Timothy Flannery

Following the successful dismissal of the plaintiffs' defamation action under the anti-SLAPP provisions of the Courts of Justice Act, the moving parties (defendants) sought full indemnity costs totalling over $1.1 million.

The court awarded full indemnity costs as requested, subject to a reduction for the costs of non-active counsel, clerks, or students.

The court also apportioned liability, finding one plaintiff jointly and severally liable only for costs related to the OMA dispute, while the other plaintiff was solely liable for costs related to the COVID-19 dispute.

The plaintiffs, two physicians, brought a $12 million defamation action against over 20 defendants, including other physicians, journalists, and media organizations.

The claims arose from two main disputes: an internal Ontario Medical Association (OMA) dispute and public criticism of the plaintiffs' controversial tweets regarding COVID-19, in which they opposed vaccines and lockdowns and promoted hydroxychloroquine.

The defendants brought anti-SLAPP motions under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court found that the defendants' expressions related to matters of public interest and that the plaintiffs failed to show their claims had substantial merit or that the defendants lacked valid defences, such as fair comment and qualified privilege.

The court also found that the public interest in protecting the defendants' expressions far outweighed any harm suffered by the plaintiffs.

The action was dismissed against all defendants.

The plaintiff, Kathleen Anne Cruikshank, on behalf of the Estate of Ross Gerrard Cruikshank, brought a motion for summary judgment seeking damages for the alleged non-repayment of private loans by the defendants, Randy Kennedy and VLC Global Ministries.

The defendants sought dismissal of the plaintiff's motion and summary judgment in their favour.

The court found that the Consolidated Loan was fully repaid through a combination of cash, cheques, and "contra agreements" for services and housing.

For the Second Loan, the court found the plaintiff's evidence unreliable and inconsistent with documentary evidence and the defendant's credible testimony, concluding that the plaintiff failed to prove outstanding debt.

The court granted summary judgment to the defendants, dismissing the plaintiff's motion and action.

The parties brought cross-motions regarding refusals and undertakings from examinations for discovery.

The plaintiff sought to compel answers from the defendants and the Attorney General, while the Attorney General sought to compel answers from the plaintiff, clarify the scope of the pleadings, and obtain foundational information for the plaintiff's expert report.

The court ordered the plaintiff to produce a refused sales graph, amend its pleadings to clarify the temporal scope and damages claim, and provide the foundational information for its expert report.

The plaintiff's motion against the Attorney General was dismissed, as the court found the undertaking regarding correspondence with U.S. regulators was adequately answered.

Following the first stage of a bifurcated trial where the applicant successfully had a separation agreement set aside, the court determined the issue of costs.

The applicant sought $60,000, while the respondent argued for a partial indemnity award of $11,000.

The court found the applicant was presumptively entitled to costs and his counsel's rates were reasonable.

However, the court limited the award to fees and disbursements connected to the first stage of the trial and noted the applicant's offer to settle did not strictly comply with the seven-day rule under subrule 18(14).

The court awarded the applicant $22,000 in costs.

The applicant husband sought to set aside a separation agreement drafted and mediated by the parties' religious pastor.

The pastor, who owed the parties a significant amount of money, acted in a conflict of interest.

The husband, suffering from significant medical and cognitive issues, signed the agreement without independent legal advice.

The court applied the Miglin framework and found the agreement was unconscionable, failed to reflect legislative objectives, and was signed under circumstances where the husband was unable to protect himself.

The separation agreement was set aside in its entirety.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his defamation claim against the County of Simcoe and its employee, as well as the substantial indemnity costs award.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that there was no evidence of malice to defeat the respondents' qualified privilege in gathering information for an Ontario Works file.

The court also upheld the costs award, noting that the appellant's unproven allegations of fraud justified costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing his claim for intentional infliction of mental suffering against the defendants.

The motion judge found that the appellant failed to demonstrate a genuine triable issue regarding whether he suffered a 'visible illness' as a result of the defendants' conduct.

The Court of Appeal agreed, noting the lack of medical evidence, and dismissed the appeal, including the appeal of the costs order.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of a recusal motion.

The appellant argued that the case management judge should have recused herself due to improper and inaccurate correspondence sent by the respondents' solicitor.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that a reasonable, informed member of the public would not have concerns about the judge's impartiality based on the correspondence.

The applicant brought two motions in a family law property dispute.

The first motion sought to consolidate the family proceeding with an existing civil application for partition and sale of jointly owned property, and to dispense with the respondent's signature for the sale of the property.

The court granted the consolidation, finding common questions of law and fact and the need to avoid a multiplicity of proceedings.

However, the court declined to dispense with the respondent's signature at this stage, adjourning that issue for further evidence from both parties.

Following a prior ruling that the defendants incorporated a company to defeat enforcement of a judgment obtained by the plaintiff, the court addressed costs of the motion.

The evidence established that the defendants collaborated to divert income through a corporation to prevent garnishment and frustrate the plaintiff’s efforts to enforce her judgment arising from fraudulent misrepresentation.

The court found the defendants’ conduct akin to fraud and held that substantial indemnity costs were warranted.

In the absence of responding submissions from the defendants, the court reviewed the claimed fees and disbursements and fixed costs.

Substantial indemnity costs were awarded jointly against both defendants.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiff’s action on summary judgment and the dismissal of the plaintiff’s motion to amend pleadings, the court addressed costs.

The defendant relied on two offers to settle and sought partial indemnity costs to the close of pleadings and substantial indemnity costs thereafter.

The court held that under Rule 49.10(2) a defendant’s offer to settle does not give rise to substantial indemnity costs and that the offers lacked sufficient compromise to justify such an award.

The court fixed the defendant’s costs on a partial indemnity basis.

A judgment creditor brought a motion alleging that the debtor incorporated a company and directed his earnings to it in order to defeat enforcement of a judgment exceeding $415,000.

The court examined the debtor’s arrangement under the Assignments and Preferences Act and Rule 60.08(16) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Evidence showed that the corporation was created after judgment and that the debtor’s spouse became the sole shareholder while the debtor continued performing the same services, with the admitted purpose of prioritizing repayment to the spouse over the creditor.

The court held that the arrangement constituted an improper preference intended to hinder the creditor.

The garnishee was ordered to honour the notice of garnishment by paying amounts owing to the debtor to the sheriff, though the court declined to find the debtor in contempt.

The appellant nurse appealed a decision of the Discipline Committee of the College of Nurses, which found he committed professional misconduct while providing in-home nursing care.

The misconduct included failing to maintain nursing standards and administering a liquid without patient consent.

The Divisional Court applied a reasonableness standard of review and found that the Panel's factual and credibility findings were amply supported by the evidence.

The appeal was dismissed, and costs of $8,500 were awarded to the respondent.

The appellants appealed a judgment regarding the interpretation of an amended agreement and the definition of an encumbrance.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the clear intention of the parties was for the respondent to receive $61,000 out of the net proceeds of sale.

Costs were awarded to the respondent.

Several residential property owners appealed an engineer's report proposing the construction of a swale and buffer strip to address flooding caused by agricultural runoff.

The appellants argued that the swale was unnecessary for their properties and that the assessments were unfair.

The Tribunal found that the flooding was primarily caused by berms constructed by the residential landowners, which prevented water from flowing to the intended sideyard swales.

The Tribunal concluded that the engineer's report provided a good solution, dismissed the appeals, and confirmed the assessments.

The landlord entered into an agreement to sell a commercial property to a third-party purchaser, subject to the tenant's right of first refusal.

After the tenant indicated it would not pay the proposed price, the landlord and purchaser entered into a second agreement without the right of first refusal condition.

The tenant subsequently exercised its right of first refusal, leading both the tenant and the purchaser to seek specific performance.

The trial judge granted specific performance to the purchaser, finding the right of first refusal void for uncertainty.

The Court of Appeal allowed the tenant's appeal, holding that the right of first refusal was enforceable, converted into an equitable interest when the landlord accepted the purchaser's offer, and was not waived by the tenant's negotiating tactics.