Gordon Scott Campbell

Several Indigenous groups brought motions to intervene in a Rule 12.08 representation motion concerning an Aboriginal title claim to lands along the Ottawa River.

The court granted leave to intervene to the Algonquins of Pikwakanagan First Nation, finding they had a direct interest as part of the collective the plaintiffs seek to represent.

The court dismissed the motion by the Nine Algonquin Collectives, concluding they did not meet the criteria for intervention under Rule 13.01, as they are not part of the proposed collective and their participation would unduly delay the proceeding.

The applicants sought adverse possession of a 16-acre parcel lying within adjoining owners' registered boundaries, relying on a fence line, historical cattle pasturing, and seasonal hunting use between 1955 and 1965.

Applying the adverse possession framework under s. 5(1) of the Real Property Limitations Act, the court found open, notorious, and continuous use during the relevant ten-year period, but held the claim failed because the applicants did not prove the use was adverse to the title holder or establish a shared mutual mistake about the boundary.

The court also rejected the submission that a payment under the respondents' title insurance policy affected the merits of the possessory title analysis.

The application was dismissed, the cross-application was granted, the respondents were declared to hold absolute title without restriction, and the applicants were ordered to remove their chattels from the disputed lands at their own cost.

The Ontario Review Board held a hearing to review the disposition of the accused, who was previously found not criminally responsible for second-degree murder.

The hospital had transferred the accused to a more secure unit with a loss of privileges due to illicit substance use.

The Board found that the accused continues to represent a significant threat to the safety of the public due to his schizophrenia, substance use disorders, and recent concerning behaviours.

The Board ordered the continuation of the Detention Order but allowed a 50km community radius to facilitate employment.

The Board also confirmed that the initial and ongoing restriction of the accused's liberties was necessary and appropriate.

This costs endorsement addresses entitlement and quantum of costs following a family law dispute regarding a change of school for the parties' child and a withdrawn claim for an interest in the proceeds of sale of a home.

The court apportions costs based on success on the various issues, the reasonableness of the parties' conduct, and the use of withdrawn claims as litigation leverage.

The result is a net costs award of $10,000 payable from the Applicant to the Respondent.

The Ontario Review Board conducted an annual review of the accused, who was previously found not criminally responsible for murder due to schizophrenia.

The hospital and the Attorney General submitted that the accused continues to pose a significant threat to public safety, citing recent substance use, rule violations, and drug-seeking behaviour, though noting recent improvements in cooperation.

The Board found that the accused remains a significant threat to public safety and ordered his continued detention at the hospital, while approving the hospital's recommendation for a graduated increase in community access privileges.

This endorsement implements a direction from the Court of Appeal for Ontario, which remitted the matter back to the Superior Court of Justice to alter a final parenting order.

The court ordered that the father may request a review of the parenting time provisions, including supervised access terms, within 12 months of February 24, 2025.

This review will proceed via a Motion to Change under the Family Law Rules without requiring the father to demonstrate a material change of circumstances.

Any subsequent requests to vary the parenting time orders will require demonstrating a material change of circumstances, sensitive to the fact that the case involves an adult child who cannot withdraw from parental charge.

The appellant father appealed a final parenting order regarding his adult child with Down Syndrome.

The trial judge had ordered that the father have no unsupervised parenting time, and that supervised parenting time occur only at the respondent mother's discretion.

The Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence confirming the child's views could not be easily ascertained, satisfying the presumption of capacity framework.

However, the Court found the trial judge erred by failing to include a review mechanism in the order, given that the adult child would never 'age out' of it.

The appeal was allowed in part and remitted to the trial judge to structure a built-in review mechanism to allow the father to seek unsupervised parenting time in the future.

This application concerned the interpretation of Eleanor Martha Devonport's will regarding a residential property gifted to her son, Peter, who predeceased her.

The applicant, Peter's spouse and estate trustee, argued the property passed to her via the anti-lapse provision (s. 31) of the Succession Law Reform Act.

The respondent, Eleanor's surviving child and estate trustee, contended Eleanor's will expressed a contrary intention, causing the gift to lapse into the residue of the estate.

The court found no contrary intention in the will to oust the anti-lapse provision, ruling the property passed to the applicant.

The court also dismissed the respondent's unjust enrichment claim and ordered the respondent to account for dealings with the property and pay occupation rent to the applicant.

The appellant, Ms. White, appealed a trial judge's order varying a separation agreement, specifically challenging the imputation of income to her of $35,000 per year and the refusal to impute higher income to the respondent, Mr. White.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's discretionary decision regarding income imputation.

The trial judge's findings were based on the separation agreement's terms requiring Ms. White to make reasonable efforts to support herself, and evidence concerning Mr. White's job loss and efforts to find new employment.

The plaintiff, a student, brought a motion under Rule 51.06(1) seeking judgment against the defendant instructor for breach of fiduciary duty and an assessment of damages, stemming from a sexual relationship between them.

The motion was dismissed because the court found serious issues of fact and law, conflicting submissions, credibility issues, and the defendant's right to a trial on viva voce evidence, indicating that the admissions made were not sufficiently clear or definite to grant judgment without a full hearing.

The applicant sought a declaration of a right-of-way over the respondent's property for vehicle parking.

The parties settled the main issue via minutes of settlement, leaving only the matter of costs for the court to determine.

The applicant sought substantial costs, arguing full success and moderate complexity.

The respondent argued the application was unnecessary and could have been resolved amicably.

The court found no basis to award costs to the applicant, concluding the litigation was not complex or necessary, and that the applicant's claims of obstruction were unsubstantiated.

The appellant mother appealed an interim order granting the respondent father decision-making authority to have their seven-year-old child vaccinated against COVID-19.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, applying the Court of Appeal's guidance in J.N. v. C.G. The court held that government recommendations regarding vaccination are admissible under the public document exception to the hearsay rule, and judicial notice may be taken of regulatory approval.

The motion judge correctly placed the onus on the mother to establish why the child should not be vaccinated, and did not err in allocating decision-making on an interim basis or in weighing the mother's views as the primary caregiver.

The applicants, owners of adjacent waterfront cottages, sought a declaration of communal adverse possession over a parcel of land separating their properties from the Ottawa River.

The disputed land had been purchased by the respondents following a municipal tax sale.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, holding that Ontario law does not recognize a communal claim for adverse possession where the claimants only used discrete portions of the land rather than possessing the whole in common.

The court also rejected the applicants' challenge to the respondents' legal title, finding the paralegal's affidavit on title issues inadmissible as expert opinion.

The applicant father brought a motion seeking a finding of primary residence and confirmation of the status quo since March 2020, when the children were placed in his care following child welfare involvement.

The respondent mother brought a cross-motion seeking the return of primary residence or expanded parenting time.

The court found that a new status quo had been established and that there was no compelling evidence to disturb it pending trial, especially given the Office of the Children's Lawyer's recommendation.

The court ordered that the children remain in the primary care of the applicant, but granted the respondent expanded parenting time of three weekends per month.

The moving party sought leave to appeal an order of Fraser J. The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal, but restricted it solely to issues concerning COVID-19 vaccination.

The court recommended the appeal be heard alongside a related case and awarded costs of $2,500 to the moving party.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal an order dated September 27, 2021.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and ordered costs payable by the moving party to the responding party fixed at $4,100.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal an order dated August 11, 2021.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and fixed costs in favour of the responding parties in the amount of $2,500.

The appellant, Shawn Poitras, appealed a trial decision that awarded the respondent, Natalie Burke, child and spousal support, arrears, an equalization payment, and exclusive possession of the matrimonial home, following an uncontested trial where the appellant's answer was struck due to repeated non-disclosure.

The appellant raised four grounds of appeal: denial of participation rights, insufficient scrutiny of the respondent's evidence, indefinite spousal support, and excessive costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, denying leave to file fresh evidence (failing the Palmer test), finding no unfairness regarding participation rights given the appellant's conduct, upholding the trial judge's scrutiny of evidence and spousal support award (applying Moge and SSAGs), and affirming the costs award.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiffs' motion for a mandatory interlocutory injunction regarding a residential heat pump, the parties could not agree on costs.

The defendants sought costs between partial and substantial indemnity, citing the plaintiffs' conduct including a last-minute adjournment and lengthy cross-examinations.

The court found the conduct did not warrant elevated costs but considered it in fixing the quantum.

The court awarded the defendants costs of $17,773.21 on a partial indemnity basis, finding it to be a fair and reasonable amount.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for a mandatory interlocutory injunction to compel their neighbours to relocate a heat pump, alleging the noise and vibration constituted a nuisance and caused health issues.

The court applied the modified RJR-MacDonald test for mandatory injunctions.

The motion was dismissed because the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a strong prima facie case, largely due to insufficient medical and expert evidence linking the heat pump to their complaints, and failed to establish irreparable harm or that the balance of convenience favoured granting the injunction.