Court File and Parties

Court File No.: CV-23-00000320-0000

Date: July 31, 2025

Ontario Superior Court of Justice

Between:

Dr. Konstantinos Sidiropoulos and Sidiropoulos Medicine Professional Corporation

Plaintiffs

– and –

Quinte Healthcare Corporation

Defendant

Counsel:

Ryan O'Connor, counsel for the Plaintiffs

Shivani Chopra, counsel for the Defendant

Heard: June 24, 2025

Reasons for Decision

Justice Flaherty

Overview

The Facts

[1] The plaintiffs, Dr. Sidiropoulos and his professional corporation, Sidiropoulos Medicine Professional Corporation ("Sidiropoulos Corporation"), brought an action for damages related to a series of events in connection with the suspension and ultimate revocation of Dr. Sidiropoulos' hospital privileges.

[2] Quinte Healthcare Corporation ("Quinte") has brought this motion to strike the plaintiffs' claim under r. 21.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194. Quinte submits that the claims should be dismissed because they:

• are fundamentally related to Dr. Sidiropoulos' hospital privileges and fall exclusively within the statutory process under the Public Hospitals Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.40 ("PHA");
• are statute barred;
• disclose no reasonable cause of action; and
• are frivolous and vexatious.

[3] For the reasons that follow, the motion to strike is allowed in part. Except the claim for lost wages from October 1, 2021 to the date Dr. Sidiropoulos' privileges were suspended, the plaintiffs' claims are struck. The plaintiffs have leave to amend the statement of claim as it relates to the allegations of defamation and misfeasance in public office.

The Agreement and Initial Appointment

[4] The Sidiropoulos Corporation entered into an agreement with Quinte to provide pathology services to the hospital. Under this agreement, the Sidiropoulos Corporation agreed to ensure that each physician providing services on behalf of the corporation:

• was a duly qualified medical practitioner specializing in pathology, appointed to Quinte's medical staff, and granted privileges necessary to provide the services contemplated by the agreement; and
• abided by Quinte's By-Laws and Medical Staff Rules and Regulations, the PHA and other applicable legislation, including regarding privileges and annual credentialing procedures.

[5] Dr. Sidiropoulos was the physician employed by Sidiropoulos Corporation and he was granted the required privileges by Quinte.

Privileges are Suspended

[6] In 2021, Quinte adopted a mandatory COVID-19 vaccination policy ("Policy"), requiring hospital staff and physicians to receive a first dose of a COVID-19 vaccine by October 1, 2021. Employees and physicians were advised that, if they failed to comply, they would be placed on an unpaid leave of absence on October 1, 2021.

[7] Dr. Sidiropoulos did not receive the COVID-19 vaccine. As of October 1, 2021, Quinte stopped paying the Sidiropoulos Corporation, although Dr. Sidiropoulos' privileges were not suspended at that time.

[8] Dr. Sidiropoulos requested an exemption from the Policy, on the grounds of disability and creed, pursuant to the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19. While his exemption request was under review, Dr. Sidiropoulos was asked not to exercise his privileges. He did not agree to a voluntary suspension of his privileges.

[9] Quinte denied his exemption request on October 5, 2021.

[10] On November 2, 2021, Dr. Sidiropoulos was advised that his privileges were suspended for non-compliance with the Policy. Quinte's Medical Advisory Committee ("MAC") was scheduled to consider this suspension at its November 19, 2021 meeting, but the matter was adjourned at Dr. Sidiropoulos' request.

Privileges are Revoked

[11] Quinte received unrelated complaints about Dr. Sidiropoulos in November 2020 and July 2021, alleging disruptive behaviour under the Code of Conduct. In December 2021, Dr. Sidiropoulos was notified that Quinte was investigating these complaints.

[12] Dr. Sidiropoulos refused to participate in the investigation. On this basis, the MAC recommended to the Hospital Board that his privileges be revoked for reasons of ungovernability. On September 27, 2022, the Hospital Board suspended Dr. Sidiropoulos' privileges on this basis.

The Privileges Decisions were not Appealed

[13] As I describe in more detail below, the PHA sets out a process of appealing a hospital's decision to revoke and suspend a physician's privileges. Dr. Sidiropoulos did not appeal the suspension or the revocation of his privileges.

The Plaintiffs' Claims

[14] The plaintiffs' statement of claim was served on October 5, 2023. It claims damages for:

• breach of contract and/or constructive dismissal damages for the balance of 10-years fixed-contract for pathology services between Quinte and the Sidiropoulos Corporation;
• reputational damages and additional lost earnings because of the defendant's misrepresentation to the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario that Dr. Sidiropoulos' hospital privileges were suspended/revoked for "failure to comply with hospital policy";
• forced leave of absence, suspension, effective termination, and overall career destruction in reprisal; and
• outstanding backpay for October 1, 2021 to the date Dr. Sidiropoulos' privileges were suspended.

[15] Quinte brought a motion to strike the action. Before this motion was heard, the plaintiffs filed an amended statement of claim on December 30, 2024, asserting claims in negligence, misfeasance in public office, and under the Human Rights Code.

Issues

[16] The motion to strike raises the following issues:

a. Does this court have jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' claims, or are some or all of them within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Health Professions Appeal and Review Board ("HPARB") under the PHA?

b. Are certain causes of action advanced in the amended statement of claim statute-barred?

c. Does the amended statement of claim disclose reasonable causes of action?

d. Should the plaintiffs have leave to further amend their statement of claim?

Analysis

Does the Court have Jurisdiction over the Claims?

[17] The Superior Court of Justice is a court of inherent jurisdiction and any derogation from its jurisdiction requires clear and explicit statutory language: Sherwani v. Fargher, 2023 ONSC 20, at paras. 142-45.

[18] The PHA sets out a comprehensive process for dealing with the receipt and revocation of hospital privileges, as well as a process for appealing decisions about a physician's hospital privileges or appointment. In this case, there is no dispute that remedies related to Dr. Sidiropoulos' hospital privileges are addressed by the PHA and cannot properly be brought before this court: Dorceus v. Ontario et al., 2024 ONSC 7087. The court has no jurisdiction to change the status of a physician's privileges and could not, for example, reinstate Dr. Sidiropoulos' privileges.

[19] The more contentious issue – and one of the key questions in this case – is whether this court has jurisdiction over claims that are connected to, or arise out of, a dispute over privileges, including claims for damages.

[20] The parties in this case have framed the nature of the claims quite differently and they take different positions about the extent to which the plaintiffs' claims are connected to Dr. Sidiropoulos' hospital privileges. In determining whether the action, or parts of the action, should be dismissed under r. 21.01(3), I have considered the affidavit evidence provided by both parties.

[21] Quinte submits that the claims are fundamentally about privileges and, therefore, within the HPARB's exclusive jurisdiction. According to Quinte, the plaintiffs are indirectly attempting to challenge the hospital's decision to suspend and then revoke Dr. Sidiropoulos' privileges. Quinte submits that the plaintiffs' relationship with Quinte and any resulting economic losses were directly tied to Dr. Sidiropoulos maintaining privileges. According to Quinte, the plaintiffs' claim for damages can only be successful if Dr. Sidiropoulos can establish that his privileges were improperly suspended or revoked. However, that issue is not within the court's jurisdiction.

[22] The plaintiffs submit that the action is not about privileges: they say they are willing to let Quinte's decisions remain in place and do not seek any relief related to Dr. Sidiropoulos' privileges. According to the plaintiffs, the action is about monetary damages for what they say are properly pleaded private law causes of actions: see Sherwani, at para. 157, citing Canada (Attorney General) v. TeleZone Inc., 2010 SCC 62, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 585, at para. 19, and Kadiri v. Southlake Regional Health Centre, 2015 ONCA 847, 343 O.A.C. 186, at para. 59. The plaintiffs also submit that the court should accept jurisdiction because it is the only forum for the professional corporation's claims. The professional corporation would have no standing before the HPARB under the PHA.

The Public Hospitals Act

[23] As noted, the PHA sets out a comprehensive code for dealing with hospital privileges. As the court in Dorceus explained, at para. 33:

There is good reason for that [detailed legislative scheme]. Those decisions involve technical, scientific evaluations of an individual's skill set as well as strategic considerations within a particular hospital. Courts are less well-equipped to deal with those issues than are hospital boards and the HPARB.

[24] Under s. 36 of the PHA, the governing body of a hospital may appoint physicians to its medical staff and determine the privileges that attach to that appointment. It may also revoke or suspend the appointment or refuse to reappoint a member of the medical staff.

[25] Section 41 of the PHA provides the process whereby a medical professional can appeal the decision of the governing body of the hospital with respect to their hospital privileges or appointment. This appeal is heard by the HPARB. The parties to such a proceeding may apply for judicial review of the decision of the HPARB to the Divisional Court.

The Jurisprudence

[26] There are three key cases dealing with civil claims and hospital privileges: Beiko v. Hotel Dieu Hospital St. Catherine's ("Beiko (ONSC)"), aff'd 2007 ONCA 860 ("Beiko (ONCA)"); Kadiri v. Southlake Regional Health Centre, 2015 ONSC 621 ("Kadiri (ONSC)"), aff'd 2015 ONCA 847 ("Kadiri (ONCA)"); and Sherwani. Although they deal with similar legal issues, the facts of each case are different.

[27] In Beiko, four ophthalmologists commenced an action for damages for breach of contract and misrepresentation relating to the hospital's decision to reduce their operating room allocation. Morawetz J. (as he then was) held that the allocation of operating room time is a matter of privilege, to be determined under the PHA's comprehensive regime. Having failed to challenge the hospital's decision about their privileges, the plaintiffs could not sustain the action for breach of contract and negligent misrepresentation. At para. 54, Justice Morawetz wrote:

There may very well be situations in which an applicant, by following the statutory process, will succeed in establishing the basis for a remedy in damages. But it is only after establishing the basis through the statutory process that it is open for the applicant to then bring an action for damages in the ordinary courts.

[28] In Kadiri, a physician left the operating room during a procedure without first advising staff. He agreed to a temporary leave of absence (and the suspension of his privileges) for the duration of the investigation into his conduct. Dr. Kadiri ultimately returned to work with full privileges, although after being disciplined and placed on probation for a period of time.

[29] Dr. Kadiri then began an action claiming damages for bad faith, misfeasance in public office, unlawful intimidation in public office, conspiracy, and intentional interference with economic interests. The issue in Kadiri was not whether the action should be dismissed because the court lacked jurisdiction, but whether it should be stayed pending an appeal to the HPARB.

[30] The Court of Appeal explained (at para. 59):

Whether a physician has followed through with the statutory privileges dispute-resolution process under a hospital's bylaws and the PHA will turn on the specific facts of each case. Depending on the specific circumstances of a case, proceeding to a hearing before the HPARB may or may not be required of the physician. In the present case, it was not because (i) Dr. Kadiri and the Hospital worked out an arrangement to deal with their dispute which they saw through to its end and (ii) at the time Dr. Kadiri commenced his lawsuit, he had returned to a full practice at the Hospital with full privileges. In those two respects, the facts of this case differ fundamentally from those in Beiko.

[31] In addition, the Court of Appeal commented that, as Dr. Kadiri had full hospital privileges when he began the lawsuit, it was difficult to see what action the HPARB could have taken regarding any cancellation, suspension or substantial alteration of his privileges: Kadiri (ONCA) at para. 57.

[32] In Sherwani, the physician voluntarily suspended and then resigned his privileges following an investigation into his surgical practice. Dr. Sherwani then brought an action against the hospital, including for misfeasance in public office. The court concluded that it had jurisdiction over the allegations of misfeasance in public office, which it found to be a properly pleaded private law action.

[33] In reaching this conclusion, Centa J. summarized the applicable legal principles as follows (at para. 157):

where a physician is content to let the hospital's privileges decision, or the existing status of the plaintiff's privileges remain in place and instead seek monetary damages for a properly pleaded private law cause of action, I see no statutory basis or principled reason why the plaintiff should be compelled to go first to HPARB when the Superior Court of Justice has jurisdiction over her claim: TeleZone, at para. 19; Kadiri (ONCA), at para. 59.

[34] While the courts in these three cases reached different conclusions, I understand these differences to arise from factual circumstances rather than conflicting interpretations of the law. In my view, these three cases apply the same basic legal principles. Specifically:

• The court's jurisdiction will turn on the specific circumstances of each case: Kadiri (ONCA), at para. 59.

• While this court has jurisdiction to determine claims for damages arising out of a privilege issue, its determination must take into account that the status of the physician's privileges has been determined and is not within its jurisdiction: Beiko (ONSC), at para. 55.

• Thus, a physician cannot properly assert a claim before the court that turns on displacing or overturning the status of their privileges. The bona fides of privileges decisions and status falls within the exclusive jurisdiction set out in the PHA. In short, if the claim in damages turns on the bona fides of the revocation or suspension of privileges, the physician must use the statutory route to challenge the privilege issue and attempt to establish a basis for the claim in damages: Beiko (ONSC), at para. 54.

• However, if the physician's claim does not turn on the bona fides of the privileges status and can be made out without interfering with that decision or status, the court has jurisdiction to consider a properly pleaded private law cause of action and there is no requirement to pursue the statutory route: see Sherwani, at paras. 156-57, citing Telezone and Kadiri (ONCA).

Application of These Principles

[35] In assessing my jurisdiction in this case, I am mindful that Dr. Sidiropoulos' privileges have been fully determined. The issue was decided by Quinte and not appealed under the PHA. It is not open to him to challenge the suspension or revocation of his privileges or the basis for those decisions before this court.

[36] Some aspects of the statement of claim are a clear and direct attempt to displace the hospital's decisions about privileges. For example, the plaintiffs plead that Dr. Sidiropoulos' privileges were revoked without authority or without the due process required under the PHA. These claims are struck. They are outside the court's jurisdiction and fall squarely within the statutory scheme.

[37] Other aspects of the statement of claim are an indirect attack on the privileges decisions. The plaintiffs say that they are willing to let the hospital's decisions remain in place. Notably, however, the amended statement of claim includes extensive facts about Quinte's decisions to revoke and suspend Dr. Sidiropoulos' privileges as well as its decision-making process. According to the plaintiffs, these facts are pleaded because "they form the basis of causes of action."

[38] That is a fair characterization. Indeed, the facts and issues related to privilege "form the basis" of many of the plaintiffs' causes of action: many of their claims can only succeed if the privileges decisions are revisited. However, that issue – the bona fides of Quinte's decisions about privileges – is outside this court's jurisdiction to decide.

[39] For example, the plaintiffs advance human rights allegations and plead that Quinte's vaccination policy was unreasonable and implemented without regard for Quinte's duty to accommodate Dr. Sidiropoulos to the point of undue hardship. I do not see how the plaintiffs can both advance these claims and let the privileges decisions stand. These human rights allegations go to the root of Quinte's decision to suspend Dr. Sidiropoulos' privileges. These claims hinge on the court revisiting the hospital's decisions and finding that they were discriminatory. This is not letting the hospital's decision remain in place.

[40] The facts of this case are different from those in Kadiri and Sherwani in that Dr. Sidiropoulos did not voluntarily suspend or resign from his privileges. In the present case, there is a clear hospital decision, which could have been appealed but was not.

[41] The statement of claim is not a model of clarity. As I understand it, however, the plaintiffs' claims of breach of contract, "career destruction," and constructive dismissal are based on allegations about the reasonableness of the Policy and Quinte's decision to deny Dr. Sidiropoulos an exemption. The claims in negligence are also based on the implementation of the Policy. Again, these allegations are an indirect attempt to challenge the privileges decisions. These causes of action can only be established if the hospital's decisions about Dr. Sidiropoulos' privileges are displaced.

[42] The plaintiffs also allege misfeasance in public office and "constructive dismissal by toxic workplace disparagement." As I understand it, these claims are based on Quinte's alleged misrepresentation to the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario (CPSO) that Dr. Sidiropoulos' hospital privileges were suspended or revoked because he failed to comply with hospital policy.

[43] Like Centa J. in Sherwani, I accept that nothing in the PHA assigns exclusive jurisdiction over a misfeasance in public office claim to the HPARB. I accept that it is possible to advance a claim in public malfeasance without asking this court to overturn the privileges decision. In this case, however, the plaintiffs' public malfeasance claim is based on allegations that the vaccination policy was unreasonable, that Quinte and its administrators failed to accommodate Dr. Sidiropoulos under the Human Rights Code, and that administrators acted outside their authority. The plaintiffs have advanced their claims of misfeasance in public office in a way that hinges on the bona fides of the hospital's privileges decision. As pleaded, the plaintiffs' claim of misfeasance in public office would require the court to revisit the privileges decision. The court has no jurisdiction to do so.

[44] In theory, allegations of defamation could also be advanced without necessarily revisiting the issue of hospital privileges. That said, it is not clear how the plaintiffs in this case could establish defamation without calling into question the privileges decision itself. For example, the amended statement of claim does not explain how the information conveyed by Quinte to the CPSO was allegedly defamatory. As I discuss in more detail, below, I find that the amended statement of claim does not disclose a reasonable cause of action in defamation. However, at this stage, I am not satisfied that the court's jurisdiction over the claim for "reputational harm" has been ousted by the operation of the PHA.

[45] The plaintiffs say the court should accept jurisdiction over their claims because it is the sole forum in which the professional corporation can pursue claims for damages against Quinte, including for breach of contract. The difficulty with this argument is that the PHA's comprehensive scheme does not cease to apply because a claim is being advanced by a corporation. Many of the corporation's claims turn on whether Dr. Sidiropoulos' privileges were improperly suspended or revoked. That is a matter squarely within the statutory scheme of the PHA. As Dr. Sidiropoulos elected not to pursue the matter before the HPARB, both plaintiffs are required to let the privileges decisions stand: they cannot advance claims that hinge on a finding that the privileges decisions were improper.

[46] Finally, the claim for unpaid wages from October 1 to the date Dr. Sidiropoulos' privileges were suspended is within this court's jurisdiction. The issue of whether the plaintiffs are entitled to payment for this period is unrelated to the bona fides of any decision by Quinte about Dr. Sidiropoulos' privileges. During that time, Dr. Sidiropoulos had full privileges and Quinte had not yet made any decision to suspend or revoke them.

Summary of Findings Regarding Jurisdiction

[47] The court does not have jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' claims for human rights damages, breach of contract, "career destruction," and constructive dismissal, and (as it is pleaded) misfeasance in public office. These causes of action depend on the court revisiting the hospital's decisions about privileges. The court has no ability to do so.

[48] At this stage, I cannot conclude that the court lacks jurisdiction to decide the plaintiffs' claim for "reputational harm."

[49] Finally, the court has jurisdiction to decide the claim for lost wages from October 1 to the date Dr. Sidiropoulos' privileges were suspended.

Does the Amended Statement of Claim Disclose a Reasonable Cause of Action?

[50] Under r. 21.01(1)(b), a defendant may move to strike out a pleading on the grounds that it discloses no reasonable cause of action. No evidence is admissible on such a motion, without the consent of the parties or leave of the court. Neither was obtained in this case. Therefore, in deciding this issue, I have not considered the affidavit evidence provided by either party. In particular, I have not considered paras. 14-78 of Dr. Sidiropoulos' affidavit of November 25, 2024.

[51] A claim will be struck under r. 21.01(1)(b) if, assuming the facts pleaded to be true, it is plain and obvious that the pleading fails to disclose a reasonable cause of action.

[52] As discussed, the plaintiffs' allegations of negligence, breach of contract, constructive dismissal, "career destruction," and human rights violations could only succeed if the hospital's decisions to suspend and then revoke Dr. Sidiropoulos' privileges were overturned. That is not a position the plaintiffs can take before this court. In these circumstances, it is plain and obvious that the above-mentioned causes of actions are untenable.

[53] Conceivably, the plaintiffs could advance claims in defamation and misfeasance in public office that do not hinge on revisiting the hospital's decisions about privileges. However, this is not how those claims have been pleaded. Other than to challenge the bona fides of the hospital's decisions, the plaintiffs have not pleaded facts to support their allegations of reputational harm or of misfeasance in public office. As pleaded, both of those claims would require the court to revisit the hospital's decisions regarding privileges. This is not within the court's jurisdiction. Accordingly, it is plain and obvious that the amended statement of claim does not disclose a reasonable cause of action in defamation or in misfeasance of public office.

[54] There is no dispute that the plaintiffs' claim for losses from October 1 to the date Dr. Sidiropoulos' privileges were suspended raises a reasonable cause of action and can proceed.

Are Certain Claims Statute-Barred?

[55] The plaintiffs filed an amended statement of claim on December 30, 2024, advancing causes of action in negligence, misfeasance in public office, as well as breaches of the Human Rights Code. No parties were added to the claim as defendants.

[56] Quinte submits that these claims are statute barred under ss. 4 and 5 of the Limitations Act, 2002, S.O. 2002, c. 24, Sched. B. The latest point in time the plaintiffs rely on in support of their claims is November 2021, when Dr. Sidiropoulos' privileges were revoked. The amended statement of claim was filed more than two years later.

[57] The plaintiffs submit that the original statement of claim contains a complete factual background. They state that the amendments are not new causes of action, but rather additional forms of relief arising out of previously pleaded facts.

[58] As the Court of Appeal explained in Klassen v. Beausoleil, 2019 ONCA 407, 34 C.P.C. (8th) 180, at para. 26, a proposed amendment will be refused if (after the expiry of the limitation period) it seeks to advance a new cause of action, namely a "fundamentally different claim" based on facts not originally pleaded. However, a new cause of action is not asserted if the amendment: (a) pleads an alternative claim for relief out of the facts previously pleaded and no new facts are relied upon; (b) amounts to different legal conclusions drawn from the same set of facts; or (c) provides particulars of an allegation or facts already pled: Klassen, at para. 29, citing Paul M. Perell & John W. Morden, The Law of Civil Procedure in Ontario, 3rd ed. (Toronto: LexisNexis, 2017), at p. 186.

[59] In determining whether a claim is statute-barred, the original statement of claim must be interpreted generously and with some allowance for drafting deficiencies: Klassen, at para. 30.

[60] In my view, the original statement of claim pleads a factual matrix that supports the plaintiffs' claims, including allegations that the Policy and its implementation were unreasonable and that Quinte was required to accommodate Dr. Sidiropoulos by exempting him from the application of the Policy. This same factual matrix underlies most of the causes of action asserted by the plaintiffs in the original statement of claim.

[61] I accept the plaintiffs' arguments on this issue. Although the claims are struck for other reasons, they are not new causes of action and are not statute-barred.

Should the Plaintiffs be Granted Leave to Amend?

[62] Quinte submits that leave to amend should be denied because the claim is an abuse of process and is frivolous and vexatious. In support of this position, Quinte argues that:

• Dr. Sidiropoulos was initially a plaintiff in another proceeding but withdrew from the other matter shortly before a scheduled hearing. In sum, the plaintiffs have pursued the current action in parallel with the other proceeding.

• The plaintiffs have not complied with the timelines set by the court.

• After receiving Quinte's motion materials on the motion to strike, the plaintiffs filed an amended statement of claim, advancing multiple causes of action. Quinte describes this as an attempt to circumvent its motion to strike.

[63] I cannot conclude that this claim is frivolous or vexatious or that it rises to the level of an abuse of process. There appears to be some overlap between this action and the other proceeding from which Dr. Sidiropoulos withdrew. Parties should be discouraged from bringing a multiplicity of proceedings. However, this case does not amount to relitigating a claim that has been determined. Nor does it constitute a misuse of the court's procedure that is manifestly unfair to Quinte or so serious that it brings the administration of justice into disrepute: Taylor Made Advertising Ltd. v. Atlific Inc., 2012 ONCA 459, 111 O.R. (3d) 221, at paras. 31-32.

[64] Rule 26.01 permits a court to, at any stage of an action, grant leave to amend a pleading on terms as are just, unless prejudice would result that could not be compensated for by costs or an adjournment. Leave to amend should only be denied in the clearest of cases, when it is plain and obvious that no tenable cause of action is possible on the facts as alleged: Mitchell v. Lewis, 2016 ONCA 903, 134 O.R. (3d) 524, at para. 21; Burnac Produce Limited v. Hugh Bowman, 2024 ONSC 1817, at para. 6.

[65] The pleadings in this case have not yet closed, no statement of defence has been filed, and Quinte has not alleged a non-compensable prejudice because of the amendments.

[66] The plaintiffs have had two opportunities to produce a proper pleading. At a certain point, fairness to the defendant and respect for the integrity of the judicial process require that they not be granted any further indulgences if they cannot deliver a statement of claim free from material deficiencies: Mitchell, at para. 22.

[67] In this case, the plaintiffs' allegations of negligence, breach of contract, constructive dismissal, "career destruction," and human rights violations turn on the bona fides of Quinte's decisions about privileges. It is plain and obvious that these claims are untenable because the basis of the allegations and the economic loss the plaintiffs claim are outside of the court's jurisdiction to decide. These claims are struck, with no leave to amend.

[68] The amended statement of claim does not disclose a reasonable cause of action in defamation or in misfeasance of public office. However, it is not plain and obvious that no tenable cause of action is possible in defamation and misfeasance in public office. These claims are struck, although the plaintiffs have leave to amend the statement of claim as it relates to misfeasance in public office and defamation.

Disposition

[69] The motion is granted, in part. Except their claim for outstanding backpay for October 1, 2021 to the date Dr. Sidiropoulos' privileges were suspended, the plaintiffs' claims are struck because they are outside of the court's jurisdiction and/or do not disclose a reasonable cause of action. The plaintiffs have leave to amend the statement of claim as it relates to their allegations of misfeasance in public office and defamation.

[70] The parties are encouraged to reach an agreement regarding the costs of this motion. If an agreement cannot be reached, the parties may make brief written submissions of no more than three pages, double spaced, 12-point font. Quinte's costs submissions are to be served and filed within 14 days. The plaintiffs' submissions are to be served and filed within 30 days. There will be no reply submissions without leave.

Released: July 31, 2025

The Honourable Justice Flaherty