Taayo Simmonds

The applicants sought declarations that their 82-year-old mother lacked capacity to manage her property and personal care, and orders invalidating testamentary documents she executed in October 2024.

Relying on a court-ordered capacity assessment, the court found the mother had been incapable of managing property and personal care, granting a power of attorney for property, instructing counsel, and possessing testamentary capacity since at least July 2024 due to moderate dementia.

The court declared the October 2024 documents invalid due to lack of capacity and undue influence by her common-law spouse, and affirmed the validity of her prior testamentary documents.

The court also held it had jurisdiction to declare the will invalid while the testator was still alive given she was not expected to regain capacity.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment order requiring them to pay $285,000 in damages to the respondents for breach of contract and unjust enrichment arising from a failed real estate transaction.

The parties had entered into an agreement for the respondents to purchase a parcel of land, conditional on the appellants obtaining municipal approval for a condominium conversion within two years.

When approval was not obtained, the respondents sued.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge made palpable and overriding errors in concluding the appellants breached their duty of good faith.

The Court also held the motion judge erred in applying unjust enrichment where a contract governed the relationship, and failed to provide sufficient reasons for dismissing the appellants' counterclaim.

A new trial was ordered.

Following a four-day trial in March and April 2025, the plaintiffs were successful against the individual defendant, who was found liable in negligence and negligent misrepresentation with damages awarded at $64,211.80.

The court determined costs on a substantial indemnity basis as of March 28, 2023, and partial indemnity basis prior to that date.

The court rejected the defendants' arguments that the plaintiffs' costs were excessive and that Rule 49 should not apply, finding that the plaintiffs' costs were reasonable and that the defendants' conduct contributed to increased litigation costs.

The decision concerns a claim by Monique Miller and Michel Desjardins against Jacques Lajoie, a home inspector, and his company, for negligence and negligent misrepresentation in the conduct of a pre-purchase home inspection.

The court found that Mr. Lajoie failed to meet the standard of care required of a reasonable and prudent home inspector, particularly in failing to report in writing on significant, visible deficiencies in the foundation, roof, and windows.

The plaintiffs reasonably relied on the inspection report in deciding to purchase the property and suffered damages as a result.

The court awarded damages for the cost of repairs to the foundation, roof, and a portion of the windows and doors.

The defendants moved for summary judgment to terminate a commercial property agreement due to the failure to obtain condominium conversion approval within two years, a condition precedent under the Planning Act.

The plaintiffs opposed, seeking specific performance or damages, arguing the property was unique and the defendants breached their good faith obligation to diligently pursue approval.

The court granted summary judgment, finding the condominium conversion commercially absurd and specific performance impossible without Planning Act compliance.

While denying specific performance, the court found the defendants breached their duty to notify the plaintiffs of the futility of the plan and awarded the plaintiffs $285,000 in damages for their investment and relocation costs, offset by accumulated rent held in court.

The appellant appealed two orders regarding child support for his two daughters.

He argued the motions judge erred by ordering him to pay 20 to 25 percent of the Guidelines table amount for one daughter while she attended university away from home, and by recalculating support for the other daughter for two specific months based on changes in shared custody.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the motions judge made no palpable and overriding error in applying section 3(2)(b) of the Federal Child Support Guidelines to determine the appropriate level of support for a university student, nor in his factual findings regarding the younger daughter's living arrangements.

The plaintiff brought a motion to strike a jury notice and sought leave to bring the motion after the action had been set down for trial.

The court denied leave, finding no evidentiary basis to explain the significant delay in bringing the motion.

Furthermore, even if leave had been granted, the court would not have struck the jury notice.

The defendants had served the jury notice prior to January 1, 2020, thereby preserving their substantive legal right to a civil jury trial under the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 76, despite the action originally proceeding under simplified procedure.

The plaintiff's arguments regarding proportionality, efficiency, and judicial resources were deemed insufficient to override this vested right.

This is an appeal from the dismissal of a motion to set aside a noting in default.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred by failing to consider the balance of prejudice and the full context of the dispute, including the appellants' arguable defence and counterclaim.

The court emphasized the strong preference for deciding civil actions on their merits.

The appeal was allowed, the noting in default was set aside, and the appellants were directed to file their statement of defence and counterclaim.

The defendants brought a motion to set aside a noting in default so they could file a statement of defence and counterclaim.

The plaintiffs had noted the defendants in default after they failed to file a defence for nearly a year.

A previous court order had granted the defendants an extension to file, which they missed, citing the COVID-19 pandemic and difficulties retaining counsel.

The court applied the factors for setting aside a noting in default and found the defendants' delay significant and their explanations uncompelling.

The motion was dismissed.

Following a successful appeal by the defendant, the trial judge determined the scale and quantum of the defendant's trial costs.

The court found that the plaintiff attempted to perpetrate a fraud on the court by presenting a forged will and misleading evidence.

Consequently, the court awarded the defendant trial costs on a full indemnity basis, fixed at $64,985.54, payable by the plaintiff or alternatively by the estate.

The applicant challenged her late mother's 2015 Will, alleging lack of testamentary capacity, undue influence, and forgery by her sister, the respondent estate trustee.

The respondent moved for summary judgment to dismiss the will challenge, while the applicant moved to amend her Notice of Objection to add further allegations of financial impropriety and conspiracy.

The court granted summary judgment, finding no genuine issue for trial as the applicant's claims were uncorroborated and the drafting lawyer's evidence confirmed the testator's capacity and the absence of suspicious circumstances.

The applicant's motion to amend was dismissed as the proposed amendments lacked legal foundation and were highly prejudicial.

This appeal concerned a motion judge's order requiring the appellants to pass their accounts as Attorneys for Property.

The appellants argued that the respondent failed to obtain proper leave under s. 42(4)-(6) of the Substitute Decisions Act, 1992, that the test for leave was misapplied, that there was insufficient evidentiary foundation, and that the reasons for the decision were inadequate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the motion judge implicitly granted leave, applied the appropriate test, and provided sufficient reasons for appellate review.

This is a costs endorsement from the Court of Appeal for Ontario following a successful appeal where the respondent's action was dismissed.

The appellant sought full indemnity costs, arguing the respondent attempted to perpetrate a fraud at trial regarding a will's witnessing.

The court clarified the distinction between full and substantial indemnity costs, noting that conduct warranting sanction typically applies to trial proceedings.

However, the onerous task faced by the appellant on appeal due to the trial judge's acceptance of the respondent's evidence was considered.

The court also addressed the recovery of costs from the Estate, applying the "blended costs award" principle due to the testator's failure to properly execute his will, which caused the litigation.

The appellant, Brian Boese, appealed a trial judge's decision that his brother Bruce's will was formally valid under the Succession Law Reform Act.

The central issue was whether the respondent, Brenda Bayford, had proven the formal validity of a 2013 will (Version 2), which she claimed to have found after Bruce's death.

The appellant argued that the trial judge misapprehended expert handwriting evidence, which indicated that Bruce's signatures on two versions of the will (one unwitnessed, one witnessed) were identical copies, suggesting one was reproduced from the other.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge made a palpable and overriding error by misunderstanding the significance of the expert evidence and its implications for the appellant's theory of the case, particularly regarding the missing original unwitnessed will and inconsistencies in the respondent's testimony.

The court also rejected the respondent's motion to admit fresh evidence.

This motion concerned a failed asset purchase agreement for a homecare franchise.

The applicant, 2712349 Ontario Incorporated, sought to recover a $65,000 "down payment" made to the personal respondent, Crystal Louis, after failing to secure financing.

The court addressed whether the applicant acted reasonably and in good faith in terminating the agreement based on the financing condition, whether the payment was refundable, and if the personal respondent was jointly and severally liable for its repayment on the basis of unjust enrichment.

The court found that the applicant acted reasonably and in good faith, the $65,000 payment was refundable as a down payment (not a non-refundable deposit), and Crystal Louis was jointly and severally liable with the corporate respondent for its return due to unjust enrichment.

The Court of Appeal heard motions concerning an appeal from an order requiring the passing of accounts for an estate.

The respondent (original applicant) sought to quash the appellants' appeal due to late service and to extend time for his cross-appeal to vary the lower court order to explicitly grant leave for his passing of accounts application.

The appellants (original respondents) sought to extend time for their notice of appeal.

The court granted the respondent's motion to extend time for his cross-appeal, finding it warranted by the justice of the case and that it would not cause prejudice.

The respondent's motion to quash the appeal was not pressed and was deemed not in the interests of justice to grant due to a technical, non-prejudicial delay.

Consequently, the appellants' motion for an extension of time was dismissed as unnecessary.

Ten days after the Court of Appeal granted summary judgment authorizing the responding party to enforce its mortgage, the moving parties brought a motion seeking to declare the enforcement proceedings null and void.

The moving parties argued they were commercial farmers and had not received the required notice under s. 21 of the Farm Debt Mediation Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, holding that the moving parties were barred from raising the issue at this late stage since mortgage enforceability was squarely at issue on the appeal.

The court found no credible evidence that the moving party was a commercial farmer and deemed the motion an abuse of process intended to delay creditors.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing its application for summary judgment for possession and sale of the respondent wife's property.

The respondents had guaranteed the indebtedness of a corporation to the appellant, with the wife granting a mortgage on her property as collateral.

The motion judge found the mortgage unenforceable due to presumed undue influence by the husband.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge failed to consider the nature of the transaction and the wife's significant interest in the corporation.

The Court held that even if the presumption arose, the appellant took sufficient steps to ensure the wife entered the transaction freely, and the presumption was rebutted by the wife's own evidence.

The applicant sought to recognize and enforce a New York judgment for over USD$6.7 million against the respondents, who had provided personal guarantees.

The respondents resisted on grounds of public policy, natural justice (alleging a conflict of interest by the applicant's New York law firm), and that the proceeding should have been an action, not an application.

The court rejected the public policy and natural justice arguments because the conflict issue was not raised in the New York court, emphasizing judicial finality and comity.

The court also found that an application was appropriate as there were no material facts in dispute.

The New York judgment was recognized and enforced.

Following a trial in which the plaintiff successfully proved the validity of the deceased's 2013 will, the parties sought a determination on costs.

The plaintiff sought full or substantial indemnity costs, while the participating defendant argued for reduced partial indemnity costs due to the plaintiff's conduct.

The court awarded the plaintiff partial indemnity costs but reduced the amount payable by the defendant by 50% due to the plaintiff's lack of diligence in the discovery process.

The court also limited the plaintiff's indemnification from the estate, ordering her to personally bear the remaining costs resulting from her mismanagement of documents.