Miranda Jean Belansky

On competing family law motions concerning a child’s medical care and dietary management, the court found a material change in circumstances based on escalating parental conflict and ongoing medical uncertainty affecting effective decision-making.

The court held that the dietary term in prior Minutes of Settlement remained binding unless varied, and that unilateral non-compliance was impermissible despite disagreement about continued necessity.

Applying best-interests principles under the Divorce Act and Children’s Law Reform Act, the court ordered an interim framework requiring continued gluten- and dairy-free compliance, detailed dietary/symptom tracking, and coordinated physician-led referrals through the child’s family doctor.

The child was ordered to remain on a tertiary clinic wait list pending medical recommendations or further order.

Both the motion and cross-motion were granted in part, with all other relief dismissed and no costs awarded.

On a family law motion, the moving party sought to set aside temporary orders that had restricted him to supervised parenting time and had shifted decision-making authority and primary residence to the responding party.

The court held that the temporary safety concerns underlying those orders had materially changed, relying in particular on child protection communications indicating no ongoing involvement regarding the parties’ children and permitting unsupervised caregiving in the moving party’s household.

The court found the temporary orders did not establish a new status quo deserving deference where the original rationale had dissipated.

The motion was granted, the temporary orders were vacated, and the prior equal parenting regime was reinstated with a short transition period of interim unsupervised parenting time.

The applicant and respondent both brought motions for temporary relief within a Motion to Change.

The applicant sought to alter the status quo parenting time established by a Texas divorce decree, add a 'no harassment' clause, and compel disclosure of the respondent's employer.

The respondent sought to maintain the parenting schedule, vacate a temporary supervision order related to his admitted alcoholism, and obtain specific orders regarding extracurricular activities.

The court dismissed both motions, save for ordering the respondent to disclose his employer's identity.

The court emphasized that interim changes to status quo parenting arrangements should not be made absent evidence of harm or necessity, especially with a trial scheduled in five months.

The supervision order was maintained pending trial to allow for tested evidence on the respondent's progress with his alcoholism.

The appellant, Ms. White, appealed a trial judge's order varying a separation agreement, specifically challenging the imputation of income to her of $35,000 per year and the refusal to impute higher income to the respondent, Mr. White.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's discretionary decision regarding income imputation.

The trial judge's findings were based on the separation agreement's terms requiring Ms. White to make reasonable efforts to support herself, and evidence concerning Mr. White's job loss and efforts to find new employment.

The parties separated and the mother sought to restrict the father's parenting time to supervised visits, alleging a history of family violence, sexual abuse, and abduction risk.

The father sought unsupervised parenting time and a determination of his child support obligations based on his income earned in Nigeria, converted at a black market exchange rate, with a reduction for undue hardship due to travel costs.

The court found the mother's allegations of sexual abuse and abduction risk to be unsubstantiated and granted the father unsupervised regular and holiday parenting time.

For child support, the court rejected the black market exchange rate, applying the Receiver General of Canada rate instead.

Due to the father's failure to provide adequate financial disclosure and his intentional under-employment, the court imputed his income at $50,000.

The father's claim for undue hardship was dismissed, and he was ordered to pay $755 per month in child support.

The parties advised the court in writing that the matter had been settled.

On consent, the court ordered that the appeal be dismissed without costs to either party.

This summary judgment motion addressed a dispute between separated parents regarding healthcare decision-making for their three children, specifically concerning vaccinations.

The parties had partial minutes of settlement, but the vaccination issue remained outstanding.

The court considered the children's capacity to consent to medical treatment under the Health Care Consent Act, 1996, and the allocation of decision-making authority.

The court ordered specific vaccination protocols for the youngest child and made the middle child's vaccination contingent on his consent, while affirming the applicant's decision-making authority for the eldest child.

The respondent father brought a motion to find the applicant mother in contempt of court for failing to return their daughter to his primary care as required by a final order.

The child had refused to return to the father's home after a summer visit with the mother.

The court dismissed the contempt motion, finding that while the mother breached the order by not returning the child, her conduct was not willful beyond a reasonable doubt because she had done all she reasonably could to encourage the child to return.

The applicant children's aid society brought a motion to vary a temporary order that had placed two young children in its care, seeking to place them with the father of the younger child under supervision.

The mother opposed the placement.

The court dismissed the motion to change the primary placement, finding insufficient evidence of the proposed father's suitability and concluding that the least intrusive order consistent with the children's best interests was to maintain the current society care order.

The court did vary the order to restrict the older child's father's access to only his biological child.

In an application for a status review under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, the respondent father moved for a temporary order for supervised access with specific terms, including an alternative supervision agency.

The Children's Aid Society (applicant) and the respondent mother agreed to supervised access but opposed the father's proposed terms, particularly the agency.

The court reviewed the father's history of domestic violence, substance abuse, and instability, finding his proposed alternative agency unsuitable.

The court ordered supervised access at Pathstone when available, with virtual or telephone access in the interim, and stipulated that repeated missed visits would terminate access.

The father's specific requests for an alternative agency were denied.

The Children's Aid Society brought a protection application for B.W.-B., seeking interim society care.

The Society later moved to vary the temporary order to place the child with kin (paternal uncle and partner), which the parents opposed, preferring foster care or return to their care.

The mother cross-moved for the child's return to parental care.

The court found the child would be at risk of harm if returned to the parents and that a supervision order would not adequately protect the child.

While acknowledging the general preference for kin placement, the court dismissed the Society's motion for kin placement due to parental opposition, concerns about the kin's past issues, and particularly, the kin's hostile and vulgar communications regarding the mother, which would undermine reunification efforts.

The mother's cross-motion for parental return was also dismissed.

The temporary order for B.W.-B. to remain in Society care was continued.