Linda Bianchi

The defendants were charged with aiding and abetting others to enter Canada without appearing for examination before a Canada Border Services Officer, contrary to section 124(1)(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.

The defendants brought a constitutional challenge under section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 and sections 15, 7, and 2(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The defendants claimed an aboriginal right to mobility within Mohawk territory at Akwesasne for family and community purposes without reporting at the border, and alleged that the reporting requirements were discriminatory and violated their liberty and freedom of association.

The court dismissed all constitutional challenges and found the defendants guilty.

The offender was convicted of human smuggling under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act for driving illegal immigrants from Cornwall to Toronto.

The Crown sought a 15-18 month conditional sentence, while the defence sought a suspended sentence or a 6-month conditional sentence.

The court found the offender's moral blameworthiness was low, as he was duped by his brother and had no profit motive.

Emphasizing the principle of proportionality, the court imposed a 6-month conditional sentence followed by 12 months of probation.

The accused was charged with offences under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act for his role in transporting individuals who had been smuggled across the US-Canada border into Cornwall.

The accused claimed he was merely doing a favour for his brother and was unaware of the illegal nature of the enterprise.

The court found that the accused's brother had informed him of the passengers' documentary deficiencies, raising a real suspicion that the accused deliberately chose to ignore.

Applying the doctrine of wilful blindness, the court concluded the accused possessed the requisite mens rea and entered convictions.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for smuggling under s. 159 of the Customs Act arising from the attempted importation of a vehicle purchased in the United States.

The appellant argued that he could not be guilty of smuggling or evading duties because legal title to the vehicle was in another person’s name, making it impossible for him to pay duties at the time of entry.

The court held that the appellant had actual possession and physical control of the vehicle and therefore was responsible for declaring it upon importation.

His misleading statements to border officials supported the inference that he intended to avoid paying duties.

The court concluded that the trial judge applied the correct legal test and that the verdict was reasonable and supported by the evidence.