Michelle Flaherty

The defendants brought a motion seeking a direction that the plaintiffs obtain court authorization under Rule 12.08 of the Rules of Civil Procedure before continuing a representative action asserting Aboriginal title and treaty rights under s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982.

The action sought declarations concerning Aboriginal title to federally held lands along the Ottawa River, including lands in the national capital region.

The plaintiffs argued that a representation motion should not be required in Aboriginal title litigation and that imposing such a requirement would undermine reconciliation and access to justice.

The court held that Rule 12.08 applies to representative proceedings advancing s. 35 claims and requires prior judicial authorization regardless of the substantive nature of the claim.

The plaintiffs were directed to bring a Rule 12.08 motion to seek authorization to proceed as representatives of the proposed collective.

Application by a corporate owner of adjacent property claiming entitlement to a disputed strip of land used as a driveway for over 30 years.

The applicant advanced claims in adverse possession and proprietary estoppel.

The court dismissed the adverse possession claim, finding the applicant could not show that its use of the disputed strip was inconsistent with the respondent's intended use of keeping the land vacant, as required by Court of Appeal authority.

However, the court granted the application on the basis of proprietary estoppel, finding that the respondent's 30-plus years of silence while the applicant and its predecessors used and improved the driveway constituted encouragement, that the applicant detrimentally relied on that silence, and that it was unconscionable for the respondent to erect a fence dividing the driveway without notice or consultation.

The respondent was ordered to remove the fence and repair damaged interlocking brick.

The applicants sought the appointment of an administrator and inspector to oversee a condominium corporation, alleging oppressive conduct by board members regarding the administration of allocated cost contribution fees.

The court denied both requests, finding that the board's inability to meet was caused by the applicants' own bad faith conduct in refusing to attend meetings.

The court found no substantial misconduct or mismanagement warranting the appointment of an administrator as a last resort.

The applicants' concerns about fee administration were found to be reasonable but did not meet the threshold for intervention.

Following a four-day trial in March and April 2025, the plaintiffs were successful against the individual defendant, who was found liable in negligence and negligent misrepresentation with damages awarded at $64,211.80.

The court determined costs on a substantial indemnity basis as of March 28, 2023, and partial indemnity basis prior to that date.

The court rejected the defendants' arguments that the plaintiffs' costs were excessive and that Rule 49 should not apply, finding that the plaintiffs' costs were reasonable and that the defendants' conduct contributed to increased litigation costs.

The defendant hospital brought a motion to strike the plaintiffs' action under Rule 21.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The plaintiffs sought damages for breach of contract, constructive dismissal, negligence, misfeasance in public office, defamation, and human rights violations arising from the suspension and revocation of the physician's hospital privileges following non-compliance with a mandatory COVID-19 vaccination policy.

The court found that most claims fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Health Professions Appeal and Review Board under the Public Hospitals Act and were struck.

The court allowed only the claim for lost wages from October 1, 2021 to the date privileges were suspended, and granted leave to amend regarding defamation and misfeasance in public office claims.

The applicant, Charles Frederick Armstrong, challenged the constitutionality of the Township of Russell’s Sign By-Law, which restricted the display of municipal election signs.

The court found that the by-law violated Armstrong’s freedom of expression under section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and that the violation was not justified under section 1.

The court also found that the Township was unjustly enriched by requiring Armstrong to pay $450 for the return of his signs, which had been removed under the unconstitutional by-law.

The court considered a motion by Mr. Simms to oppose the confirmation of a certificate of an assessment officer, effectively appealing the assessment of costs.

The motion was brought more than two years after service of the certificate, well outside the 15-day period set by the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court found the delay was not adequately explained and that the merits of the appeal were insufficient to justify an extension of time.

The motion was dismissed.

The decision concerns a claim by Monique Miller and Michel Desjardins against Jacques Lajoie, a home inspector, and his company, for negligence and negligent misrepresentation in the conduct of a pre-purchase home inspection.

The court found that Mr. Lajoie failed to meet the standard of care required of a reasonable and prudent home inspector, particularly in failing to report in writing on significant, visible deficiencies in the foundation, roof, and windows.

The plaintiffs reasonably relied on the inspection report in deciding to purchase the property and suffered damages as a result.

The court awarded damages for the cost of repairs to the foundation, roof, and a portion of the windows and doors.

The plaintiffs, Yusuf Ebadi and Hasina Ebadi, brought a motion to amend their statement of claim to add a claim for loss of equity, seeking an additional $610,000 in damages.

The defendants did not object to the amendments provided the plaintiffs gave relevant disclosure, reattended at examinations for discovery, and paid the defendants’ costs thrown away.

The court granted leave to amend the statement of claim and set a timetable for further steps, including disclosure and discoveries.

The court found the defendants were entitled to costs thrown away in the amount of $15,000, due to the expanded scope of litigation and the need to duplicate certain steps.

The timetable for next steps was set out, and the parties were directed to adhere to it.

This decision addresses a motion for summary judgment brought by three defendants seeking indemnification from Luc Corbeil and the Corbeil Family Trust in relation to a loan and indemnity agreement.

The court found that the moving parties did not provide the personal guarantees required to trigger the indemnity, and that the Corbeil Family Trust was not a party to the relevant agreements.

Summary judgment was granted in favour of the responding parties.

The court dismissed a motion under section 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act (Ontario) by three siblings (Normand Quesnel, Rachelle Paquette, and Marc Quesnel) to dismiss a defamation action brought by their brother, Gilles Quesnel.

The moving parties argued the action was a SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation).

The court found that while some of the impugned statements related to matters of public interest (communications to authorities and professionals), others (communications to friends and family) did not.

The court held that the action had substantial merit, that the moving parties had no valid defence, and that the public interest in allowing the action to proceed outweighed the public interest in protecting the impugned expressions.

The court considered whether a condominium unit owned by the late Qasem Mahmud was held in trust for the Arabic and Islamic Education Foundation.

The applicant, as estate trustee, sought a declaration that neither an express trust nor a purchase money resulting trust existed in favour of the Foundation.

The court found that the requirements for an express trust were not met, as Mr. Mahmud did not own the property when the declaration of trust was signed and the necessary formalities were lacking.

The court also found that the Foundation did not contribute to the purchase price at the time of acquisition, so no purchase money resulting trust arose.

The application was allowed, and the Foundation was found to have no beneficial interest in the property.

The court dismissed an application by Alain Bellefeuille for a temporary publication ban regarding information related to a Special Investigations Unit (SIU) investigation.

Bellefeuille, charged with first degree murder and attempted murder, argued that publication of the SIU report could prejudice his right to a fair trial.

The court found the risk to trial fairness was speculative and could be mitigated by jury selection and instructions.

The open court principle and freedom of expression outweighed any potential benefit of a publication ban.

The court found the applicant, Samantha Paige Mayer Graham, in contempt of two court orders regarding parenting time and directed the urgent appointment of the Office of the Children’s Lawyer.

The decision details a pattern of non-compliance by the applicant, including failure to facilitate telephone and in-person parenting time for the respondent, Nathan Jacob Desgagne, and addresses the best interests of the children, the adequacy of remedies, and the appropriateness of a contempt finding as a last resort.

The court dismissed a motion by the defendants, a real estate agent and her brokerage, to strike the plaintiff’s negligence claim.

The defendants argued the claim was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Landlord Tenant Board (LTB), was statute-barred, and disclosed no reasonable cause of action.

The court found the LTB did not have jurisdiction over claims of real estate agent negligence, the limitation period had not clearly expired, and the statement of claim disclosed all elements of negligence.

The action was allowed to proceed.

The applicant, a dangerous offender serving an indeterminate sentence, brought a habeas corpus application alleging that Correctional Service Canada (CSC) failed to provide him with sufficient rehabilitation opportunities, thereby violating his liberty by depriving him of the chance to obtain a lower security level or parole.

He sought unconditional release or, alternatively, transfer to a minimum-security institution.

The court dismissed the application, finding that many of the applicant's arguments challenged the Parole Board's decisions, which fall within its exclusive jurisdiction.

Furthermore, even if CSC programming issues were outside the Parole Board's jurisdiction, the applicant failed to demonstrate a deprivation of residual liberty, as merely losing an opportunity for greater liberty or a transfer to a less restrictive environment does not constitute such a deprivation for habeas corpus purposes.

The court concluded there was no basis to find his detention unlawful.

The applicants brought a motion challenging the validity of their mother's will and the interpretation of a clause granting one of the respondents the option to purchase the family home for the remaining mortgage amount.

The court found the will valid, as the testator had acknowledged her signature in the presence of two witnesses, satisfying the strict compliance requirements of the Succession Law Reform Act.

The court also applied the armchair rule to interpret the purchase option, concluding the testator intended for the respondent to have the option to acquire the home even though the mortgage balance was zero at the time of death.

The estate trustee was ordered to pass accounts.

The applicant challenged $776,000 in inter vivos transfers made by her elderly father to her brother, the respondent, in the 20 months prior to the father's death.

The applicant argued the transfers were void due to a resulting trust and undue influence, citing the father's dementia.

The court found that a $500,000 transfer was a valid gift, corroborated by a signed Gift Letter and the evidence of an investment advisor.

However, the court held that a $98,000 cheque and $178,000 in e-transfers were not valid gifts, as the respondent failed to rebut the presumption of a resulting trust with corroborating evidence.

The application was allowed in part.

The applicant, a commercial real estate financing company, sought a receivership order over the debtor and beneficial owners of properties due to loan default, outstanding interest, and unpaid municipal taxes.

The court considered factors for appointing a receiver, including the contractual right to appointment and the respondents' lack of transparency and uncertain sale prospects.

The application was granted, and a receiver was appointed.