Julian Porter

Following the successful dismissal of the plaintiffs' defamation action under the anti-SLAPP provisions of the Courts of Justice Act, the moving parties (defendants) sought full indemnity costs totalling over $1.1 million.

The court awarded full indemnity costs as requested, subject to a reduction for the costs of non-active counsel, clerks, or students.

The court also apportioned liability, finding one plaintiff jointly and severally liable only for costs related to the OMA dispute, while the other plaintiff was solely liable for costs related to the COVID-19 dispute.

The plaintiffs, two physicians, brought a $12 million defamation action against over 20 defendants, including other physicians, journalists, and media organizations.

The claims arose from two main disputes: an internal Ontario Medical Association (OMA) dispute and public criticism of the plaintiffs' controversial tweets regarding COVID-19, in which they opposed vaccines and lockdowns and promoted hydroxychloroquine.

The defendants brought anti-SLAPP motions under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court found that the defendants' expressions related to matters of public interest and that the plaintiffs failed to show their claims had substantial merit or that the defendants lacked valid defences, such as fair comment and qualified privilege.

The court also found that the public interest in protecting the defendants' expressions far outweighed any harm suffered by the plaintiffs.

The action was dismissed against all defendants.

In an Internet defamation dispute, the appellants sought a stay of an Ontario libel action in favour of an Israeli forum.

The Court held that tort situs remains a presumptive connecting factor for jurisdiction simpliciter in online defamation, while requiring robust forum non conveniens review.

The majority found material errors in the forum non conveniens analysis and concluded Israel was clearly the more appropriate forum.

The appeal was allowed and the stay motion was granted.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her defamation action following a five-day trial.

The trial judge found that while the respondent's statements were defamatory and made in the context of an employment reference, they were protected by qualified privilege.

The trial judge also found that the appellant failed to prove malice, which would have defeated the privilege.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision on liability, finding no palpable and overriding error.

The court also addressed the appellant's challenge to costs, granting leave to appeal costs and reducing the award by $8,275.00 to exclude costs for voluntary mediation.

The plaintiff sued her former manager for defamation after he provided a negative employment reference to a prospective employer, resulting in a revoked job offer.

The court found that while the manager's statements were defamatory, they were made on an occasion of qualified privilege.

The plaintiff failed to prove that the manager was motivated by malice.

The court also dismissed the plaintiff's alternative tort claims as they were based on the same facts as the defamation claim.

The action was dismissed in its entirety.

The plaintiff, Tracey Kanak, sued her former manager, Darryl Riggin, for defamation based on statements made during a job reference.

The plaintiff alleged malice, while the defendant pleaded qualified privilege and denied malice.

The court found the statements defamatory but concluded they were made on an occasion of qualified privilege.

The plaintiff failed to prove malice, as the defendant's testimony was credible and his statements were honest and not reckless.

The court also dismissed the plaintiff's alternative claims (breach of contract, intentional interference, infliction of emotional distress, invasion of privacy) as they were deemed "dressed up" pleadings of defamation, resting on the same impugned publications.

The action was dismissed in its entirety.

The parties agreed on the costs of the appeal.

The Court of Appeal ordered the appellants to pay the respondent costs fixed at $30,000 on a partial indemnity scale, inclusive of disbursements and taxes.

The respondent, a Canadian businessman, brought a libel action in Ontario against an Israeli newspaper regarding an article published online and in print.

The appellants moved to stay the action, arguing Ontario lacked jurisdiction, Israel was a more appropriate forum, and the action was an abuse of process.

The motion judge dismissed the stay motion, finding Ontario had jurisdiction based on the tort being committed in Ontario, and that Israel was not clearly a more appropriate forum.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the motion judge's findings on jurisdiction and forum non conveniens.

The defendants moved to set aside service ex juris and stay a defamation action brought by an Ontario resident against an Israeli newspaper and journalists regarding an article published online.

The court held that Ontario had jurisdiction simpliciter because the alleged defamatory article was read by individuals in Ontario, establishing a presumptive connecting factor through the commission of the tort in the province.

The defendants failed to rebut the presumption of jurisdiction and did not demonstrate that Israel was a clearly more appropriate forum under the forum non conveniens analysis.

The plaintiff’s undertaking to limit damages to reputational harm suffered within Canada, the availability of jury trials in Ontario, and fairness considerations supported Ontario as the proper forum.

The court also rejected the argument that the action constituted an abuse of process due to minimal publication in Ontario.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment that dismissed his claim based on the defence of qualified privilege.

The appellant argued the trial judge made a palpable and overriding error regarding the sequence of events and the appellant's objections to a development.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge made strong credibility findings against the appellant and correctly concluded the appellant had no genuine objection, making the defence of qualified privilege available.

The appellants, an engineer and his company, sued for defamation after the respondent lawyer wrote a letter on behalf of his client, a gas company, describing the engineer's allegations about a gas heater explosion as 'professionally irresponsible if not deceitful or at worst malicious'.

The trial judge dismissed the action on the basis of qualified privilege.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding that the lawyer's letter was written on an occasion of qualified privilege to protect his client's interests, was sent only to those who received the engineer's initial letter, was not motivated by malice, and used language that was reasonably appropriate to the occasion.

The appellant sued the respondents for libel arising from a newspaper article.

Prior to filing a statement of defence, one of the individual respondents successfully moved to strike the claim against him on the basis that he was not personally served with a libel notice under s. 5(1) of the Libel and Slander Act.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the alternative mode of service in s. 5(1)—delivery to a grown-up person at the defendant's chief office—applies to all defendants, including individuals.

Delivery of the notice to an assistant at the respondent's campaign headquarters constituted effective service.