Timothy Flannery

Following the successful dismissal of the plaintiffs' defamation action under the anti-SLAPP provisions of the Courts of Justice Act, the moving parties (defendants) sought full indemnity costs totalling over $1.1 million.

The court awarded full indemnity costs as requested, subject to a reduction for the costs of non-active counsel, clerks, or students.

The court also apportioned liability, finding one plaintiff jointly and severally liable only for costs related to the OMA dispute, while the other plaintiff was solely liable for costs related to the COVID-19 dispute.

The plaintiffs, two physicians, brought a $12 million defamation action against over 20 defendants, including other physicians, journalists, and media organizations.

The claims arose from two main disputes: an internal Ontario Medical Association (OMA) dispute and public criticism of the plaintiffs' controversial tweets regarding COVID-19, in which they opposed vaccines and lockdowns and promoted hydroxychloroquine.

The defendants brought anti-SLAPP motions under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court found that the defendants' expressions related to matters of public interest and that the plaintiffs failed to show their claims had substantial merit or that the defendants lacked valid defences, such as fair comment and qualified privilege.

The court also found that the public interest in protecting the defendants' expressions far outweighed any harm suffered by the plaintiffs.

The action was dismissed against all defendants.

The plaintiff, Kathleen Anne Cruikshank, on behalf of the Estate of Ross Gerrard Cruikshank, brought a motion for summary judgment seeking damages for the alleged non-repayment of private loans by the defendants, Randy Kennedy and VLC Global Ministries.

The defendants sought dismissal of the plaintiff's motion and summary judgment in their favour.

The court found that the Consolidated Loan was fully repaid through a combination of cash, cheques, and "contra agreements" for services and housing.

For the Second Loan, the court found the plaintiff's evidence unreliable and inconsistent with documentary evidence and the defendant's credible testimony, concluding that the plaintiff failed to prove outstanding debt.

The court granted summary judgment to the defendants, dismissing the plaintiff's motion and action.

The parties brought cross-motions regarding refusals and undertakings from examinations for discovery.

The plaintiff sought to compel answers from the defendants and the Attorney General, while the Attorney General sought to compel answers from the plaintiff, clarify the scope of the pleadings, and obtain foundational information for the plaintiff's expert report.

The court ordered the plaintiff to produce a refused sales graph, amend its pleadings to clarify the temporal scope and damages claim, and provide the foundational information for its expert report.

The plaintiff's motion against the Attorney General was dismissed, as the court found the undertaking regarding correspondence with U.S. regulators was adequately answered.

Following the first stage of a bifurcated trial where the applicant successfully had a separation agreement set aside, the court determined the issue of costs.

The applicant sought $60,000, while the respondent argued for a partial indemnity award of $11,000.

The court found the applicant was presumptively entitled to costs and his counsel's rates were reasonable.

However, the court limited the award to fees and disbursements connected to the first stage of the trial and noted the applicant's offer to settle did not strictly comply with the seven-day rule under subrule 18(14).

The court awarded the applicant $22,000 in costs.

The applicant husband sought to set aside a separation agreement drafted and mediated by the parties' religious pastor.

The pastor, who owed the parties a significant amount of money, acted in a conflict of interest.

The husband, suffering from significant medical and cognitive issues, signed the agreement without independent legal advice.

The court applied the Miglin framework and found the agreement was unconscionable, failed to reflect legislative objectives, and was signed under circumstances where the husband was unable to protect himself.

The separation agreement was set aside in its entirety.

The applicant brought two motions in a family law property dispute.

The first motion sought to consolidate the family proceeding with an existing civil application for partition and sale of jointly owned property, and to dispense with the respondent's signature for the sale of the property.

The court granted the consolidation, finding common questions of law and fact and the need to avoid a multiplicity of proceedings.

However, the court declined to dispense with the respondent's signature at this stage, adjourning that issue for further evidence from both parties.