Miranda Jean Belansky

The appellant, Ms. White, appealed a trial judge's order varying a separation agreement, specifically challenging the imputation of income to her of $35,000 per year and the refusal to impute higher income to the respondent, Mr. White.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's discretionary decision regarding income imputation.

The trial judge's findings were based on the separation agreement's terms requiring Ms. White to make reasonable efforts to support herself, and evidence concerning Mr. White's job loss and efforts to find new employment.

This summary judgment motion addressed a dispute between separated parents regarding healthcare decision-making for their three children, specifically concerning vaccinations.

The parties had partial minutes of settlement, but the vaccination issue remained outstanding.

The court considered the children's capacity to consent to medical treatment under the Health Care Consent Act, 1996, and the allocation of decision-making authority.

The court ordered specific vaccination protocols for the youngest child and made the middle child's vaccination contingent on his consent, while affirming the applicant's decision-making authority for the eldest child.

In an application for a status review under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, the respondent father moved for a temporary order for supervised access with specific terms, including an alternative supervision agency.

The Children's Aid Society (applicant) and the respondent mother agreed to supervised access but opposed the father's proposed terms, particularly the agency.

The court reviewed the father's history of domestic violence, substance abuse, and instability, finding his proposed alternative agency unsuitable.

The court ordered supervised access at Pathstone when available, with virtual or telephone access in the interim, and stipulated that repeated missed visits would terminate access.

The father's specific requests for an alternative agency were denied.

The Children's Aid Society brought a protection application for B.W.-B., seeking interim society care.

The Society later moved to vary the temporary order to place the child with kin (paternal uncle and partner), which the parents opposed, preferring foster care or return to their care.

The mother cross-moved for the child's return to parental care.

The court found the child would be at risk of harm if returned to the parents and that a supervision order would not adequately protect the child.

While acknowledging the general preference for kin placement, the court dismissed the Society's motion for kin placement due to parental opposition, concerns about the kin's past issues, and particularly, the kin's hostile and vulgar communications regarding the mother, which would undermine reunification efforts.

The mother's cross-motion for parental return was also dismissed.

The temporary order for B.W.-B. to remain in Society care was continued.