic reason for the payments.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' environmental contamination action on the basis that it was commenced after the expiry of the two-year limitation period.

The plaintiffs argued that the limitation period was tolled under s. 5(1)(a)(iv) of the Limitations Act because the ongoing involvement of the Ministry of the Environment constituted an alternative process, making a court proceeding inappropriate.

The court held that the Ministry's involvement did not toll the limitation period because it was not an alternative dispute resolution process with a reasonably ascertainable end date, and the plaintiffs' decision to delay litigation was tactical.

The motion for summary judgment was granted and the action was dismissed.

A self-represented litigant sought to extend the time to bring a motion for leave to appeal an order of the Divisional Court that had upheld a master's decision dismissing his action against a commercial landlord.

The applicant had missed the 15-day deadline by three days but delayed nine months before bringing the motion to extend time.

Two motion judges refused the extension.

The Court of Appeal panel reversed both orders and granted the extension, finding that the justice of the case favoured extension based on the applicant's maintained intention to appeal, absence of prejudice to the respondent, and arguable errors in the courts below regarding jurisdiction and the application of the striking rule.

The appellants appealed from an order dismissing their motion to strike claims for usurious interest and unlawful commissions in actions brought by the trustee in bankruptcy of the promoters of an alleged Ponzi scheme.

The appellants argued the order was final because it determined a question of law regarding whether the claims were statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The Court of Appeal held that the order was interlocutory, not final, and therefore the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

The court found that the motion judge did not formally invoke the applicable rule for determining questions of law, the formal order simply dismissed the motion without making a binding determination, and the motion was premature as pleadings had not closed.

The applicant, a professional engineer, sought judicial review of a decision by the respondent's Complaints Committee refusing to refer his complaint against another engineer to the Discipline Committee.

The applicant alleged the other engineer engaged in professional misconduct by inappropriately sharing confidential shop drawings with a competitor and having a conflict of interest.

The Divisional Court found that while the Complaints Committee's written reasons were defective for lacking transparency, the record before the Committee provided ample justification for its decision.

Applying the principles from Newfoundland Nurses, the court supplemented the reasons with the record and concluded the decision was reasonable.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The defendants brought a motion to strike the plaintiff bankruptcy trustee's claims for the return of usurious interest and unlawful commissions paid as part of a Ponzi scheme.

The defendants argued the claims were statute-barred and that breach of statute is not a valid civil cause of action.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the limitation period did not begin to run until the trustee completed its investigation into the complex fraud.

The court also granted the plaintiff's cross-motion to amend the pleadings to explicitly frame the claims in unjust enrichment.

The plaintiff, Doyle Salewski Inc. (DSI), as Trustee in Bankruptcy for Golden Oaks Enterprises Inc. and Joseph Gilles Jean Claude Lacasse, brought claims against various defendants, including Victor Laschewski, for recovery of usurious interest and unlawful commissions arising from an alleged Ponzi scheme.

The defendant Laschewski brought a motion to strike DSI's claims, arguing they were statute-barred due to expired limitation periods and failed to disclose a cause of action.

DSI brought a cross-motion for leave to amend its statements of claim to explicitly plead unjust enrichment.

The court dismissed the defendant's motion to strike, finding that the claims were not statute-barred due to the discoverability rule in bankruptcy/fraudulent schemes and that unjust enrichment was a valid cause of action.

The court granted DSI leave to amend its statements of claim.

The parties were former joint investors in two real estate properties.

The defendant paid the plaintiff $195,000, which the defendant claimed was a full settlement for both properties, while the plaintiff claimed it was only for one.

Three years into the litigation, the defendant brought a motion to amend his statement of defence, withdraw admissions, and add a counterclaim alleging he overpaid the plaintiff.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the admissions were advertent and that allowing the amendments would fundamentally alter the factual narrative, causing prejudice to the plaintiff that could not be remedied by costs.

The defendant brought a motion seeking removal of the plaintiff’s counsel as solicitor of record on the basis of an alleged conflict of interest and risk to solicitor‑client privilege.

The motion relied on the fact that the plaintiff’s counsel maintained offices in the same building as another lawyer who had previously represented the defendant in an unrelated real estate transaction.

The court applied the principles from MacDonald Estate v. Martin regarding protection of confidential information and the competing values of maintaining professional integrity and preserving a litigant’s choice of counsel.

The evidence established that the two lawyers operated entirely separate practices with independent systems, staff, and files, and had not shared confidential information.

The motion was dismissed and the matter was ordered into case management due to the defendant now being self‑represented.

The applicant filed an application alleging discrimination in employment on the basis of sex, sexual orientation, and disability.

The Tribunal held a summary hearing to determine whether the application had a reasonable prospect of success.

The respondent argued that the applicant was terminated for threatening behaviour and that there was no medical evidence of a disability or capacity to work.

The Tribunal found that the applicant might be able to establish a link between his disability and the termination, as the behaviour leading to termination may have been caused by his disability.

The Tribunal declined to dismiss the application and ordered it to proceed to a one-day hearing where the applicant must call his case.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his wrongful dismissal claim, arguing he was misled during a workplace investigation interview.

The trial judge found the appellant lied about the content of emails with a subordinate and his personal use of company equipment, and agreed to be a party to his subordinate's falsehood.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's application of the McKinley proportionality test, finding the dishonesty was work-related and breached the trust required of managers.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The purchasers entered into an agreement to buy land, but it was later discovered the vendor owned 12% less land than described.

The purchasers sought specific performance with an abatement of the purchase price.

The trial judge dismissed the claim for an abatement and allowed the vendor's counterclaim for delay damages.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed the decision, holding that a purchaser is generally entitled to specific performance with an abatement where the vendor cannot convey the whole property, and the trial judge erred in his application of equitable principles.

The appeal was allowed, the abatement granted, and the counterclaim dismissed.