COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO
Paciocco, George and Dawe JJ.A.
BETWEEN
His Majesty the King
Respondent
and
Ralph George
Appellant
Counsel:
Ralph George, acting in person
Maija Martin, appearing as duty counsel
Victoria Rivers, for the respondent
Heard: July 9, 2026
On appeal from the sentence imposed by Justice Jennifer Penman of the Superior Court of Justice, on November 5, 2024.
REASONS FOR DECISION
1On June 15, 2022, Ralph George, who was 20 years of age at the time, fled his apartment by jumping off the balcony as police were arriving to respond to what reasonably appeared to be a domestic altercation. After entering and observing drugs in plain view, officers obtained and executed a search warrant and seized 288.50 grams of methamphetamine, 202.39 grams of cocaine, and 85.80 grams of fentanyl, as well as a loaded restricted firearm and almost $15,000 in cash.
2On July 4, 2022, Mr. George was observed in a convenience store moving a firearm from his waistband to a bag he was carrying. This led to his arrest. The gun he had put in the bag was loaded. During the search incident to arrest, he was found to also be in possession of ammunition and further quantities of methamphetamine (232.62 grams), cocaine (114,97 grams) and fentanyl (92.23 grams), and close to $7,000 in cash.
3Mr. George brought exclusionary Charter motions based on the execution of the search warrant in his apartment on June 15, 2022. After these motions were denied, he pleaded guilty to the July 4, 2022 counts and did not contest his guilt on the June 15, 2022 charges. He was convicted of two counts each of possessing methamphetamine, cocaine and fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking (one set of charges for each incident), and two counts of possessing a loaded restricted firearm (one charge for each incident). In connection with the second incident, he was also convicted of one count of possessing a firearm knowing that the serial number had been removed; one count of possessing a firearm while prohibited from doing so; and one count of failing to comply with a recognizance.
4Mr. George was on probation at the time of both incidents, arising from a prior drug trafficking conviction.
5The trial judge arrived at a global sentence of 19 years after identifying the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. She included among the aggravating circumstances that the appellant had “fled from the police on June 15, 2022”. The mitigating circumstances included the anti-Black racism he had experienced; the trial judge found there was a link between the offences and the disadvantage described in the presentence report (“PSR”), including his “negative experiences with the police”. After cautioning herself not to impose a crushing sentence, the trial judge reduced the sentence by 5 years to 14 years in light of the principle of totality and the other mitigating circumstances. After providing Summers credit for the length of presentence custody, the trial judge imposed a net sentence of 11.5 years.
6Mr. George is not pursuing his conviction appeal in relation to the June 15, 2022 charges, and it is dismissed as abandoned. He seeks leave to appeal his sentence, raising two grounds.
7First, he argues that this sentence is manifestly unfit as it is crushing for a man his age, with his reduced moral fault given the social context evidence that was provided. We do not accept this submission. The trial judge, mindful of these factors, chose a sentence at the low end of the range after giving generous consideration to the mitigating circumstances. The sentence she chose was not unfit. Mr. George was sentenced for successive, independent and gravely serious firearms offenses, as well as successive incidents of drug trafficking, including in fentanyl, committed while he was on a firearm prohibition and probation for a prior narcotics conviction. The trial judge gave as low a sentence as she believed she could in the circumstances, expressly acknowledging the need to avoid a crushing sentence. We see no basis for interfering with her assessment.
8Second, duty counsel argued on Mr. George’s behalf that the sentencing judge erred in principle by treating his flight on June 15, 2022 as aggravating after accepting his negative experiences with the police as described in the PSR. The PSR recounted his personal experiences with the police during police raids, including one incident in which his head was slammed against the wall by police and his mother was knocked to the ground. Duty counsel argued that after making this finding the trial judge should not have treated flight from the police as an aggravating circumstance. We agree that the findings are incongruent.
9To be clear, we recognize that the circumstances of flight from the police can be an aggravating circumstance even where there have been negative experiences with the police, as in R. v. Morris, 2021 ONCA 680, 159 O.R. (3d) 641, where it was found aggravating that Mr. Morris tossed a loaded firearm while fleeing from the police. This court explained at para. 170:
[F]leeing from the police while in possession of a loaded handgun increases the risk of a confrontation, during which the weapon may be discharged deliberately, or even accidentally. Either substantially increases the risk to the public.
10In Morris, the court also held it to be a separate aggravating factor that Mr. Morris had discarded his gun in a location that “was readily accessible by the public”, noting that “leaving a loaded firearm anywhere in a public space is clearly a significant aggravating factor”: Morris, at para. 172. However, in this case there was no evidence that Mr. George had a firearm on his person when he fled the police on June 15, 2022.
11The trial judge failed to explain why Mr. George’s flight should be treated as aggravating given the impact his experiences with the police could have had on that decision. In our view, in the circumstances of this case, flight should not have been treated as an aggravating circumstance. We accept that although this aggravating factor was not a major feature in the sentence imposed, it impacted the sentence. If it had not, the trial judge would not have featured it as an aggravating factor.
12We therefore deny the conviction appeal, grant leave to appeal sentence, and allow the sentence appeal in part by reducing the sentence on count 1 from 2 years to 18 months. This reduces the net sentence from 11.5 years to 11 years. In our view, a six-month reduction amply rectifies the impact that treating flight as an aggravating circumstance would have had on the sentence the trial judge imposed.
“David M. Paciocco J.A.”
“J. George J.A.”
“J. Dawe J.A.”