Maija Martin

The appellant appealed his sentence of 2 years and 11 months' imprisonment for firearms and drug trafficking offences, arguing he should have received additional credit for lockdowns and triple bunking during presentence custody.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the sentencing judge was aware of the difficult circumstances and that the few additional days of lockdown and triple bunking shown in newly filed records would not impact the sentence.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittals on charges of causing death while driving with excess blood-drug concentration (THC) and dangerous driving causing death, following a fatal collision with a horse and buggy.

The trial judge had acquitted the respondent on the basis that the Crown failed to prove a causal nexus between the respondent's impairment and the collision, and failed to establish a marked departure from the standard of care.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that section 320.14(3) of the Criminal Code does not require proof that the impairment itself caused the death, only that the accused caused the death while committing the predicate offence.

The Court also found the trial judge erred in applying the modified objective standard for dangerous driving.

A new trial was ordered.

During a jury trial for importing cocaine, the accused raised the defence of duress, testifying she and her son were forced at gunpoint to carry the drugs.

In cross-examination, the Crown suggested an alternate theory that the accused initially agreed to carry the drugs voluntarily but was only coerced when the perpetrators forced her son to participate.

The accused denied this.

The court ruled that the Crown could not advance this alternate theory to the jury, finding it lacked an air of reality and was purely speculative, as there was no direct or circumstantial evidence to support it.

The appellant was convicted of importing fentanyl and possession for the purpose of trafficking after a controlled delivery of a package from China.

On appeal, she raised several grounds, including errors in jury instructions on importing, circumstantial evidence, and after-the-fact conduct, as well as the unreasonableness of the verdicts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed these grounds but allowed the appeal based on two errors: the trial judge improperly permitted the Crown to invite an adverse inference against the appellant for testifying after another defence witness, and the trial judge erred in dismissing the appellant's application to adduce evidence of a known third-party suspect.

The convictions were set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The accused was charged with sexual assault, voyeurism, and child pornography offences against the complainant.

The police seized the accused's cell phones and obtained two search warrants.

The accused applied to exclude the digital evidence obtained from the phones, arguing the police failed to make full and frank disclosure in the Information to Obtain (ITO) by omitting recantation letters and denials from a family member.

The court found the police breached s. 8 of the Charter by conducting warrantless searches of the digital media outside the authorized scope and date ranges.

Applying the Grant test under s. 24(2) of the Charter, the court concluded the Charter-infringing state conduct was serious and had a high impact on the accused's privacy interests.

The digital evidence was excluded.

The appellant was convicted by a jury of possession of various controlled substances for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime, following the execution of a search warrant at an apartment and storage unit.

He appealed his convictions, arguing the trial judge gave an unfair and unbalanced jury charge and erred in refusing to hear a mid-trial Charter application challenging the storage unit search.

He also appealed his five-year sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the jury instructions adequate and the refusal of the untimely Charter application justified.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, save for setting aside the victim surcharge.

The Attorney General for Ontario and the Criminal Lawyers' Association of Ontario (CLA) sought leave to intervene in an upcoming appeal concerning the scope of the actus reus of importing contraband.

The Attorney General sought to argue the impact of the definition on provincial prosecutions of importing firearms and child pornography.

The CLA sought to argue that extending the actus reus beyond the immediate entry point disproportionately impacts racialized communities, relying on social context evidence.

The court granted both applications for leave to intervene, finding the proposed arguments and materials relevant and non-controversial.

The appellant challenged a conviction for importing cocaine under s. 6(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act after the intermediate appellate court affirmed the conviction over a dissent.

The central issue was whether the trial reasons adequately disclosed the factual basis for finding the required mental element beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Court held that, read in context and as a whole, the trial reasons did not permit effective appellate review of the mens rea finding.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.

The accused was committed for trial on charges including manslaughter and criminal negligence causing death and bodily harm after providing cocaine laced with heroin to two women, resulting in one death and one coma.

The accused brought a certiorari application to quash the committals, arguing there was no evidence he intended to traffic heroin specifically, nor evidence of objective foresight of bodily harm.

The Superior Court dismissed the application, holding that the mens rea for trafficking does not require knowledge of the specific drug, and there was sufficient evidence of objective fault given the inherent dangers of street drugs and circumstantial evidence of the accused's knowledge.

The appellant appealed convictions for two counts of uttering threats entered in the Ontario Court of Justice.

He argued that the trial judge misapplied the third branch of the W. (D.) credibility framework and effectively reversed the burden of proof by treating the case as a credibility contest and by improperly favouring police evidence.

The court held that the trial judge’s reasons, read as a whole, demonstrated an understanding and proper application of the W. (D.) analysis and that the judge was entitled to prefer the officers’ testimony.

Minor inconsistencies in the officers’ evidence were not material, and credibility findings were owed deference.

The appellate court found no palpable and overriding error or misapprehension of the evidence.

Two accused were charged with possession of cocaine, marijuana, and hashish for the purpose of trafficking after police executed a search warrant at an apartment and discovered drugs and alleged trafficking paraphernalia hidden throughout the unit.

Both accused denied knowledge of the drugs and asserted that a third individual, who allegedly lived in the apartment and was known by the nickname “Stinky,” was responsible.

The court considered whether the Crown had proven knowledge and possession under s. 4(3) of the Criminal Code through circumstantial evidence, applying the principles in R. v. W.(D.).

Given that the drugs were concealed, not in plain view, and that multiple individuals had access to the apartment, the evidence did not establish knowledge beyond a reasonable doubt.

The testimony of the accused and supporting witness raised a reasonable doubt as to whether the accused knew of the drugs or trafficking activity.

The accused, charged with firearms and drug offences, brought applications to cross-examine the affiant and sub-affiants of an Information to Obtain (ITO) a wiretap authorization, and a Garofoli application to exclude the intercepted communications.

The applicants argued that the ITO relied heavily on confidential informants and lacked sufficient detail to establish reasonable and probable grounds.

The court dismissed the application to cross-examine, finding no evidentiary basis to suggest it would elicit testimony discrediting the statutory preconditions.

The court also dismissed the Garofoli application, concluding that the redacted ITO and judicial summary provided sufficient evidence to establish reasonable and probable grounds to believe the interceptions would afford evidence of the offences.

Following a traffic stop, police discovered marijuana in a pouch and a loaded handgun on the accused during a search incident to arrest.

The accused argued that the initial detention, questioning, and search violated his Charter rights and sought exclusion of the evidence.

The court held that the traffic stop and extended detention were lawful and that the search of the pouch and subsequent arrest were valid.

Although the court found that police improperly asked about drugs without grounds during the traffic stop, no evidence flowed from that breach.

The firearm and drug evidence were therefore admissible, resulting in multiple convictions for firearm offences and simple possession of marijuana.

The accused applied to quash a telewarrant and exclude evidence obtained during the execution of a search warrant relating to firearm and drug offences.

The challenge argued that the Information to Obtain relied too heavily on a confidential informer, contained careless drafting errors, and failed to establish reasonable and probable grounds.

Applying the principles from Garofoli and Debot, the court assessed the reliability of the informant’s tip, the credibility of the source, and the extent of police corroboration.

The court found the informer’s information detailed and credible, supported by prior reliability and partial police corroboration through database checks and surveillance.

Despite drafting errors in the ITO, the totality of the circumstances provided a sufficient evidentiary foundation for the issuing justice to grant the warrant.