Michelle Flaherty

Several Indigenous groups brought motions to intervene in a Rule 12.08 representation motion concerning an Aboriginal title claim to lands along the Ottawa River.

The court granted leave to intervene to the Algonquins of Pikwakanagan First Nation, finding they had a direct interest as part of the collective the plaintiffs seek to represent.

The court dismissed the motion by the Nine Algonquin Collectives, concluding they did not meet the criteria for intervention under Rule 13.01, as they are not part of the proposed collective and their participation would unduly delay the proceeding.

The plaintiff subcontractor registered construction liens for foundation work performed on a cottage following flood damage.

The court had to determine whether the liens were timely, which required deciding whether the Old Act or New Act applied based on the transition provisions.

The court found that the flood repair work constituted a new contract entered into before July 1, 2018, meaning the Old Act's 45-day preservation deadline applied.

Because the liens were registered more than 45 days after the last supply of materials, they were declared expired and vacated.

The plaintiff's alternative claim in quantum meruit and the defendant's claim for breach of contract were both dismissed.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment in a civil proceeding to enforce an alleged intra-family loan of $105,798.75 against his brother and sister-in-law.

The sister-in-law, who was engaged in family law proceedings against the brother, opposed the motion and brought a cross-motion to add the plaintiff and his corporation to the family law matter, alleging the loan was fabricated to shield assets from equalization.

The court dismissed the summary judgment motion, finding genuine issues of credibility regarding the source of the funds and the brothers' intertwined finances.

The court also dismissed the cross-motion to add parties, instead ordering a focussed trial under the Family Law Rules to determine the validity of the loan, while staying the civil action.

The applicant, a registered electoral district association, applied for an order extending the time to file its 2024 annual financial transactions return under the Canada Elections Act.

The applicant missed the statutory deadline and did not apply to the Chief Electoral Officer for an extension within the prescribed period.

The court dismissed the application, finding that it lacked jurisdiction to extend the deadline outside of the specific circumstances set out in section 475.93(2) of the Act.

The court noted that the doctrine of special circumstances no longer applies to statutory deadlines for filing applications.

The defendants brought a motion seeking a direction that the plaintiffs obtain court authorization under Rule 12.08 of the Rules of Civil Procedure before continuing a representative action asserting Aboriginal title and treaty rights under s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982.

The action sought declarations concerning Aboriginal title to federally held lands along the Ottawa River, including lands in the national capital region.

The plaintiffs argued that a representation motion should not be required in Aboriginal title litigation and that imposing such a requirement would undermine reconciliation and access to justice.

The court held that Rule 12.08 applies to representative proceedings advancing s. 35 claims and requires prior judicial authorization regardless of the substantive nature of the claim.

The plaintiffs were directed to bring a Rule 12.08 motion to seek authorization to proceed as representatives of the proposed collective.

Application by a corporate owner of adjacent property claiming entitlement to a disputed strip of land used as a driveway for over 30 years.

The applicant advanced claims in adverse possession and proprietary estoppel.

The court dismissed the adverse possession claim, finding the applicant could not show that its use of the disputed strip was inconsistent with the respondent's intended use of keeping the land vacant, as required by Court of Appeal authority.

However, the court granted the application on the basis of proprietary estoppel, finding that the respondent's 30-plus years of silence while the applicant and its predecessors used and improved the driveway constituted encouragement, that the applicant detrimentally relied on that silence, and that it was unconscionable for the respondent to erect a fence dividing the driveway without notice or consultation.

The respondent was ordered to remove the fence and repair damaged interlocking brick.

The applicants sought the appointment of an administrator and inspector to oversee a condominium corporation, alleging oppressive conduct by board members regarding the administration of allocated cost contribution fees.

The court denied both requests, finding that the board's inability to meet was caused by the applicants' own bad faith conduct in refusing to attend meetings.

The court found no substantial misconduct or mismanagement warranting the appointment of an administrator as a last resort.

The applicants' concerns about fee administration were found to be reasonable but did not meet the threshold for intervention.

Following a four-day trial in March and April 2025, the plaintiffs were successful against the individual defendant, who was found liable in negligence and negligent misrepresentation with damages awarded at $64,211.80.

The court determined costs on a substantial indemnity basis as of March 28, 2023, and partial indemnity basis prior to that date.

The court rejected the defendants' arguments that the plaintiffs' costs were excessive and that Rule 49 should not apply, finding that the plaintiffs' costs were reasonable and that the defendants' conduct contributed to increased litigation costs.

The self-represented appellant brought a motion in the Superior Court of Justice seeking to appeal a case conference endorsement issued by a judge of the Divisional Court.

The appellant also requested an adjournment to submit new evidence of alleged fraud by the Landlord and Tenant Board, and argued he was not properly served with the respondents' motion materials because the email did not address him correctly.

The court denied the adjournment and found service was valid.

The motion was dismissed on the basis that a judge of the Superior Court has no jurisdiction under section 21 of the Courts of Justice Act to set aside or vary a case conference endorsement made by a judge of the Divisional Court.

The defendant hospital brought a motion to strike the plaintiffs' action under Rule 21.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The plaintiffs sought damages for breach of contract, constructive dismissal, negligence, misfeasance in public office, defamation, and human rights violations arising from the suspension and revocation of the physician's hospital privileges following non-compliance with a mandatory COVID-19 vaccination policy.

The court found that most claims fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Health Professions Appeal and Review Board under the Public Hospitals Act and were struck.

The court allowed only the claim for lost wages from October 1, 2021 to the date privileges were suspended, and granted leave to amend regarding defamation and misfeasance in public office claims.

The applicant, Charles Frederick Armstrong, challenged the constitutionality of the Township of Russell’s Sign By-Law, which restricted the display of municipal election signs.

The court found that the by-law violated Armstrong’s freedom of expression under section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and that the violation was not justified under section 1.

The court also found that the Township was unjustly enriched by requiring Armstrong to pay $450 for the return of his signs, which had been removed under the unconstitutional by-law.

The court considered a motion by Mr. Simms to oppose the confirmation of a certificate of an assessment officer, effectively appealing the assessment of costs.

The motion was brought more than two years after service of the certificate, well outside the 15-day period set by the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court found the delay was not adequately explained and that the merits of the appeal were insufficient to justify an extension of time.

The motion was dismissed.

The moving parties' anti-SLAPP motion was previously dismissed.

The responding party sought costs of $100,000.

The court found that costs were warranted under s. 137.1(8) of the Courts of Justice Act because the moving parties' motion lacked merit and the impugned expression was largely unrelated to the public interest.

Applying principles of proportionality and the screening purpose of anti-SLAPP motions, the court awarded costs of $50,000 to the responding party.

The decision concerns a claim by Monique Miller and Michel Desjardins against Jacques Lajoie, a home inspector, and his company, for negligence and negligent misrepresentation in the conduct of a pre-purchase home inspection.

The court found that Mr. Lajoie failed to meet the standard of care required of a reasonable and prudent home inspector, particularly in failing to report in writing on significant, visible deficiencies in the foundation, roof, and windows.

The plaintiffs reasonably relied on the inspection report in deciding to purchase the property and suffered damages as a result.

The court awarded damages for the cost of repairs to the foundation, roof, and a portion of the windows and doors.

The plaintiffs, Yusuf Ebadi and Hasina Ebadi, brought a motion to amend their statement of claim to add a claim for loss of equity, seeking an additional $610,000 in damages.

The defendants did not object to the amendments provided the plaintiffs gave relevant disclosure, reattended at examinations for discovery, and paid the defendants’ costs thrown away.

The court granted leave to amend the statement of claim and set a timetable for further steps, including disclosure and discoveries.

The court found the defendants were entitled to costs thrown away in the amount of $15,000, due to the expanded scope of litigation and the need to duplicate certain steps.

The timetable for next steps was set out, and the parties were directed to adhere to it.

This decision addresses a motion for summary judgment brought by three defendants seeking indemnification from Luc Corbeil and the Corbeil Family Trust in relation to a loan and indemnity agreement.

The court found that the moving parties did not provide the personal guarantees required to trigger the indemnity, and that the Corbeil Family Trust was not a party to the relevant agreements.

Summary judgment was granted in favour of the responding parties.

The court dismissed a motion under section 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act (Ontario) by three siblings (Normand Quesnel, Rachelle Paquette, and Marc Quesnel) to dismiss a defamation action brought by their brother, Gilles Quesnel.

The moving parties argued the action was a SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation).

The court found that while some of the impugned statements related to matters of public interest (communications to authorities and professionals), others (communications to friends and family) did not.

The court held that the action had substantial merit, that the moving parties had no valid defence, and that the public interest in allowing the action to proceed outweighed the public interest in protecting the impugned expressions.

The court considered whether a condominium unit owned by the late Qasem Mahmud was held in trust for the Arabic and Islamic Education Foundation.

The applicant, as estate trustee, sought a declaration that neither an express trust nor a purchase money resulting trust existed in favour of the Foundation.

The court found that the requirements for an express trust were not met, as Mr. Mahmud did not own the property when the declaration of trust was signed and the necessary formalities were lacking.

The court also found that the Foundation did not contribute to the purchase price at the time of acquisition, so no purchase money resulting trust arose.

The application was allowed, and the Foundation was found to have no beneficial interest in the property.

The court dismissed an application by Alain Bellefeuille for a temporary publication ban regarding information related to a Special Investigations Unit (SIU) investigation.

Bellefeuille, charged with first degree murder and attempted murder, argued that publication of the SIU report could prejudice his right to a fair trial.

The court found the risk to trial fairness was speculative and could be mitigated by jury selection and instructions.

The open court principle and freedom of expression outweighed any potential benefit of a publication ban.

The court found the applicant, Samantha Paige Mayer Graham, in contempt of two court orders regarding parenting time and directed the urgent appointment of the Office of the Children’s Lawyer.

The decision details a pattern of non-compliance by the applicant, including failure to facilitate telephone and in-person parenting time for the respondent, Nathan Jacob Desgagne, and addresses the best interests of the children, the adequacy of remedies, and the appropriateness of a contempt finding as a last resort.