Dylan James MacLeod Crosby

A motor vehicle accident occurred on April 25, 2015, on Scenic Road in Renfrew County involving two vehicles traveling in opposite directions, resulting in serious injury to a passenger.

Damages were resolved prior to trial.

The sole issue at trial was whether the driver of the oncoming vehicle (Prince) bore any liability for the accident.

The defendant driver (Vandenheuvel) admitted to crossing the centre line.

The court found that the plaintiff failed to establish any liability against Prince, dismissing the action against him.

The court found that Prince was driving in his own lane at a reasonable speed and took appropriate evasive action upon discovering the oncoming vehicle.

This is a costs endorsement following a trial management conference and a motion by the applicant to adjourn the trial.

The adjournment was necessitated by the respondent's failure to comply with financial disclosure obligations, which the court emphasized as essential for fair and efficient family law proceedings.

The applicant sought full indemnity costs, and the respondent failed to provide any responding submissions.

The court awarded the applicant fixed costs of $1500 plus HST, payable forthwith, finding the amount reasonable given the time spent and counsel's hourly rate.

The appellant mother appealed an interim order granting the respondent father decision-making authority to have their seven-year-old child vaccinated against COVID-19.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, applying the Court of Appeal's guidance in J.N. v. C.G. The court held that government recommendations regarding vaccination are admissible under the public document exception to the hearsay rule, and judicial notice may be taken of regulatory approval.

The motion judge correctly placed the onus on the mother to establish why the child should not be vaccinated, and did not err in allocating decision-making on an interim basis or in weighing the mother's views as the primary caregiver.

The moving party sought leave to appeal an order of Fraser J. The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal, but restricted it solely to issues concerning COVID-19 vaccination.

The court recommended the appeal be heard alongside a related case and awarded costs of $2,500 to the moving party.

The respondent mother brought an urgent motion for the return of the parties' seven-year-old child to her primary care after the applicant father unilaterally withheld the child following a medical incident.

The father alleged the mother had substance abuse issues, but a Children's Aid Society investigation did not verify these concerns.

The court found that the father engaged in inappropriate self-help by altering the established status quo without a compelling reason.

The court ordered the child returned to the mother's primary care, restored the previous parenting schedule, and permitted the mother to return the child to his original school.

On a family law motion, the applicant sought immediate sale of the jointly owned matrimonial home pending trial, while the respondent opposed sale and proposed retaining the home through an equalization set-off.

Applying the pre-trial sale framework under the Partition Act in light of unresolved Family Law Act issues, the court held that immediate sale should be refused where substantial rights, including equalization, pension treatment, and a potential spousal support claim, could still be affected at trial.

The court also considered the modest anticipated delay to trial, the respondent's undertaking to assume mortgage payments, and the limited practical advantage of listing during winter and COVID-19 restrictions.

The request for immediate sale was denied, the respondent was ordered to pay the mortgage pending trial, and use of the Family Wizard application was ordered on consent.

The moving party brought a motion for an order to sell the parties' jointly owned, unfinished matrimonial home prior to trial, for a Voice of the Child Report, and for leave to amend her answer to claim spousal support.

The court dismissed the request for the sale of the home due to uncertainty regarding its current equity and because it currently houses the parties' child, noting that a new motion could be brought once an updated appraisal is obtained.

The court granted the requests for a Voice of the Child Report and for leave to amend the answer to claim spousal support.

The applicant was successful on a motion regarding the interim parenting schedule for the parties' two children.

The court considered the factors under Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules, noting that while the applicant's email offer did not meet the formal requirements of Rule 18, it was similar to the final result.

The court awarded the applicant costs fixed at $1,800 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The applicant father sought an interim order prohibiting the respondent mother from relocating the parties' four-year-old child to Deep River, Ontario, and requesting primary care.

The mother had been the primary caregiver since birth and moved to reside with her new partner.

Applying the Gordon v. Goertz and Plumley factors, the court found that the mother was likely to succeed at trial regarding primary care and that the move was made in good faith.

The court dismissed the father's motion, permitting the interim relocation pending trial.

The applicant, a grandmother, sought a temporary order for access to her 5-year-old granddaughter.

The parents and other family members opposed the motion, citing concerns about the applicant's disrespect for parental decisions, promotion of religious views, and attempts to facilitate contact with an estranged aunt.

The court, applying the principles from *Chapman v. Chapman*, found that the parents were attentive, capable, and loving, and had not shown an inability to act in the child's best interests.

The court determined that the parents' decision to limit access was not arbitrary or unreasonable, despite the potential impact on the grandmother-granddaughter relationship.

The motion for temporary access was dismissed.

The court heard urgent applications and a cross-application for the appointment of a guardian for personal care and property for an incapacitated individual.

The primary applicant sought guardianship to challenge a doctor's life support plan at the Consent and Capacity Board, while the cross-applicant (spouse) intended to consent to the plan if appointed.

The court dismissed both applications for guardianship of personal care, finding that the need for decisions could be met by a less restrictive alternative, specifically by allowing the Consent and Capacity Board to determine the appropriate substitute decision-maker.

The court emphasized that the Board is the expert body for such life-and-death decisions.

Applications for guardianship of property were adjourned.

The primary applicant was ordered to pay partial indemnity costs to the spouse and a statutory fee to the Public Guardian and Trustee, partly due to the inappropriate conduct of counsel and the lack of admissible evidence.

Following an unsuccessful defence motion for summary judgment on a discoverability issue in a motor vehicle accident action, the court addressed the appropriate quantum of costs payable to the plaintiff.

The plaintiff sought over $50,000 in partial indemnity costs.

The court found the requested fees excessive, noting duplication of work among multiple counsel and disproportionate time claimed by senior counsel who did not draft the materials.

Applying s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court emphasized fairness, reasonableness, and the expectations of the parties.

Costs were reduced and fixed at a lump sum of $29,000 inclusive of fees, disbursements, and HST.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their action against the respondent insurer for breach of the duty of good faith.

The motion judge had found the action was barred by the one-year limitation period in the standard automobile policy.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the cause of action did not arise until the insured's liability was finally ascertained by judgment.

Furthermore, the court held that a claim for breach of the independent duty of good faith is not a claim under the insurance contract, and is therefore subject to the general six-year limitation period rather than the one-year statutory condition.