Bruce O’Toole

The plaintiff, Rockface Capital Advisors Ltd., brought a summary judgment motion against the defendant, Mountain Province Diamonds Inc., seeking US$126,500 plus interest and costs for services rendered under a debt consultant contract.

The dispute centered on the interpretation of a contract clause defining the "Success Fee" as 0.25% of the "principal debt," with specific exclusions for accrued interest and capitalized financing fees.

Rockface argued for the full loan facility amount, while Mountain Province contended that certain fees and interest should be deducted.

The court found the contract language clear, supporting Mountain Province's interpretation, and dismissed the summary judgment motion.

The defendants brought a motion to strike the plaintiff's claim and sought a declaration that Nova Scotia law governed their Aircraft Management and Operating Agreement.

The court determined that Ontario law was the proper law of the agreement, applying principles of issue estoppel, rectification of mistake, bona fide choice of law, and public policy (attornment).

The motion to strike was granted in part: claims for regulatory complaint, inducing breach of contract against the corporate defendant, and oppression remedy were struck without leave to amend.

Claims for unlawful means and charter revenue were struck with leave to amend.

The request to strike the declaratory relief regarding a possessory lien was dismissed.

Following a prior proceeding, the court determined the appropriate costs payable by the unsuccessful party.

The successful defendants sought costs under s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and rule 57.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court considered factors including indemnity, the reasonable expectations of the parties, and the fairness and reasonableness of the time and rates charged.

The court awarded the Drabble defendants the full amount claimed, finding the costs reasonable and reasonably anticipated, but reduced the costs sought by the Webb defendants after concluding their time spent was excessive in the circumstances.

The defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing a negligence and breach of contract claim against financial advisors on the basis that the action was statute‑barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The plaintiff alleged negligent investment advice relating to a 2010 flow‑through investment that generated significant capital gains tax.

The court applied the discoverability principle under ss. 4 and 5 of the Act and held that the plaintiff knew or ought reasonably to have known the material facts when he received and approved his 2010 income tax return in May 2011.

The plaintiff’s failure to carefully review the return did not postpone the commencement of the limitation period.

As the action was commenced more than two years later, the claim was barred.

Following a successful motion by the plaintiffs for leave to issue a Certificate of Pending Litigation and dismissal of a defendant’s cross-motion to strike affidavit evidence, the court determined the issue of costs.

The plaintiffs sought partial-indemnity costs supported by a detailed bill of costs.

The defendant argued that costs should be reserved for the trial judge due to limited financial resources, potential indemnification rights, and the plaintiffs’ CCAA protection.

The court held that impecuniosity, potential indemnification, and speculative trial costs considerations were not valid reasons to deny or delay a costs award.

Partial-indemnity costs were awarded to the successful moving parties.