Taayo Simmonds

The appellants appealed a summary judgment order requiring them to pay $285,000 in damages to the respondents for breach of contract and unjust enrichment arising from a failed real estate transaction.

The parties had entered into an agreement for the respondents to purchase a parcel of land, conditional on the appellants obtaining municipal approval for a condominium conversion within two years.

When approval was not obtained, the respondents sued.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge made palpable and overriding errors in concluding the appellants breached their duty of good faith.

The Court also held the motion judge erred in applying unjust enrichment where a contract governed the relationship, and failed to provide sufficient reasons for dismissing the appellants' counterclaim.

A new trial was ordered.

Following a four-day trial in March and April 2025, the plaintiffs were successful against the individual defendant, who was found liable in negligence and negligent misrepresentation with damages awarded at $64,211.80.

The court determined costs on a substantial indemnity basis as of March 28, 2023, and partial indemnity basis prior to that date.

The court rejected the defendants' arguments that the plaintiffs' costs were excessive and that Rule 49 should not apply, finding that the plaintiffs' costs were reasonable and that the defendants' conduct contributed to increased litigation costs.

The decision concerns a claim by Monique Miller and Michel Desjardins against Jacques Lajoie, a home inspector, and his company, for negligence and negligent misrepresentation in the conduct of a pre-purchase home inspection.

The court found that Mr. Lajoie failed to meet the standard of care required of a reasonable and prudent home inspector, particularly in failing to report in writing on significant, visible deficiencies in the foundation, roof, and windows.

The plaintiffs reasonably relied on the inspection report in deciding to purchase the property and suffered damages as a result.

The court awarded damages for the cost of repairs to the foundation, roof, and a portion of the windows and doors.

The defendants moved for summary judgment to terminate a commercial property agreement due to the failure to obtain condominium conversion approval within two years, a condition precedent under the Planning Act.

The plaintiffs opposed, seeking specific performance or damages, arguing the property was unique and the defendants breached their good faith obligation to diligently pursue approval.

The court granted summary judgment, finding the condominium conversion commercially absurd and specific performance impossible without Planning Act compliance.

While denying specific performance, the court found the defendants breached their duty to notify the plaintiffs of the futility of the plan and awarded the plaintiffs $285,000 in damages for their investment and relocation costs, offset by accumulated rent held in court.

The plaintiff brought a motion to strike a jury notice and sought leave to bring the motion after the action had been set down for trial.

The court denied leave, finding no evidentiary basis to explain the significant delay in bringing the motion.

Furthermore, even if leave had been granted, the court would not have struck the jury notice.

The defendants had served the jury notice prior to January 1, 2020, thereby preserving their substantive legal right to a civil jury trial under the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 76, despite the action originally proceeding under simplified procedure.

The plaintiff's arguments regarding proportionality, efficiency, and judicial resources were deemed insufficient to override this vested right.

This is an appeal from the dismissal of a motion to set aside a noting in default.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred by failing to consider the balance of prejudice and the full context of the dispute, including the appellants' arguable defence and counterclaim.

The court emphasized the strong preference for deciding civil actions on their merits.

The appeal was allowed, the noting in default was set aside, and the appellants were directed to file their statement of defence and counterclaim.

The defendants brought a motion to set aside a noting in default so they could file a statement of defence and counterclaim.

The plaintiffs had noted the defendants in default after they failed to file a defence for nearly a year.

A previous court order had granted the defendants an extension to file, which they missed, citing the COVID-19 pandemic and difficulties retaining counsel.

The court applied the factors for setting aside a noting in default and found the defendants' delay significant and their explanations uncompelling.

The motion was dismissed.

Following a successful appeal by the defendant, the trial judge determined the scale and quantum of the defendant's trial costs.

The court found that the plaintiff attempted to perpetrate a fraud on the court by presenting a forged will and misleading evidence.

Consequently, the court awarded the defendant trial costs on a full indemnity basis, fixed at $64,985.54, payable by the plaintiff or alternatively by the estate.

The applicant challenged her late mother's 2015 Will, alleging lack of testamentary capacity, undue influence, and forgery by her sister, the respondent estate trustee.

The respondent moved for summary judgment to dismiss the will challenge, while the applicant moved to amend her Notice of Objection to add further allegations of financial impropriety and conspiracy.

The court granted summary judgment, finding no genuine issue for trial as the applicant's claims were uncorroborated and the drafting lawyer's evidence confirmed the testator's capacity and the absence of suspicious circumstances.

The applicant's motion to amend was dismissed as the proposed amendments lacked legal foundation and were highly prejudicial.

This appeal concerned a motion judge's order requiring the appellants to pass their accounts as Attorneys for Property.

The appellants argued that the respondent failed to obtain proper leave under s. 42(4)-(6) of the Substitute Decisions Act, 1992, that the test for leave was misapplied, that there was insufficient evidentiary foundation, and that the reasons for the decision were inadequate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the motion judge implicitly granted leave, applied the appropriate test, and provided sufficient reasons for appellate review.

This is a costs endorsement from the Court of Appeal for Ontario following a successful appeal where the respondent's action was dismissed.

The appellant sought full indemnity costs, arguing the respondent attempted to perpetrate a fraud at trial regarding a will's witnessing.

The court clarified the distinction between full and substantial indemnity costs, noting that conduct warranting sanction typically applies to trial proceedings.

However, the onerous task faced by the appellant on appeal due to the trial judge's acceptance of the respondent's evidence was considered.

The court also addressed the recovery of costs from the Estate, applying the "blended costs award" principle due to the testator's failure to properly execute his will, which caused the litigation.

The appellant, Brian Boese, appealed a trial judge's decision that his brother Bruce's will was formally valid under the Succession Law Reform Act.

The central issue was whether the respondent, Brenda Bayford, had proven the formal validity of a 2013 will (Version 2), which she claimed to have found after Bruce's death.

The appellant argued that the trial judge misapprehended expert handwriting evidence, which indicated that Bruce's signatures on two versions of the will (one unwitnessed, one witnessed) were identical copies, suggesting one was reproduced from the other.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge made a palpable and overriding error by misunderstanding the significance of the expert evidence and its implications for the appellant's theory of the case, particularly regarding the missing original unwitnessed will and inconsistencies in the respondent's testimony.

The court also rejected the respondent's motion to admit fresh evidence.

This motion concerned a failed asset purchase agreement for a homecare franchise.

The applicant, 2712349 Ontario Incorporated, sought to recover a $65,000 "down payment" made to the personal respondent, Crystal Louis, after failing to secure financing.

The court addressed whether the applicant acted reasonably and in good faith in terminating the agreement based on the financing condition, whether the payment was refundable, and if the personal respondent was jointly and severally liable for its repayment on the basis of unjust enrichment.

The court found that the applicant acted reasonably and in good faith, the $65,000 payment was refundable as a down payment (not a non-refundable deposit), and Crystal Louis was jointly and severally liable with the corporate respondent for its return due to unjust enrichment.

The Court of Appeal heard motions concerning an appeal from an order requiring the passing of accounts for an estate.

The respondent (original applicant) sought to quash the appellants' appeal due to late service and to extend time for his cross-appeal to vary the lower court order to explicitly grant leave for his passing of accounts application.

The appellants (original respondents) sought to extend time for their notice of appeal.

The court granted the respondent's motion to extend time for his cross-appeal, finding it warranted by the justice of the case and that it would not cause prejudice.

The respondent's motion to quash the appeal was not pressed and was deemed not in the interests of justice to grant due to a technical, non-prejudicial delay.

Consequently, the appellants' motion for an extension of time was dismissed as unnecessary.

The applicant sought to recognize and enforce a New York judgment for over USD$6.7 million against the respondents, who had provided personal guarantees.

The respondents resisted on grounds of public policy, natural justice (alleging a conflict of interest by the applicant's New York law firm), and that the proceeding should have been an action, not an application.

The court rejected the public policy and natural justice arguments because the conflict issue was not raised in the New York court, emphasizing judicial finality and comity.

The court also found that an application was appropriate as there were no material facts in dispute.

The New York judgment was recognized and enforced.

Following a trial in which the plaintiff successfully proved the validity of the deceased's 2013 will, the parties sought a determination on costs.

The plaintiff sought full or substantial indemnity costs, while the participating defendant argued for reduced partial indemnity costs due to the plaintiff's conduct.

The court awarded the plaintiff partial indemnity costs but reduced the amount payable by the defendant by 50% due to the plaintiff's lack of diligence in the discovery process.

The court also limited the plaintiff's indemnification from the estate, ordering her to personally bear the remaining costs resulting from her mismanagement of documents.

The plaintiff sought to prove a 2013 will executed by the deceased, which left the family farm to her and the residue to the deceased's nieces and nephews.

The defendant brother challenged the will, alleging it was not signed by the deceased or not signed in the presence of two witnesses, relying on the discovery of an unwitnessed copy of the will shortly after death.

The court accepted the evidence of the two attesting witnesses and found that the will was duly executed in accordance with the Succession Law Reform Act.

The 2013 will was declared valid and the plaintiff was granted a Certificate of Appointment as Estate Trustee.

The plaintiff sought summary judgment to enforce a collateral mortgage on an Ontario property owned by the defendant wife, which secured a loan to her husband's company.

A New York court had previously found the personal guarantees valid.

The Ontario Superior Court of Justice declined to apply issue estoppel, finding it would work an injustice.

The court held the mortgage was unenforceable because it was the product of presumed undue influence by the husband, of which the plaintiff had constructive notice, and the plaintiff failed to ensure the wife received independent legal advice.

The action was dismissed.