Dave Morin-Pelletier

The moving parties' anti-SLAPP motion was previously dismissed.

The responding party sought costs of $100,000.

The court found that costs were warranted under s. 137.1(8) of the Courts of Justice Act because the moving parties' motion lacked merit and the impugned expression was largely unrelated to the public interest.

Applying principles of proportionality and the screening purpose of anti-SLAPP motions, the court awarded costs of $50,000 to the responding party.

The plaintiffs sought to consolidate a 2023 action with a related 2021 action involving overlapping parties and issues arising from an “Estate Freeze” transaction.

The court found that both actions shared common questions of fact and arose from the same series of transactions, and that consolidation (or hearing the actions together) would avoid multiplicity of proceedings, inconsistent findings, and unnecessary costs.

The court ordered the actions to be heard together or one after the other, subject to the trial judge’s directions, and awarded costs to the plaintiffs.

The court dismissed a motion under section 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act (Ontario) by three siblings (Normand Quesnel, Rachelle Paquette, and Marc Quesnel) to dismiss a defamation action brought by their brother, Gilles Quesnel.

The moving parties argued the action was a SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation).

The court found that while some of the impugned statements related to matters of public interest (communications to authorities and professionals), others (communications to friends and family) did not.

The court held that the action had substantial merit, that the moving parties had no valid defence, and that the public interest in allowing the action to proceed outweighed the public interest in protecting the impugned expressions.

The court considered whether a condominium unit owned by the late Qasem Mahmud was held in trust for the Arabic and Islamic Education Foundation.

The applicant, as estate trustee, sought a declaration that neither an express trust nor a purchase money resulting trust existed in favour of the Foundation.

The court found that the requirements for an express trust were not met, as Mr. Mahmud did not own the property when the declaration of trust was signed and the necessary formalities were lacking.

The court also found that the Foundation did not contribute to the purchase price at the time of acquisition, so no purchase money resulting trust arose.

The application was allowed, and the Foundation was found to have no beneficial interest in the property.

The applicants challenged the capacity of Anastasia Helen Troy ("Ann") when she signed her 2022 will and powers of attorney (POAs), alleging incapacity and undue influence.

They sought a declaration that Ann is currently incapable, appointment as guardians, and an accounting.

The respondents moved to dismiss the application.

The court dismissed the challenge to the will, stating it cannot be challenged while the testator is alive.

However, the court found sufficient "suspicious circumstances" to allow the challenge to the 2022 POAs to proceed, noting concerns about Ann's cognitive decline and the respondents' conduct.

The court denied the request for an accounting at this stage due to no direct evidence of mismanagement but granted directions for medical record disclosure and ordered parties to conduct themselves respectfully around Ann.

The plaintiff brought a motion to amend his statement of claim to remove his mother as a defendant and add her as a plaintiff, with himself acting as her litigation guardian.

The defendant brother opposed the motion, arguing the plaintiff was not an appropriate litigation guardian due to a conflict of interest and an acrimonious relationship.

The court found that the mother was a party under disability requiring a litigation guardian.

The court also held that the plaintiff was an appropriate litigation guardian, as he had no interest adverse to his mother and the level of acrimony did not interfere with his ability to act in her best interests.

The motion to amend the statement of claim was allowed.

Following a trial where the maternal grandmother was awarded sole custody of the child, the respondents sought costs.

The applicant father argued each party should bear their own costs due to his limited means and the grandmother's alleged bad faith.

The court found the father's behaviour unreasonable during the litigation, which lengthened the process, but did not find bad faith.

Considering the father's ability to pay and the principles of reasonableness and proportionality, the court ordered the father to pay costs of $15,000 to the grandmother and $3,000 to the mother, payable in monthly instalments.

The applicant sought a consent order and dismissal of an application without costs, following a mediation and minutes of settlement.

The motion record included a draft order with unusual provisions, such as fund transfers, property charges, life insurance beneficiary designation, and return of items.

The court noted the involvement of the Public Guardian and Trustee and the application being brought under the Substitute Decisions Act, 1992, suggesting the respondent might be a party under disability.

The initial motion record was deemed incomplete, lacking necessary information and relying on unsworn correspondence.

The court declined to grant the order and instructed counsel to prepare an amended motion record and arrange an in-court hearing for further clarification.

The appellants, minority shareholders in a family lumber business, appealed the dismissal of their application for an oppression remedy and winding-up order under the Business Corporations Act.

They argued the motion judge erred by failing to address the winding-up provisions, taking judicial notice of political news, and finding parts of their claim statute-barred.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the criteria for winding-up were the same as for oppression, which the judge correctly found was not established.

The court also upheld the judge's findings that the appellant had no reasonable expectation of becoming an officer or receiving dividends given the company's conservative management and industry challenges.

The applicant, a minority shareholder in a family-owned lumber company, brought an application for an oppression remedy under s. 248 of the Business Corporations Act, seeking an order to force the respondents to buy out her shares or liquidate the company.

She alleged that the company's refusal to pay dividends despite being profitable, and its refusal to buy her shares, constituted oppressive conduct.

The respondents argued the claim was statute-barred and that the retention of capital was necessary due to the cyclical nature of the softwood lumber industry and the expiration of the Canada-US softwood lumber agreement.

The court found that while the claim regarding recent non-payment of dividends was not statute-barred, the applicant did not have a reasonable expectation of receiving dividends given the industry's challenges.

The court concluded that the company's conservative management style and decision to retain a high working capital were valid business decisions and did not constitute oppression.

The application was dismissed.

The applicants were successful on an interim motion permitting the individual applicant to resume his day-to-day involvement in the parties' businesses.

The court was asked to determine the costs of the motion.

The respondents argued costs should be in the cause, while the applicants sought substantial indemnity costs payable immediately.

The court found that the respondent's conduct in unilaterally ousting the applicant without colour of right justified an order of costs in any event of the cause.

However, the court awarded costs on a partial indemnity basis, fixing them at $23,810.59 inclusive of fees, disbursements, and HST.

The applicant sought to enforce an arbitration award against the respondents by way of an application.

The court previously converted the application into an action because material facts were in dispute, and directed the parties to make written submissions on costs for the preliminary motion.

The court denied costs to both parties.

The applicant was denied costs because it should have known an application was inappropriate given the disputed facts.

The respondents were denied costs due to egregious deficiencies in their responding affidavit and delays in satisfying undertakings.

The applicant sought to enforce a 2013 arbitration award against individual respondents associated with a dissolved corporation that had been the party to the arbitration.

The applicant argued that the arbitration clause bound administrators or assigns, that the corporate veil should be pierced, and that personal liability or oppression remedies justified enforcement against the individuals.

The court held that enforcement proceedings under the Arbitration Act are limited to enforcing the award itself and do not authorize determining new liability against non‑parties to the arbitration.

Because resolving the applicant’s claims would require complex factual and legal determinations, including corporate veil and oppression issues, the matter could not proceed by application.

The court ordered that the claim proceed by way of an action.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment under the Partition Act seeking partition and sale of jointly owned residential property following the parties’ separation.

The defendant, who remained in occupation of the property, requested an adjournment and had not filed responding materials.

The court refused the adjournment but declined to determine monetary adjustments on the motion, directing that such issues be addressed through a reference.

The court ordered a court-supervised sale of the property under s. 3(1) of the Partition Act, required the defendant to vacate by a specified date, and provided directions governing listing, sale procedures, and interim responsibilities for the mortgage and maintenance of the property.

Decision on costs following a family law motion concerning clarification of a prior court decision relating to child support.

The successful party sought recovery of litigation expenses, while the opposing party argued each side should bear their own costs.

Applying Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules, the court reaffirmed the presumption that the successful party is entitled to costs and considered factors including the parties’ conduct and the simplicity of the issues.

The court found the moving party’s conduct had contributed to unnecessary litigation by delaying and failing to pay child support obligations.

Costs of $2,000 were awarded to the successful party.

The moving party sought summary judgment against the responding party for breach of a leasing contract.

The court applied Rule 20 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the “full appreciation of the evidence” test from Combined Air Mechanical Services Inc. v. Flesch.

The court found that the responding party had confirmed receipt of the leased equipment and made twelve monthly payments before defaulting.

The evidence established that the responding party breached the contract and that any dispute with the equipment supplier did not affect his obligations to the leasing company.

Summary judgment was granted in favour of the moving party for the amounts owing under the contract.