Marie-Hélène Godbout

The respondent brought a motion to enforce a final consent order requiring the parties to resolve future spousal support disputes through arbitration.

The applicant opposed the motion, arguing that the order itself was not a valid arbitration agreement and she preferred to proceed in court via a Motion to Change.

The court held that it has jurisdiction to enforce a consent order to arbitrate by compelling the parties to execute a compliant family arbitration agreement.

The court ordered the applicant to sign the arbitration agreement and stayed her court proceeding.

The applicant father brought a motion for a temporary parenting schedule and the appointment of a parenting capacity assessor pending trial.

The respondent mother consented to the appointment of the assessor but proposed a more restrictive parenting schedule.

The court ordered the appointment of the agreed-upon assessor with costs shared equally.

Finding no evidence of risk to the child and emphasizing the need to foster the father-child relationship, the court expanded the applicant's parenting time and assumed case management of the proceeding.

The parties, engaged in high conflict litigation over parenting time, consented to a temporary order appointing a parenting coordinator.

The parenting coordinator subsequently issued two interim awards that increased the applicant's parenting time and ordered the appointment of a custody assessor.

The respondent sought to terminate the parenting coordination process and set aside the awards, while the applicant sought to enforce them.

The court found that the parenting coordinator exceeded her jurisdiction by making significant changes to the residential schedule without a mediation/arbitration agreement.

The court set aside the awards, terminated the parenting coordination process, and directed the parties to file written submissions for a temporary parenting schedule.

On an interim family motion, the applicant sought retroactive and increased ongoing spousal support, and a determination of whether child support for an adult child had ended.

The court held that conflicting affidavit evidence and unresolved income issues made retroactive relief inappropriate on an interim record, particularly where the applicant was effectively seeking final relief before trial.

The court found prima facie entitlement to spousal support, but maintained the status quo at the amount fixed in the parties' addendum because there was no demonstrated financial hardship or urgency.

Child support was terminated as of December 31, 2020 based on the respondent's admission, with any earlier termination date left for trial.

The father brought a motion seeking a temporary order to stay the mother's application to change their son's name from William Jr. Ndze Fuhgeh to William Benjamin Ndze Fuhgeh Bernard.

The father's main application sought to prohibit the mother from changing the child's name without his consent.

The court granted the temporary stay, finding it was not in the child's best interests for the name change application to proceed immediately, as ongoing case-managed matters and the father's main application might clarify relevant issues.

Costs were reserved to the judge overseeing the father's main application.

The respondent brought a motion for temporary relief, including spousal support and an advance for legal fees, prior to a case conference.

He argued the motion was urgent due to dire financial hardship.

The applicant brought a cross-motion for the unconditional release of the net proceeds from the sale of her home.

The respondent also requested the judge recuse herself for alleged bias after preliminary rulings went against him.

The court dismissed the recusal request, finding no reasonable apprehension of bias.

The court also dismissed both the motion and cross-motion, finding that neither party established the urgency required under Rule 14(4.2) of the Family Law Rules to proceed before a case conference.

The appellant father appealed a Family Court order granting the mother sole custody of their two children with supervised access to him, and allowing the Children's Aid Society to withdraw its protection application.

The father argued the motions judge erred in finding a material change in circumstances, hearing the matters simultaneously, allowing the withdrawal without a full hearing, and improperly relying on a section 54 assessment report.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motions judge properly applied the test for varying custody due to parental alienation, correctly exercised discretion to hear the matters together, held an appropriate hearing for the withdrawal, and did not improperly rely on the assessment report.

Following a decision on a motion to change and a motion for withdrawal in child protection proceedings, the parties made written submissions on costs.

The Applicant Mother sought substantial indemnity costs against the Respondent Father, while the Father sought costs against both the Mother and the Children's Aid Society.

The court denied costs in the child protection proceedings, noting that costs in such matters require more than mere success.

However, the court awarded costs to the Applicant Mother for the motion to change in the divorce proceedings, as she was the substantially successful party.

The court fixed costs at an elevated partial indemnity rate of $28,319.46, sanctioning the Respondent Father for his unreasonable behaviour in filing voluminous and unnecessary materials.

The parties consented to an interim order incorporating an access and visitation schedule and the report of Julie Guindon.

The respondent was ordered to pay $817 per month in child support for two children based on an annual income of $55,000.

Ms. Guindon was to remain available to assist the parties for 12 months, and the matter was assigned to the judge under the Coordinated Case Management protocol.