Chad Kopach

The decision addresses motions regarding the appointment of representative counsel for current and former employees and retirees of Hudson’s Bay Company ULC and related entities in ongoing Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) proceedings.

The Court declined to appoint any of the nominated law firms as representative counsel at this stage, instead appointing the Honourable Herman Wilton-Siegel as an independent third party to evaluate proposals and make a recommendation.

The Court also approved amendments to the Sale and Investment Solicitation Process (SISP) to remove the company’s art and artifact collection from the SISP and to appoint Heffel Gallery Limited to conduct a separate auction for the collection, subject to further court approval of procedures.

The reasons review the legal framework for appointing representative counsel and the importance of balancing stakeholder interests in complex insolvency proceedings.

This endorsement grants a brief adjournment in the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) proceedings involving Hudson’s Bay Company ULC and related entities, following ongoing discussions between the applicants and stakeholders.

The court extends the stay of proceedings, increases the Directors’ Charge, amends the relative priorities of charges, and approves the engagement of Reflect Advisors, LLC as financial advisor.

The court finds the requested relief appropriate, unopposed, and supported by the Monitor, and orders the requested amendments to the Initial Order.

The applicant, a commercial real estate financing company, sought a receivership order over the debtor and beneficial owners of properties due to loan default, outstanding interest, and unpaid municipal taxes.

The court considered factors for appointing a receiver, including the contractual right to appointment and the respondents' lack of transparency and uncertain sale prospects.

The application was granted, and a receiver was appointed.

The applicants brought a motion for consent orders to discharge construction liens and direct the return of security paid into court.

The court refused to grant the relief due to significant deficiencies in the motion materials and the proposed draft order.

These deficiencies included incorrect legal terminology (e.g., referring to discharge of a "Claim for Construction Lien" instead of a "lien"), failure to provide updated parcel registers to address sheltering liens, an improper preamble in the draft order, and an incorrect provision for the return of security that contravened Section 46(4) of the Construction Act.

The court emphasized the need for counsel to be meticulous in drafting and noted the waste of judicial resources caused by such carelessness.

Money Gate Corporation (MGC) brought a motion for an extension of time to file its notice of appeal and a declaration that it had an appeal as of right under s. 193(c) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA), or alternatively for leave to appeal under s. 193(e).

The underlying matter involved a receivership where a motion judge had dismissed MGC's claim for payment from the proceeds of a property sale, finding no valid assignment of a second mortgage and that MGC was not the registered owner.

The Court of Appeal granted the extension of time, finding MGC's grounds of appeal not frivolous and no real prejudice to the responding parties.

Crucially, the court declared that MGC had an appeal as of right under s. 193(c) of the BIA, concluding that the motion judge's order finally determined MGC's economic interests in the property proceeds, distinguishing it from a mere priorities dispute.

The applicants sought a declaration that a 2001 easement and restrictive covenant registered on title to a former golf course prohibited the respondent from developing the lands for residential use.

The respondent argued the covenant only protected storm water management access and did not prevent development.

The court applied contract interpretation principles and found the plain language of the restrictive covenant, read in context, constituted a complete prohibition on building structures on the golf course lands.

By operation of the Land Titles Act, the covenant was deemed to expire 40 years after registration, prohibiting residential development until 2041.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario heard two appeals concerning a priority dispute over accelerated interest in closed mortgages and a costs order in a receivership.

The primary issue was whether the first mortgagee, First National Financial GP Corporation (FN), was entitled to future, unearned, accelerated interest upon the early discharge of its closed mortgages due to the mortgagors' default and court-ordered sale.

The court found that the trial judge erred by failing to conduct a full contractual analysis of the mortgage provisions and by relying on a standalone common law entitlement to accelerated interest.

The Court of Appeal held that the mortgage terms explicitly provided for FN's entitlements upon default, which did not include accelerated interest.

The appeal regarding accelerated interest was allowed.

The appeal concerning the receiver's costs was dismissed, as the trial judge's discretion was properly exercised.

Following a successful Application for Directions regarding an arbitration, the applicant sought costs of $11,743.35 on a partial indemnity basis.

The respondents argued for divided success and sought their own costs.

The court found the applicant was entirely successful on the substantive issues and that the respondents' actions had unnecessarily complicated and delayed the arbitration.

The court awarded costs to the applicant fixed at $9,000 payable forthwith.

This case conference order addresses procedural and factual disputes in an ongoing insolvency proceeding involving Eureka 93 Inc. and three related companies under the BIA.

The noteholders (Dominion Capital LLC) had postponed creditor votes on proposals, seeking further investigations and information regarding asset valuations and the validity of their claims.

The debtors challenged the noteholders' status as creditors for one proposal.

The court provided directions to resolve the gridlock, ordering the Proposal Trustee to assess and value the noteholders' proofs of claim, setting deadlines for examinations of witnesses, and mandating the completion of votes on the proposals.

The court emphasized the Trustee's role in validating claims and cautioned against allowing peripheral issues to unduly complicate the summary insolvency process.

The Receiver, supported by the Applicant (senior secured lender and stalking horse bidder), sought court approval for a Sale Procedure featuring a stalking horse agreement for the North Barrie Crossing Shopping Centre.

The Respondents opposed, raising concerns about the credit bid valuation, expense reimbursement, deposit requirements, minimum overbid, and the timing of the sale during the COVID-19 crisis.

The court applied the Soundair and CCM Master principles, largely approving the Receiver's plan with minor amendments, including requiring environmental and building condition reports and tenant estoppel certificates, and extending the sale timeline by two weeks to enhance the bidding process.

The receiver sought declaratory relief regarding an appeal of an approval and vesting order for the sale of a two-building apartment complex with 110 units, 30 of which were designated for affordable housing.

The receiver sought declarations that the appeal was governed by the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, that the appellants lacked an automatic right of appeal and must seek leave, and that any automatic stay under the BIA should be cancelled.

The appellants challenged the sale price, arguing it did not represent fair market value and pointing to late offers as evidence.

The court found the late offers were not credible and that no loss exceeding $10,000 had been demonstrated, thereby requiring leave to appeal.

The court also cancelled any stay to permit the transaction to close.

The defendants brought motions to set aside default judgments totaling over $315,000, which were granted after their Statements of Defence were struck for non-compliance with court orders and rules.

The court applied the five-factor test from *Mountain View Farms Ltd. v. McQueen* to determine if the interests of justice favored setting aside the judgments.

The court found that the defendants moved promptly, had an arguable defence, and would suffer significant prejudice if the judgments stood.

While the explanation for default was neutral, the court emphasized that striking a defence is a severe remedy and that the plaintiff could have made more effort to ensure the self-represented defendants were aware of their jeopardy.

The motions to set aside the default judgments and associated writs of seizure and sale were granted, with costs reserved.

The defendants (Hageys) brought a motion seeking to set aside or vary a previous summary judgment, introduce new evidence, and obtain a stay of a writ of possession and costs awards.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the Hageys failed to satisfy the two-part test from `Scott v. Cook` for admitting new evidence and that the issues regarding a stay had been previously determined.

The court also noted that a request for an accounting related to a separate action was not properly brought in the current proceeding.

The previous order granting summary judgment remained in force.

The plaintiff bank brought a motion for summary judgment seeking rectification of two mortgages registered against the defendants' abutting properties to comply with the Planning Act, as well as possession of the properties.

The defendants had defaulted on the loan and entered bankruptcy.

The court found that the parties had a common continuing intention to mortgage both properties as security for the loan, and that the failure to cross-reference the mortgages was a mistake.

The court granted rectification, deemed the notices of sale sufficient, and granted judgment for possession.

The plaintiff's motion to dismiss the defendants' counterclaim was dismissed without prejudice as the counterclaim remained stayed under Rule 11 due to the bankruptcy.

Following two trials in a commercial dispute, the successful party sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

The court held that allegations by the opposing party that a shareholders’ agreement was a fraudulent forgery were unsupported and justified elevated costs to the end of the first trial.

Costs thereafter were awarded on a partial indemnity basis because the second trial concerned only the quantum payable.

The court reviewed objections to time entries and disbursements and rejected most reductions, finding the work and rates generally reasonable.

A global adjustment was made to account for limited overlap between successive counsel.

Following earlier reasons ordering a buy‑out of a shareholder’s interests in two corporations for $640,000, the court addressed the appropriate start date for pre‑judgment interest.

The court reviewed the procedural history and determined that the buy‑out claim had not been pursued at the first trial and only crystallized when the court permitted the claim to proceed on April 11, 2013.

Accordingly, the cause of action for the buy‑out arose on that date.

Pre‑judgment interest was ordered to run from April 11, 2013 at the applicable quarterly rate.

Post‑judgment interest was set at 2% per annum.

Following judgment in a civil action, the court determined the issue of costs.

The plaintiff argued entitlement to enhanced costs on the basis that he had beaten his offer to settle, while the defendant disputed that claim and argued the action should have been brought in Small Claims Court.

The court accepted that the plaintiff had not beaten the offer to settle and found that the proceeding should properly have been brought in Small Claims Court, justifying the exercise of discretion under Rule 57.05 to decline awarding costs to the plaintiff.

However, the court also declined to award costs to the defendant due to misconduct by its agent.

As a result, no costs were awarded to either party.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment seeking repayment of funds withdrawn from his bank account for an alleged car loan arranged through a dealership acting as the bank’s agent.

The bank asserted that a valid loan agreement existed and relied on signed loan documentation and the plaintiff’s payment history.

The court held that the bank failed to establish that acceptance of the loan application was communicated to the borrower, a required element for contract formation.

Because the bank did not prove that a binding loan agreement existed, it had no legal right to withdraw the funds.

Summary judgment was granted requiring repayment of the withdrawn amount with interest, while additional damage claims were dismissed for lack of evidence.

The plaintiff dentist alleged that the defendants supplied defective dental equipment causing business losses, property damage from leaking equipment, and delays in opening a second clinic.

On competing motions relating to documentary production and discovery procedures, the court applied the relevance standard under Rule 30.02 and the proportionality principle under Rule 29.2.03 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court ordered various categories of document production from both sides, including financial records, repair invoices, equipment images, and documents relevant to alleged lost profits and misrepresentation.

The court also permitted the plaintiff to examine an individual defendant personally at discovery due to allegations that he was the directing mind of the corporate defendant and personally involved in the representations at issue.

A discovery plan was ordered to move the litigation forward.

Following a prior trial determining that the respondent was bound by a shareholders’ agreement granting the moving party a 20% share interest in two corporations, the parties brought a motion seeking reconsideration and variation of portions of the earlier judgment.

The dispute concerned a buyout order and valuation process imposed under s. 248 of the Business Corporations Act that had not been argued at trial.

The court held that it was inappropriate to impose such relief when the issue had effectively been removed from the matters to be determined at trial.

The court therefore set aside the earlier buyout and valuation provisions, while permitting the moving party to pursue such remedies through further pleadings and evidence within the existing proceeding.

Additional relief relating to an accounting order was also struck, and no costs were awarded.