CITATION: Bernard v. Fuhgeh, 2017 ONSC 4727
COURT FILE NO.: FC-17-361
DATE: 20170803
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO
RE: MARIE MARIELLE EDITH BERNARD, Applicant
-and-
WILLIAM NDZE FUHGEH, Respondent
BEFORE: Madam Justice Julie Audet
COUNSEL: Marie-Hélène Godbout, for the Applicant
Respondent, self-represented
HEARD: August 2, 2017
ENDORSEMENT
[1] This is a motion brought by William Ndze Fuhgeh (“the Respondent”) before the scheduled case conference date of September 6, 2017. He seeks a declaration that the relief claimed in his motion is urgent pursuant to rule 14 (4.2) of the Family Law Rules, O. Reg. 114/99. Mary Marielle Edith Bernard (“the Applicant”) seeks a declaration that the Respondent’s motion be dismissed on the basis that it is not urgent. By way of cross-motion, she also seeks an order for the net proceeds from the sale of her home currently held in trust, be released to her without condition.
History of this Proceeding
[2] This application was filed by the Applicant in February 2017. The first appearance took place on April 3, 2017. At that time, the matter was put before Justice Doyle to provide guidance to the parties with respect to a request made by the Respondent that portions of the Applicant’s application be struck and to deal with the Applicant’s request for disclosure. Justice Doyle gave the Respondent leave to bring a motion to strike portions of the application. The Applicant was given leave to bring a motion to request financial disclosure.
[3] These motions ultimately did not proceed. Rather, on June 22, 2017, the Respondent filed a motion to be heard in procedural motions court on June 27, 2017 seeking the following:
leave to bring an urgent motion to determine the entitlement to and quantum of the amount to be paid to the Respondent from the sale of the Applicant’s property;
an order that the proceeds from the sale of that property be held in trust until further direction of the Court;
immediate and full disclosure of closing documents related to the sale of the property;
disclosure of a police report;
an order abridging the time to deliver his motion, given the urgency.
[4] Along with his notice of motion, the Respondent filed an eight-paragraph affidavit and 224 pages of exhibits. Although his notice of motion was signed on June 22, 2017 and his supporting affidavit was sworn on June 23, 2017, the Respondent only served his motion materials on the Applicant’s counsel in the afternoon of June 26, 2017.
[5] On June 27, 2017, the parties appeared before Justice Trousdale. The Applicant took the position that the motion was not urgent. Alternatively, she sought a brief adjournment to allow her to file a responding affidavit. Justice Trousdale endorsed the record as follows:
I find that the issue of the net proceeds of sale of the house is urgent and as the Applicant is consenting to a temporary order being made today with respect to the net proceeds of sale, I will make that order today. […] The issue of whether the motion is urgent shall be adjourned to July 4, 2017 at 10 AM. […] The cost of this appearance today is adjourned to the Justice hearing the motion as to whether the matter should proceed on an urgent basis prior to a case conference.
The matter was adjourned to July 4, 2017 and scheduled for 40 minutes.
[6] The Applicant’s responding affidavit sworn on June 29, 2014 was served on the Respondent on the same day, along with a notice of cross-motion in which she sought the following relief:
an order dismissing the Respondent’s motion based on the finding that it is not urgent;
an order releasing the funds from the sale of the Applicant’s home to her without condition;
in order for the production of a police occurrence report filed by the Respondent but only to the extent that the court also makes a disclosure order against the Applicant.
[7] On July 4, 2017, the date of the return of the motion, the Respondent filed an amended notice of motion with the court in which he sought the following additional temporary relief:
temporary spousal support;
in the alternative to his request for a determination of his entitlement to a share of the net proceeds from the sale of the Applicant’s property, an order pursuant to rule 24 (12) of the Family Law Rules that an amount of $30,000 be paid to him as an advance for disbursements and legal fees;
an order striking the Applicant’s notice of cross-motion as well as striking 112 paragraphs from the Applicant’s responding affidavit sworn June 29, 2017 (which contained 137 paragraphs in total).
[8] Once again, although the Respondent’s amended notice of motion was signed on June 30, 2017, the Respondent did not serve it on the Applicant until July 4, 2017, the morning of the motion. The Respondent also purported to file an affidavit to which counsel for the Applicant objected on the grounds that it contained pages of exhibits with no context. The matter was put before Justice O’Bonsawin who was of the view that the matters raised by the Respondent’s amended notice of motion could not be argued within the timeframe that the motion was scheduled for. The matter was adjourned to August 1, 2017 for a three-hour motion. The costs for that appearance were also reserved to the judge hearing the motion.
[9] On July 14, 2017, the Respondent filed a supplementary two-page affidavit along with 136 pages of exhibits. The Applicant did not file any supplementary materials.
Preliminary Matters
[10] The Respondent began his submissions by asking that the vast majority of the mother’s responding affidavit and factum be struck. He took the position that statements made in the Applicant’s affidavit were argumentative; contained editorial comments, opinions, and conclusory statements; had the effect of imputing and inferring motives, thoughts and intentions of other persons; were irrelevant, a waste of time, and a nuisance; inserted for colour and flare; had a prejudicial flavour; etc… He also took the position that some of the statements made in the Applicant’s factum were not based on evidence presented for the purpose of the motion.
[11] As an example, the Respondent was of the view that the following statement made by the Applicant in her affidavit dated June 29, 2017 at para. 3 was argumentative and should be struck:
The Respondent’s notice of motion was served on my lawyer on Thursday June 22, 2017 without a supporting affidavit. The notice of motion simply stated that the Respondent was relying on his answer, as filed in the continuing record, as the basis of his motion. There was not mention of an affidavit.
[12] Similarly, at paras. 22 and 23, the Respondent took the position that the following allegations by the Applicant contained editorial comments, opinion and conclusory statements, imputed and inferred motives, and thoughts and intentions of other persons:
22 The Respondent has been out of my residence since February 2017.
23 The circumstances leading to our separation stem from years of financial and emotional abuse I endured at the hands of the Respondent. The Respondent refused to file his answer as he wanted all references to my experiences of abuse by him, to be struck from the record.
[13] He also took the position that the following statements made by the Applicant in her affidavit at paras: 21 and 32 were objectionable based on the fact that they were comments or findings made in other legal proceedings:
21 I am aware of a Final Order regarding the Respondent’s support obligations for Joshua. The Respondent pays $450.00 per month for Joshua’s support which is the full table amount based on an imputed income of $50,000.00. This Order dates back to 2013 and has never been changed.
32 The Respondent has a different access schedule with Joshua. Joshua’s mother has sole custody of Joshua. Joshua’s primary residence is with his Mother.
And so on for over 100 additional paragraphs.
[14] After hearing his arguments on this issue, I advised the Respondent that his request to strike most of the paragraphs contained in the Applicant’s affidavit was without merit and a waste of the court’s time; and as such, was denied. I asked him to proceed with the main issue in this case, namely, whether or not his motion was urgent.
[15] The Respondent then proceeded to request that I strike from the record the affidavit of Michel Sicotte sworn July 5, 2017 and filed with the court on the same day. As per the Order of Justice Trousdale, the Applicant consented to have the net proceeds from the sale of her property held in trust by the lawyer responsible for its sale, namely, Mr. Sicotte. In a his very brief affidavit, Mr. Sicotte simply confirms that he has abided by the terms of Justice Trousdale’s Order and that the proceeds are held in trust in a separate interest-bearing account.
[16] The Respondent took the position that pursuant to the Order of Justice O’Bonsawin, the Applicant was not allowed to file any further affidavits; only an amended factum. Justice O’Bonsawin’s Endorsement states:
I order that Mr. Fuhgeh must serve and file his affidavit with proper particulars within 10 days of this endorsement. In addition, this court accepts his amended motion form but I do not make any determination as to its merit. I also order that the Applicant may also file an amended factum within 5 days of having received the Respondent’s further affidavit.
[17] I indicated to the Respondent that in my view, Mr. Sicotte’s affidavit had nothing to do with the issues raised in this motion, and that his affidavit was entirely irrelevant to the matters at hands. I ruled that I would not consider it for the purpose of the motion, but that I would not remove it from the record either. Once again, I asked the Respondent to proceed with his argument on the issue of urgency.
[18] Following these two rulings, the Respondent expressed concerns about my impartiality in this case based on my having a “blindspot” about the affidavit materials filed by the Applicant and having a closed mind to his arguments on the matter. He requested that I recuse myself from this motion. I denied his request. The Respondent then requested that I provide written reasons for my refusal to recuse myself and I indicated that written reasons would be provided along with my written decision on the other issues raised in this motion.
Analysis
[19] Justice Katarynych in Ontario (Director, Family Responsibility Office) v. Samra, 2008 ONCJ 465, 59 R.F.L. (6th) 219 provides an excellent summary of the law of recusal on the basis of judicial bias or lack of impartiality. The relevant portion of his decision is reproduced below:
18 An allegation of judicial bias is one that counsel should make “only after careful and anxious reflection.” A finding of real or perceived bias is serious business. It calls into question an element of judicial integrity — not simply the personal integrity of the judge, but the integrity of the entire administration of justice.
19 When considering the issue of bias in regard to a judge, there is a starting presumption of impartiality; specifically, that judges in their exercise of any judicial duty, will be faithful to that part of their oath of office that requires them to act impartially, which in its essence is a state of mind in which the judge is disinterested in the outcome and is open to persuasion by the evidence and submissions.
20 Bias, on the other hand, denotes a state of mind or attitude that is in some way predisposed to a particular result or that is closed to a particular issue.
21 The criteria for determining when an apprehension of bias arises are those first enunciated in Committee for Justice & Liberty v. Canada (National Energy Board), 1976 CanLII 2 (SCC), [1978] 1 S.C.R. 369:
…the apprehension of bias must be a reasonable one, held by reasonable and right-minded persons, applying themselves to the question and obtaining thereon the required information… the test is “what would an informed person, viewing the matter realistically and practically — and having thought the matter through — conclude. Would he think that it is more likely than not that [the judge], whether consciously or unconsciously, would not decide fairly?
22 It is a test that has been consistently followed in Canada for more than 20 years.
23 There is a two-fold objective element to this test:
• the person considering the alleged bias must be reasonable; and
• the apprehension of the bias itself must also be reasonable in the circumstances of the case.
24 Regardless of the precise words used to describe the test, the object of the different formulations is to emphasize that the threshold for a finding of real or perceived bias is high. The grounds advanced for this apprehension must be substantial. The test is not related to the “very sensitive or scrupulous conscience”.
25 The onus of demonstrating real or perceived bias lies with the person who is alleging its existence.
26 The belief of the applicant and his counsel that the applicant would not receive a fair hearing before a particular judge is not the standard against which apprehension of bias is measured. The apprehension of bias must be considered objectively through the eyes of a fully informed, reasonable person who is reacting reasonably in the circumstances.
27 If the applicant is to succeed, the evidence in the motion must rise above the imaginary or conjectural sentiments of the applicant and demonstrate real likelihood or probability of bias.
28 The applicant’s task is to show wrongful or inappropriate declarations showing a state of mind that sways judgment — a predisposition that is so great that the judge is not open to persuasion upon presentation of new evidence or new arguments.
29 The presumption of judicial impartiality will only be displaced with cogent evidence that something a judge has done gives rise to actual bias or a reasonable apprehension of bias — evidence that would cause a reasonable person who understands the contextual issues and the law governing the case to believe that the particular judge would not entertain the various points of view with an open mind.
30 The specific complaints raised by the applicant in support of his recusal motion are to be construed in light of the entire proceedings. Regard must be had to the cumulative effect of all of the relevant factors. See R. v. S. (R.D.), supra. See also R. v. Giroux, supra.
31 Judicial officers should not accede too readily to allegations of actual or appearance of bias. Although it is important that justice be seen to be done, it is equally important that judicial officers discharge their duty to sit and do not, by acceding too readily to the applicant’s suggestions, encourage parties to believe that, by seeking the disqualification of a judge, they will have their case tried by someone thought to be more likely to decide the case in their favour.
[20] Essentially, the Respondent did not like my ruling with regards to his preliminary requests. A litigant’s objections to a ruling made by the judge in the context of a motion are hardly sufficient to disqualify the judge from hearing the other issues in the motion based on perceived impartiality. I am of the view that a fully informed, reasonable person considering the Respondent’s expressed apprehension of bias in an objective manner would not find it reasonable in the circumstances of this case.
Urgency
[21] The Respondent takes the position that his motion should be heard before a case conference is heard based on urgency and his alleged dire financial hardship. He argues that when he brought his motion for an order that the net proceeds from the sale of the Applicant’s property be held in trust, the matter was urgent as the proceeds from sale could have been depleted before he had an opportunity to prove his claims on the merits with regards to his interest in this property.
[22] His requests for temporary spousal support as well as for an advance of $30,000 to cover fees and disbursements in this proceeding are advanced on the basis of alleged dire financial hardship on his part, which creates urgency. The Respondent is a lawyer practising in Ottawa. He submits that for a period of approximately four months, he had to sleep on a mattress on the floor of his office as he was unable to pay for alternative accommodations due to lack of financial resources. He claims to have no income and to be unable to pay for day-to-day living expenses.
[23] In her responding affidavit, the Applicant indicates that the Respondent’s income as a self-employed sole practitioner is difficult to establish. A request for disclosure from the Respondent sent to him on June 16 remains outstanding. The Applicant states that since the date of separation, the Respondent has only paid to her one cheque in the amount of $239.53, allegedly to cover some of his child support obligations. She explains that she has been solely responsible for all the needs of their young child including daycare expenses of approximately $1,000 per month. She states that the Respondent is not being truthful in the representations he makes about his income, and that his financial circumstances are not so dire as to meet the high threshold of rule 14 (4.2), particularly since he is not supporting his child.
Analysis
[24] The leading case with regards to the test to establish “urgency” under rule 14 (4.2) of the Family Law Rules and, thus, to be permitted to have a motion heard before case conference is Rosen v. Rosen 2005 CarswellOnt 68. In that case, Justice Wildman provided the following guidance:
2 Generally motions are now discouraged as the opening step in a family law file. The philosophy of the Family Rules is to encourage parties to sit down in a case conference prior to a motion, to see if some or all of the issues can be resolved, either directly or with input from the presiding judge. There is a deliberate attempt to try to avoid the damage that flows from the “nasty affidavit war” that accompanies the filing of a motion. This approach has been tremendously successful. The vast majority of cases are resolved at a case conference without the need for a formal motion.
3 In some instances, the parties cannot wait for a case conference. Rule 14 (4.2) provides that a court may hear a motion prior to a case conference if there is urgency or hardship or that a case conference is not required for some other reason in the interest of justice.
4 Mr. Singer says there is very little reported case law on the issue of what constitutes “urgency”. He refers me to the Webster Dictionary definition of “urgent”, which is “Pressing; necessitating or calling for immediate action; earnestly insistent; importunate.”
5 He has also directed me to the decision of Belch J in Hood v. Hood, 2001 CanLII 28129 (ON SC), [2001] O.J. No. 2918 (S.C.J. – Family Court) in which this definition was considered. Justice Belch refused to hear the motion in that case before a case conference. He commented, “It is my decision that an urgent motion within a court proceeding contemplates issues such as abduction, threats of harm, dire financial circumstances and these can be addressed prior to a case conference.”
6 I agree with Justice Belch. However, given the apparent lack of direction in the case law about what constitutes urgency, I will add my comments about how I approach a request to proceed with an “urgent” motion prior to a case conference.
7 The first step should be an inquiry as to when case conference dates are available to deal with the matter. If there is a particularly pressing issue, the trial coordinator should be made aware of this, as there may be times that could be made available for cases of urgency to avoid a motion. In this particular case, I was surprised to hear from Mr. Singer that he had made NO inquiry about available case conference dates prior to bringing his motion. He says he assumed from a case conference date that was assigned in another matter that there would be a wait of 3 to 4 weeks [1]. He was surprised to learn from me that there are dates available in this court on January 14 (two days from now); January 17 and 21 (Monday and Friday of next week) and January 24 (the following week). There are also several dates available after January 24.
8 The availability of case conference dates is important in assessing urgency. Obviously, if a date was not available for several months, a situation that would not otherwise seem urgent might become more critical.
9 The next step prior to bringing a motion should be to engage in settlement discussions to try to obtain a resolution of the pressing matters until the case conference date. The focus is on achieving a short-term agreement to get the parties through to the case conference date without a motion, rather than necessarily achieving a final resolution on all issues in the case. While the court will not want to hear about the content of offers that have been exchanged, due to the confidentiality provisions of Rule 18(8) it is important to know whether the parties have made some attempt to negotiate and, if not, why not.
10 For example, if an urgent motion is being considered because an applicant is in dire need of support, it is helpful in assessing urgency for the court to know whether support has been requested from the other side and, if so, whether proposals have been made. Generally, counsel will advise the court of their positions as part of their opening statements on the issue of urgency. I have seen situations where a moving party “urgently” requests, for example, $2000/month support to see him or her through to the first case conference date. In assessing whether this motion is urgent or not, it will make a difference to know whether the other side is completely refusing to pay any funds or is prepared to pay enough money to address immediate needs but not necessarily the amount requested by the moving party. If the payor’s opening position to the court is that he or she will pay, for example, $1500/month rather than the requested $2000 until the case conference, the urgency becomes less compelling. A similar analysis could be applied to “urgent” motions for custody, access, etc. It is generally difficult to establish that a motion is urgently needed, absent any attempt to resolve the issues by negotiation prior to bringing the motion [2].
12 Absent canvassing case conference dates and showing attempts to resolve matters until the available case conference date, it is difficult to understand how urgency can be established.
[25] I make the following findings of facts based on the evidence before me, which are relevant for the purpose of this motion:
The parties are not married. They cohabitated for about four years.
They have one child together who is four years old (“Junior”). Junior has remained in his mother’s primary care since the parties separated in January 2017. He has access to his father.
The property (a home) in which the Respondent claims an interest was purchased by the Applicant in her sole name and was (up until its sale) held in her sole name.
In his Answer, the Respondent claims to have made significant financial contributions towards the purchase of the Applicant’s home (including $10,000 towards the down payment) and to have paid his 50% share of the mortgage and home insurance payments since its purchase, as well his equal contribution to the acquisition of household chattels and fixtures including but not limited to furniture, appliances, air conditioner, fence, carpets, TVs, beds, etc. His claim for an equitable interest in the Applicant’s home is based on those allegations.
In his 2016 Income Tax Return (which is confirmed in his financial statement sworn on May 31, 2017), the Respondent claims to earn self-employment income of approximately $21,000 per annum (before business expenses) from which an equivalent amount is deducted for business expenses, leaving no taxable income. The amount of his yearly expenses (both business and personal) exceeds $56,000. There is no explanation in his affidavit materials as to how this shortfall is funded by him.
If the Respondent’s allegations with regards to his income are to be believed, then his allegations with regards to his contributions to the acquisition and maintenance of the home lack credibility. If his allegations with regards to his contributions towards the acquisition and maintenance of the home are to be believed, then the evidence he provides with regards to his income lacks credibility.
Based on the evidence before me, I find that the Respondent is not truthful about his financial circumstances.
The Respondent left the Applicant’s home in early February 2017.
The Respondent signed a residential lease agreement on April 18, 2017 which calls for monthly rent in the amount of $1,350 plus utilities. He still resides there.
The Respondent’s motion was filed on June 22, 2017 as a result of him finding out that the Applicant’s property had been sold and that the closing was to take place in the following days. By that time, and at no point prior to that date, the Respondent had never sought to bring a motion for spousal support or an advance on account of legal expenses. The bulk of his motion related to securing the proceeds from the sale of the property. If his evidence is to be believed, he would have been suffering dire financial circumstances for the past four months.
The additional temporary financial relief claimed by the Respondent in the context of this motion were advanced by him for the first time on July 4, six months after his alleged dire financial circumstances arose (as a result of the parties’ separation), and weeks after he had secured alternate living arrangements. In fact, at the time he amended his notice of motion and claimed dire financial hardship for the first time, he had already moved into his new rented accommodations.
There is no evidence before me that would suggest that the Respondent took steps to try and secure an earlier case conference date. In fact, I find that the Respondent did not cooperate in providing his available dates for a case conference or a motion as authorized by Justice Trousdale, which created further delays in obtaining a case conference date.
There is no evidence before me that would suggest that the Respondent engaged in discussions with the Applicant’s counsel once the proceeds were secured to try to achieve a temporary settlement. However, in all fairness to the Respondent, the evidence makes it quite clear that the Applicant would not have been prepared to entertain any settlement by which she would have been required to provide financial assistance of any kind to the Respondent, even if he had tried.
[26] The matter of the potential disposition of the net proceeds from the sale of the Applicant’s property was deemed urgent by Justice Trousdale. That urgency was addressed by way of a consent order made by her. I find that none of the other orders claimed by the Respondent in his original notice of motion were so urgent as to negate the legislated requirement that there be a case conference held before a motion can be brought. Further, I find that the Respondent’s claim for an order determining his entitlement to the Applicant’s property and quantifying that entitlement is a substantive matter that cannot be adjudicated upon in the context of a motion, urgent or not, unless the evidence is so compelling as to warrant the bringing of a summary judgement motion; such matters must be dealt with on their merits based on proper evidence in the context of a trial.
[27] With regards to the relief claimed by the Respondent in his amended notice of motion, I find that the Respondent has not established that his circumstances are so dire that his motion for temporary relief should be heard before the case conference.
[28] In Rooney v. Rooney, 2004 ONCJ 24, Justice Kulkurin had to decide whether or not the mother’s motion for interim child support should be heard before a case conference had been held. The mother claimed that the father was employed and had an income more than double hers. She was incurring a monthly deficit of expenses over income and could not meet her monthly expenses. She claimed that the father had stalled and delayed the proceeding and that she had to support the children on her own for over one and a half year as a result of those delays. She argued that there was a pressing need to formally establish the father’s child support obligations. Justice Kulkurin stated:
10 Although I have some sympathy for the mother’s circumstances, I do not find that she has established that “urgency” or “hardship” exists in the sense that I consider these to mean in the context of subrule 14(4.2). Her contention is that the court should conclude that there is hardship (or as her counsel expressed “urgent need”) where a non-custodial parent does not pay child support and where the custodial parent bears the bulk of the responsibility for providing for the needs of the children.
11 It is possible that such circumstances could result in a situation of hardship but it is not necessarily so. The evidence indicates that the existing situation has persisted for some 18 months. There is no evidence why now, in February 2004, that existing situation is of such hardship (or urgency) that the court should dispense with the normal requirement of a case conference on this motion claim. The evidence would be more persuasive in claims of this type if it were to provide particulars or details that related to the children and their needs and how such needs were not being met. However, there is scant evidence relating to the children. That is not to say that hardship must be hardship of the children but it would certainly be more compelling if it were. If, as the mother argues, every day that goes by without support being paid by the father is undue hardship, then there should be plenty of evidence over one and a half years what hardships have been suffered.
[29] Similarly in this case, I am of the view that the evidence presented by the Respondent falls short of establishing his alleged financial hardship.
[30] Finally, I am of the view that none of the disclosure requests made by the Respondent are urgent. They can be dealt with at the case conference.
Cross-Motion
[31] By way of cross-motion, the Applicant seeks an order that the net proceeds from the sale of her home be paid to her immediately, without condition. She takes the position that she consented to an order that they be held in trust to further her request for a brief adjournment allowing her to prepare and defend the Respondent’s motion. She also claims that damages are an adequate remedy if the Respondent’s unjust enrichment claim is successful and as such, there are no reasons at law to retain the proceeds from the sale of the home in trust at this time.
[32] While the Applicant’s argument may very well have merit, for me to adjudicate on this issue before a case conference has been held I must also find that this issue is urgent in accordance with rule 14(4.2). Justice Trousdale found that the issue of the net proceeds of sale of the house was urgent, and the parties consented to a temporary order being made that they be held in trust “pending further order of the court.” I find that the Applicant’s request for the release of the funds is not urgent and for that reason I decline to deal with that motion at this time. She may seek an order to that effect once a case conference has been held.
Order
[33] The Respondent’s motion and the Applicant’s cross-motion are dismissed. The parties shall attend a case conference after which they may bring their requests for temporary relief by way of motions.
Costs
[34] The Applicant is clearly the successful party in this case. If the parties cannot agree as to costs, they may provide me with brief written submissions on costs not exceeding three pages. The Applicant will have 15 days from the date of this Order to provide her submissions and the Respondent will have 15 days thereafter to do the same. The Applicant will be allowed a brief reply if deemed necessary, of no more than one page which shall be provided within the next 5 days.
Madam Justice Julie Audet
Date: August 3, 2017
CITATION: Bernard v. Fuhgeh, 2017 ONSC 4727
COURT FILE NO.: FC-17-361
DATE: 20170803
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
RE: MARIE MARIELLE EDITH BERNARD, Applicant
-and-
WILLIAM NDZE FUHGEH, Respondent
BEFORE: Madam Justice Julie Audet
COUNSEL: Marie-Hélène Godbout, for the Applicant
Respondent, self-represented
ENDORSEMENT
Audet J.
Released: August 3, 2017