Tamara Ramsey

At a case conference, the applicant landlord requested an interim order requiring the respondent commercial tenant and its indemnifiers to pay outstanding rental arrears and ongoing rent until the application hearing.

The court ordered the respondents to pay full monthly rent going forward, but declined to make an order regarding accumulated arrears as the respondents' counsel had just been retained and needed time to respond.

This motion concerned a failed asset purchase agreement for a homecare franchise.

The applicant, 2712349 Ontario Incorporated, sought to recover a $65,000 "down payment" made to the personal respondent, Crystal Louis, after failing to secure financing.

The court addressed whether the applicant acted reasonably and in good faith in terminating the agreement based on the financing condition, whether the payment was refundable, and if the personal respondent was jointly and severally liable for its repayment on the basis of unjust enrichment.

The court found that the applicant acted reasonably and in good faith, the $65,000 payment was refundable as a down payment (not a non-refundable deposit), and Crystal Louis was jointly and severally liable with the corporate respondent for its return due to unjust enrichment.

The moving parties, trustees of a family trust, sought to consolidate or temporarily stay an application for a passing of accounts and declarations of breach of fiduciary duty, pending the outcome of a complex related action concerning the ownership of family businesses.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the two proceedings did not share common questions of fact or law, and that delaying the application would prejudice the beneficiaries' right to a timely accounting and preservation of trust assets.

Following an appeal and cross-appeal where success was divided, the parties made written submissions on costs.

The Divisional Court ordered no costs for the appeal due to the divided success, noting the significant finding of oppressive conduct by the appellants.

The court also set aside the application judge's costs award of $25,000 due to the altered outcome, but upheld the award of $14,790 plus HST for accounting fees, as the appellants' conduct necessitated retaining accountants.

The court determined costs following the dismissal of a defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

The plaintiff sought costs on a full indemnity scale or alternatively on a partial indemnity scale, arguing the motion should never have been brought.

The court declined to award full indemnity costs, noting that summary judgment jurisprudence was still developing following amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure and the decision in Combined Air Mechanical Services Inc. v. Flesch.

While the court found the time spent by counsel generally reasonable given the factual complexity and cross‑examinations, it concluded the amount sought exceeded what the defendant could reasonably have expected to pay.

The plaintiff was awarded $65,000 in fees and disbursements.

The defendant brought a motion for summary judgment arguing that the plaintiff’s action to recover funds advanced during a former romantic relationship was barred by the applicable limitation period.

The dispute concerned whether substantial funds used for the renovation of the defendant’s law office constituted a loan or a gift and whether the defendant, a lawyer who had professional dealings with the plaintiff’s business, owed and breached a fiduciary duty.

The court held that the nature of the parties’ personal and professional relationship, the characterization of the transactions, and the existence of any fiduciary duty or conflict of interest required credibility findings that could not be made on a summary judgment motion.

The court also noted that the resolution of these issues could affect whether a limitation period applied.

The motion for summary judgment was therefore dismissed.

The plaintiff brought a motion for leave to amend a defamation action after the trial record had been filed, seeking to expand the claim to include intentional infliction of mental suffering, conspiracy to injure, malicious prosecution, and damages under s. 61 of the Family Law Act.

The proposed amendments relied in part on an alleged assignment of rights from the plaintiff’s son arising from criminal proceedings that had resulted in his acquittal.

The court held that the evidentiary foundation for the alleged assignment was deficient and, in any event, causes of action based on personal torts such as malicious prosecution and conspiracy were not assignable.

The court further held that the conspiracy and Family Law Act claims were legally untenable as pleaded.

Leave to amend was granted only to add a claim for intentional infliction of mental and emotional distress related to the alleged defamation.

These consolidated appeals addressed the interpretation and application of the amended summary judgment regime under Rule 20 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Court of Appeal held that summary judgment may be granted not only where claims or defences are without merit or the parties agree, but also where the motion judge can achieve a full appreciation of the evidence and issues required to make dispositive findings on the motion record, possibly supplemented by limited oral evidence.

The court articulated the “full appreciation” test, confirmed that the standard of review on whether there is a genuine issue requiring a trial is correctness, and explained the proper use of the new powers to weigh evidence, evaluate credibility, draw inferences, and hear oral evidence on discrete issues.

Applying those principles, the court dismissed the Combined Air, Misek, and Parker appeals, dismissed the Mauldin appeal, and allowed the Bruno appeal by setting aside summary judgment and dismissing the motion.

The defendant sought leave to appeal a motion judge's order that allowed the plaintiffs to add her as a defendant in her personal capacity after the presumptive expiry of the limitation period.

The motion judge had made a final determination that the claim was not discoverable until December 2010, effectively precluding a limitation defence at trial.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal, finding good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's decision to make a final fact-finding determination on discoverability during a gatekeeping motion, and concluding that the scope of a motion judge's power under Rule 5.04 is a matter of general importance.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding they repudiated the respondent's consulting contract without cause by way of anticipatory breach.

The respondent cross-appealed, seeking 24 months of payments instead of 12.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's finding that the respondent's responsibilities were implicitly taken away without warning, constituting anticipatory breach.

The court also agreed there was no duty to mitigate as the consulting agreement was part of a package deal for the sale of the respondent's business.

The cross-appeal was dismissed because the contract clearly limited payments to 12 months in the event of termination without cause.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's careful and thorough reasons on either of the points argued.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents.

The appellant appealed and the respondent cross-appealed a judgment of the Superior Court of Justice.

Both the appeal and the cross-appeal were dismissed on consent without costs.

The defendant appealed a Master's order granting summary judgment to the plaintiff for the purchase price of a fiber optic measurement machine.

The defendant argued the machine was defective and that the Master erred in finding no genuine issue for trial.

The Divisional Court reviewed the conflicting jurisprudence on the standard of review for a Master's final discretionary order, concluding the standard is correctness.

Applying this standard, the court upheld the Master's decision, finding the defendant had retained the machine for over a year without rejecting it, thereby accepting it under the Sale of Goods Act.