Joël Rocque

The court dismissed a motion under section 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act (Ontario) by three siblings (Normand Quesnel, Rachelle Paquette, and Marc Quesnel) to dismiss a defamation action brought by their brother, Gilles Quesnel.

The moving parties argued the action was a SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation).

The court found that while some of the impugned statements related to matters of public interest (communications to authorities and professionals), others (communications to friends and family) did not.

The court held that the action had substantial merit, that the moving parties had no valid defence, and that the public interest in allowing the action to proceed outweighed the public interest in protecting the impugned expressions.

The moving parties (appellants) brought a motion seeking an order for the release of transcripts from Superior Court hearings, an extension of time to perfect their appeal, and costs.

The responding parties did not oppose the release of transcripts or the extension but opposed the request for costs.

The court granted the release of the transcripts and the extension of time, directing the Superior Court to expedite its review and release.

However, the court denied the moving parties' request for costs, finding that their essential problem was with the Superior Court, not the responding parties.

The court also clarified it had no jurisdiction over the settling of the Superior Court order.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their wrongful dismissal action as statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The appellants were dismissed for cause in November 2009 and commenced their action in July 2015, approximately six years later.

The appellants argued that they did not know whether a civil proceeding was an appropriate means to seek remedy until related criminal proceedings were resolved.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, holding that "appropriate" under section 5(1)(a)(iv) of the Limitations Act means legally appropriate, not whether the proceeding will succeed.

The court distinguished Winmill v. Woodstock (Police Services Board) on the basis that the civil and criminal matters were not mirror images of each other in this case.

The appellant sought to set aside a decision by Justice Pardu refusing to extend the time to appeal a Superior Court decision.

Justice Pardu had found that the appellant demonstrated intention to appeal within the prescribed time and accepted his explanation for the delay, with no prejudice to the respondent.

However, she dismissed the motion on the sole ground that the grounds of appeal were devoid of merit.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, finding that the appellant's claims were directly related to his employment and fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of an arbitrator under the settlement agreement.

The defendant MacEwen Petroleum Inc. brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' wrongful dismissal claim as statute-barred.

The plaintiffs argued the limitation period should run from the date of their criminal acquittals, not the date of termination, citing exceptions for claims against state agents.

The court found that the plaintiffs' claim was discoverable on the date of termination (November 9, 2009) and did not fall within the narrow exceptions for tolling the limitation period, which are typically reserved for cases involving police misconduct where civil and criminal claims are "mirror images." The motion was granted, and the plaintiffs' claims were dismissed as statute-barred.