COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO
Paciocco, George and Dawe JJ.A.
BETWEEN
His Majesty the King
Respondent
and
Ramon Williams
Appellant
Ramon Williams, acting in person
Maija Martin, appearing as duty counsel
Kevin Pitt, for the respondent
Heard: July 9, 2026
On appeal from the convictions entered by Justice Nyron Dwyer of the Ontario Court of Justice on September 8, 2022, and from the sentence imposed on April 8, 2025.
REASONS FOR DECISION
1The appellant was convicted of trafficking in persons, procuring a person to offer or provide sexual services, advertising sexual services, exercising control over a person providing sexual services, receiving a material benefit from sexual services, assault, forcible confinement, uttering threats, and possession of property obtained by crime. He was sentenced to 12 years’ imprisonment, less credit for the time spent in pre-sentence custody.
2The appellant appeals both his convictions and sentence. Assisted by pro bono duty counsel, he submits that the trial judge failed to grapple with numerous significant issues in the complainant’s evidence, rendering the reasons insufficient.
3After being introduced through a dating website, the complainant and the appellant arranged to meet at a hotel. Once they met in person, the appellant suggested that the complainant work in the sex trade. He offered to assist her and proposed that they divide the proceeds equally. The complainant agreed.
4The appellant advertised the complainant’s services, communicated with clients, and collected payment. The appellant controlled all the money the complainant earned. Although he sometimes gave her funds to buy food and regularly provided her with drugs, the appellant never shared the proceeds with the complainant. After initially working out of a hotel room, the complainant began working from her home. During that period, the appellant and his girlfriend, Z.A., stayed with her. Z.A. also worked in the sex trade.
5On the evening of January 12, 2021, the complainant decided that she no longer wanted to engage in sex work. She asked the appellant and Z.A. to leave her home, but they refused. The appellant then bound the complainant’s arms and legs, tied her to the bed, threatened to kill her and throw her in a ditch, placed something in her mouth, and repeatedly hit and choked her. Z.A. participated in the beating. The next morning, the appellant untied the complainant, who then escaped. The appellant got into his car and chased her, but she was able to evade him; this was captured on surveillance video. The appellant then returned to the complainant’s home and, together with Z.A., stole some of her belongings, including her television. That too was captured on video.
6The complainant and Z.A. both testified for the Crown. The appellant, who called no evidence, conceded that, if the trial judge accepted the complainant’s and Z.A.’s evidence as credible and reliable, most of the counts would be established and he should be found guilty.
7Duty counsel identifies six areas that, in her submission, the trial judge was required, but failed, to address: the complainant’s inconsistent evidence about (i) how she met the appellant; (ii) whether she received any money from the appellant; (iii) when the appellant first became violent toward her; (iv) what substances she was using at the relevant time; and (v) the events of January 12, 2021; as well as (vi) potential motives for the complainant to lie. Duty counsel argued further that it was problematic for the trial judge to rely on Z.A.’s evidence to “corroborate” and overcome deficiencies in the complainant’s evidence because Z.A.’s evidence was, at least in some respects, bad character evidence.
8We are not persuaded by these arguments. The trial judge understood that the principal issue was the credibility and reliability of the complainant and Z.A. and clearly appreciated the difficulties with their evidence. Although he did not address each of the identified inconsistencies specifically, the trial judge acknowledged problems with the complainant’s evidence and recognized that Z.A. had a motive to lie, namely, to obtain bail and ultimately have the charges against her withdrawn, and because of her animus towards the appellant.
9In our view, the trial judge’s reasons respond to the issues raised by counsel and permit meaningful appellate review. With respect to the events of January 12, for example, the reasons make clear the trial judge found that Z.A.’s evidence was independent and confirmed the complainant’s evidence in material respects, which is all that is required in the absence of a formal corroboration rule, none of which applied in this case. The same was true of the surveillance videos, which showed the appellant chasing the complainant after she fled, and then returning with Z.A. to steal items from her home. It too provided independent confirmation that would logically increase the confidence of a court in the accuracy of the testimony the witness was providing.
10In any event, the inconsistencies largely concerned the nature of the arrangement between the complainant and the appellant, which were, while relevant, somewhat peripheral. Although inconsistencies on peripheral matters may bear on credibility, the complainant was consistent that she met the appellant and, at his urging, engaged in sex work. The trial judge found that significant, and reasonably concluded that it, together with Z.A.’s evidence and the video footage, overcame the deficiencies in the complainant’s evidence and satisfied him beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant committed the offences alleged.
11With respect to the appellant’s argument concerning the trial judge’s reliance on the dangerous evidence of Z.A., including the “bad character” evidence she gave, as material confirmation of the complainant’s testimony, he did not raise these issues at trial and there is no basis to entertain them for the first time on appeal. In any event, as there was no evidence that the complainant and Z.A. had ever spoken about these events before testifying, and given materially overlapping features in their respective evidence, it was open to the trial judge to find Z.A.’s evidence to be confirmatory.
12We also reject the suggestion that Z.A. provided inadmissible bad character evidence. The impugned evidence appears to have been necessary background to understand the relationship between Z.A., the appellant, and the complainant, as well as the events surrounding the charged offences. Nothing in the trial judge’s reasons suggests that he used this evidence for an improper purpose.
13For these reasons, the conviction appeal is dismissed.
14Neither the appellant nor duty counsel made oral submissions on the sentence appeal, and the appellant’s written submissions identify no basis for appellate intervention. Leave to appeal sentence is therefore denied.
“David M. Paciocco J.A.”
“J. George J.A.”
“J. Dawe J.A.”
Footnotes
- This appeal is subject to a publication ban pursuant to s. 486.4 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.