Gordon Scott Campbell

The appellant mother appealed an order placing her two children in extended society care with no access.

The children, who are Métis, were apprehended due to exposure to domestic violence and adult sexual activity.

The Court of Appeal upheld the extended society care order, finding no error in the lower courts' assessment of the children's need for protection or the statutory time limits.

However, applying the Kawartha framework, the Court found the trial judge erred by placing the burden on the mother to prove access was beneficial.

The Court allowed the appeal in part, granting the mother monthly photograph access as it was in the children's best interests and would not impair adoption prospects.

The appellant appealed an order striking his answer and amended answer in a family law proceeding due to his ongoing failure to comply with court orders regarding costs, household expenses, and financial disclosure.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding the appellant's non-compliance to be wilful and egregious.

The court emphasized that striking pleadings is an exceptional remedy but was justified here given the appellant's repeated disregard for his fundamental obligations.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on charges of assault with a weapon, breaking and entering, robbery, and aggravated assault.

The Crown argued that the trial judge erred in law by assessing the evidence piecemeal rather than considering it holistically, thereby failing to appreciate how the cumulative evidence built the strength of the Crown's case.

While the appellate court found that the trial judge did commit an error of law in her approach to the evidence, the appeal was dismissed because the victim—a Crown witness who knew the respondent well—testified with certainty that the attacker was not the respondent.

This independent exculpatory evidence raised a reasonable doubt that could not be overcome by the trial judge's error.

The father appealed a trial judgment permitting the mother to relocate with two children (ages five and seven) from Orleans, Ontario to Montreal, Quebec.

The father moved for a stay of the trial judgment pending appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion for a stay, finding that the grounds of appeal were not particularly strong, that the father would not suffer irreparable harm, and that the balance of convenience favoured allowing the relocation to proceed.

The trial judgment had granted the father increased access, including overnight access on alternating weekends commencing February 2020, and the mother had made arrangements to facilitate the father's continued relationship with the children.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for criminal harassment, arguing his guilty plea was not informed.

He believed there was a joint submission on sentence that would spare him a criminal record, confusing an agreement on facts with an agreement on sentence.

Applying the framework from R. v. Wong, the Superior Court of Justice found the appellant established a reasonable probability he would have opted for a trial had he known he risked a criminal record.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The father brought a motion to change a final order regarding access to the parties' child, arguing that the child's commencement of school drastically reduced his access time.

The mother sought a variation for child support and contribution to special expenses.

The court found a material change in circumstances for both access and support.

The court ordered a revised access schedule granting the father more frequent access during the school year and extended summer access.

The court also imputed income to the father at minimum wage, finding him intentionally unemployed, and ordered him to pay child support and share special expenses equally, with a deduction for his increased transportation costs.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Minister of Justice's decision to order his surrender to the United States of America pursuant to the Extradition Act.

The applicant, a Mohawk of Akwesasne with Aboriginal heritage, argued that the Minister failed to give proper consideration to Gladue principles and his Charter rights.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Minister's decision, finding that she had properly considered all relevant factors, including the applicant's Aboriginal background and Gladue principles, and that the applicant's circumstances were distinguishable from prior cases.

The court applied a reasonableness standard of review and found the Minister's decision fell within a range of acceptable outcomes.

The applicant, a certified general accountant, sought judicial review of decisions by the Professional Conduct Tribunal and Appeal Tribunal finding him guilty of professional misconduct, revoking his membership, and imposing fines and costs.

The Divisional Court held that the Appeal Tribunal lacked standing to argue the merits of the application.

On the merits, the Court found the Liability Decision unreasonable because it lacked adequate reasons and relied on purely formulaic, conclusory credibility findings without analyzing the evidence.

The decisions were set aside and the matter remitted for a rehearing before a differently constituted panel.

The defendant appealed a Small Claims Court decision awarding the plaintiff the balance owing on a masonry contract and dismissing her counterclaim for faulty work.

On appeal, the defendant argued the trial judge demonstrated bias by disclosing a prior acquaintance with one of the plaintiff's witnesses and made palpable and overriding errors of fact.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no appearance of bias as the trial judge had repeatedly invited submissions on the issue and the defendant's representative had encouraged him to remain.

The court also found no palpable and overriding errors in the trial judge's factual findings, which were supported by the evidence.

The appellant father appealed a Family Court order granting the mother sole custody of their two children with supervised access to him, and allowing the Children's Aid Society to withdraw its protection application.

The father argued the motions judge erred in finding a material change in circumstances, hearing the matters simultaneously, allowing the withdrawal without a full hearing, and improperly relying on a section 54 assessment report.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motions judge properly applied the test for varying custody due to parental alienation, correctly exercised discretion to hear the matters together, held an appropriate hearing for the withdrawal, and did not improperly rely on the assessment report.

The moving party sought an extension of time to appeal two orders in a high-conflict matrimonial proceeding: an order striking his pleadings for failure to pay costs, and a subsequent final order from an uncontested trial.

The moving party argued that as a self-represented litigant, he did not understand the implications of the order striking his pleadings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding that the moving party had a lawyer present when the consequences were discussed, failed to move promptly after learning of the final order, and failed to demonstrate that the final order resulted in any real injustice or substantive errors.

The Crown brought an application to admit evidence of the accused's prior convictions for sexual assault from 1990 as similar fact evidence.

The accused is charged with sexual offences against a complainant with cognitive disabilities.

The Crown sought to adduce evidence that the prior victims also had mental disabilities.

The court found that the Crown failed to provide sufficient cogent detail about the circumstances of the prior offences, rendering the evidence merely indicative of general propensity.

The application was dismissed as the evidence lacked probative value and its admission would be highly prejudicial.

The defendants were charged with aiding and abetting others to enter Canada without appearing for examination before a Canada Border Services Officer, contrary to section 124(1)(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.

The defendants brought a constitutional challenge under section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 and sections 15, 7, and 2(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The defendants claimed an aboriginal right to mobility within Mohawk territory at Akwesasne for family and community purposes without reporting at the border, and alleged that the reporting requirements were discriminatory and violated their liberty and freedom of association.

The court dismissed all constitutional challenges and found the defendants guilty.

The moving party sought leave to appeal an interlocutory family law decision that imposed a new interim parenting regime.

The court considered the test for granting leave to appeal under the Courts of Justice Act and applicable procedural rules.

It found there were serious questions about whether the motion judge exceeded jurisdiction by making substantive orders not requested in the pleadings and without a full evidentiary record or opportunity for cross-examination.

The court held that the circumstances raised concerns about natural justice and procedural fairness.

Leave to appeal was granted and a temporary stay of the impugned order was issued pending the appeal.

The appellants were convicted of multiple mortgage financing frauds involving the manipulation of recent immigrants to obtain mortgage financing and take title to properties.

They appealed their convictions and sentences of four years' imprisonment, fines in lieu of forfeiture, and a joint restitution order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding no errors in the trial judge's jury instructions regarding co-conspirators, treatment of evidence, or response to Crown counsel's closing remarks.

The sentence appeals were also dismissed, as the custodial sentences were within the appropriate range for large-scale fraud, and the fines and restitution orders were properly imposed.

The appellant father appealed a motion judge's order finding him in contempt of court for using his mother as a caregiver for his children instead of the designated daycare provider, and a subsequent order imposing sanctions.

The respondent mother moved to quash the appeal as out of time.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion to quash, extending the time for service.

The Court allowed the appeal and set aside the contempt and sanction orders, finding that the motion judge erred by making findings of contempt that extended beyond the specific non-monetary breach alleged in the notice of motion.

The applicant sought the release of seized cash under s. 462.34 of the Criminal Code to fund legal expenses in pending criminal proceedings.

Police had seized more than $1 million in cash during a search that also uncovered drugs and other evidence.

The court accepted that the seized funds were available for potential release and that the applicant had established sole entitlement to the money despite arguments about possible competing claims.

However, the applicant failed to demonstrate financial need, as required under s. 462.34, given inconsistencies between his claimed lack of assets and evidence that he possessed substantial unexplained cash and lived in a mortgage-free home.

The application for release of funds for legal fees was therefore denied.

The respondent's fishing vessel was seized for fishing without a licence.

While the vessel was detained, the Federal Court ordered its sale in a separate civil action, and the proceeds were held by the Receiver General.

The respondent was subsequently convicted of Fisheries Act offences, and the sentencing judge ordered forfeiture of $50,000 of the proceeds of the sale.

The Court of Appeal overturned the forfeiture, holding that physical detention of the vessel was a precondition to forfeiture under the Fisheries Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that s. 72(1) of the Fisheries Act authorizes a provincial superior court to order forfeiture of the proceeds of a vessel's sale even when sold under the authority of the Federal Court.

The appellant, a Mi'kmaq Indian, was charged with fishing without a licence, fishing during the close season with illegal nets, and selling eels without a licence.

He argued that the Treaties of 1760-61 granted him a treaty right to catch and sell fish, exempting him from the regulations.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the treaties included an implied right to hunt and fish to obtain necessaries (a moderate livelihood) through trade.

The discretionary licensing system and close season under the federal fisheries regulations infringed this treaty right and were not justified.

The appeal was allowed and acquittals were entered.

The appellants appealed a decision of the Federal Court of Appeal which had found that section 231.4 of the Income Tax Act infringed sections 7 and 8 of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, adopting the dissenting reasons of Strayer J.A. in the court below.

The Court held that section 231.4 does not restrict the rights guaranteed by section 7 or section 8 of the Charter, and restored the trial judgment dismissing the constitutional challenge.