Caitlin E. Milne

The appellant was tried for offences related to spousal abuse and applied for a stay of proceedings on the basis that his right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter had been infringed.

The trial judge included the period between the end of evidence and argument and the release of the stay decision in calculating total delay, found the net delay exceeded the Jordan presumptive ceiling, and granted the stay.

The Court of Appeal set aside the stay, holding that under R. v. K.G.K. that period should not be counted, bringing total delay below 30 months.

The Supreme Court of Canada affirmed the Court of Appeal, finding the appellant had not established that the remaining 29.25 months of delay was markedly longer than reasonable in the broader context of the trial.

Various creditors of 1671379 Ontario Inc. and Manuel Elkind brought motions to determine priority status for garnishment payments owed by the City of St. Catharines and Region of Niagara under a Brownfield Tax Increment Based Incentive Grant Program Agreement (BTIG).

The primary dispute was between MCAP Financial Corporation, which held a registered and perfected security interest under the Personal Property Security Act (PPSA), and Assignment Credit Corp. (ACC), which claimed priority based on an assignment of a prior judgment.

The court found that MCAP's security interest, including the proceeds of the BTIG, maintained its priority status despite being reduced to a shortfall judgment.

The court dismissed ACC's claim for priority, finding that its assigned interest was subject to MCAP's prior perfected security and that ACC's claim should be limited to $400,000 as per a "Side Deal" in a previous endorsement.

The defendant sought to schedule an anti-SLAPP motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act in a Small Claims Court action.

The court, relying on the Ontario Court of Appeal's decision in Laurentide Kitchens Inc. v. Homestars Inc., ruled that anti-SLAPP motions are incompatible with the summary procedures and objectives of the Small Claims Court, regardless of whether they are heard by a deputy judge, administrative judge, or a Superior Court judge sitting as a Small Claims Court judge.

Consequently, the anti-SLAPP motion was not scheduled.

Instead, the court scheduled a motion to transfer the existing Small Claims Court action to the Superior Court of Justice, allowing the defendant to pursue the anti-SLAPP relief in the appropriate forum.

This is a costs endorsement following successful summary judgment motions by the defendants.

The court determined the scale and amount of costs payable by the plaintiffs to the defendants.

The defendants sought substantial indemnity costs based on their offers to settle, which proposed dismissal of the action without costs.

The court found that such offers, while relevant, do not automatically attract substantial indemnity costs, and awarded partial indemnity costs, considering factors like success, complexity, amounts at stake, and litigation conduct.

The plaintiffs, who held a right of first refusal (ROFR) over certain wind farm assets, sued the vendor and the third-party purchaser, alleging they conspired to artificially inflate the purchase price allocation of the ROFR assets to discourage the plaintiffs from exercising their rights.

The plaintiffs sought damages for breach of the duty of good faith, breach of fiduciary duty, conspiracy, and inducing breach of contract.

On cross-motions for summary judgment, the court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims, finding that the vendor acted in good faith and the purchaser was entitled to act in its own commercial self-interest.

The court held that a difference in valuation or a strategic bid allocation does not, without more, constitute a breach of the duty of good faith or an intent to eviscerate the ROFR.

The Crown appealed a Superior Court order staying charges against three respondents (two brothers and their mother) due to unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The trial judge had calculated the delay at 32 months, exceeding the 30-month Jordan ceiling.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in law by including the period from the end of evidence and argument until the stay decision in the Jordan ceiling calculation, based on the Supreme Court's decision in R. v. K.G.K. Correcting this error reduced the net delay to 29.25 months, falling below the ceiling.

The Court also found no error in the trial judge's characterization of other delay periods and concluded that the delay was not unreasonable, even if below the ceiling.

The appeal was allowed, the stay order was set aside, and the matter was remitted to the trial judge to release the verdict.