Kathryn A. McCulloch

The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed the appeal of Herbert and Jacqueline Watkins, setting aside the order dismissing their action and the associated costs order.

The motion judge had dismissed the action for failure to appoint counsel or deliver a notice of intent to act in person under r. 15.04(8) of the Rules of Civil Procedure and for delay under r. 24.01.

The Court of Appeal found that the removal order for the appellants' counsel was not effective, as it was not properly served, and that the motion judge erred in relying on r. 15.04(8).

The finding of inordinate and inexcusable delay was also found to be unreasonable due to confusion over representation.

Costs of the appeal were awarded to the appellants.

This is an appeal concerning confidentiality orders in a civil action involving a minor plaintiff (P1), two minor defendants (D1, D2), and a school (XYZ School) with its employees.

The original motion judge had issued broad sealing and publication ban orders to protect the identities of the minor parties, extending to the school and its employees.

The appellants (P1 and Toronto Star) argued these orders were overbroad.

The Court of Appeal, applying the reformulated Sherman Estate test, found that while protecting the minors' identities was an important public interest, anonymizing the school and its employees was not necessary.

The court allowed the appeal, setting aside the broad sealing order and limiting the anonymity and publication bans to only the minor parties and their litigation guardians, along with specific identifying information, while allowing the school's identity to be public.

This is a motion to quash appeals of a non-publication and sealing order.

The Court of Appeal determined that the order was final for the media (Toronto Star) as it finally determined their constitutional rights under s. 2(b) of the Charter, allowing their appeal to proceed as of right.

For the plaintiffs, the order was interlocutory, but the court exercised its discretion under s. 6(2) of the Courts of Justice Act to hear their appeal concurrently due to the interrelation of the issues.

The motion to quash the appeals was dismissed.

The plaintiff brought a motion for a status hearing under Rule 48.14 to set a timetable for the remaining steps in an action commenced in 2010.

The defendant opposed the motion and sought dismissal for delay.

The court found that the delay was largely attributable to the plaintiff's former counsel, who failed to advance the action and refused to release the file due to a solicitor's lien.

The court held that the plaintiff had not abandoned the action and should not be penalized for counsel's inaction.

Furthermore, the court found no actual prejudice to the defendant, despite the deteriorating health of its key witness and the destruction of some documents.

The motion was granted, allowing the action to proceed on its merits.

The applicant, a tenant of the Toronto Community Housing Corporation (TCHC), sought judicial review of a decision removing his rent-geared-to-income subsidy.

The subsidy was removed after the applicant failed to provide requested corporate financial information and bank statements for his legal professional corporation.

The applicant argued that the TCHC breached procedural fairness and failed to accommodate his disabilities.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the TCHC provided ample opportunity to comply, the process was fair, and there was no evidence that the applicant's disabilities prevented him from providing the required documentation.

The appellants appealed an interlocutory order regarding the waiver of solicitor-client privilege and document production.

By the time the appeal was heard, the trial had already commenced.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal as moot, holding that the trial judge is best positioned to determine issues of privilege, fairness, and production mid-trial.

On a refusals motion arising from two related civil actions over a settlement agreement resolving a car dealership dispute, the moving parties sought production of solicitor-client communications and legal files concerning settlement negotiations.

The responding parties alleged they entered the agreement in reliance on misrepresentations and sought to set it aside, but did not plead reliance on legal advice.

The court adopted the two-part implied waiver analysis requiring that legal advice be material to the lawsuit and affirmatively put in issue by the party claiming privilege.

It held that merely placing state of mind in issue was insufficient, and that disclosure of a single email did not amount to selective disclosure waiving privilege over the broader solicitor-client communications.

The motion was dismissed.

The appellants appealed an order establishing a sale process for two corporations involved in an oppression remedy claim.

The motion judge ordered that the two corporations being sold could no longer be parties to the litigation to facilitate the sale.

The appellants argued this would cause tax prejudice, but the Court of Appeal found that any tax consequences could be addressed through expert calculation without flowing damages through the corporations.

The appeal was dismissed.