Mark Halfyard

The appellant was convicted of importing opium after drugs were found in his luggage upon returning from India.

He appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in her jury instructions regarding his unrecorded out-of-court statements to police, the Crown's comments on his right to silence, and the scope of the W.(D.) instruction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the jury instructions were functionally adequate, properly cautioned the jury on the right to silence, and correctly conveyed how to apply the burden of proof to the evidence as a whole.

The appellant was convicted of first-degree murder and arson in the death of his intimate partner.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by admitting hearsay statements made by the deceased about their relationship, failing to give a limiting instruction regarding bad character evidence, and permitting lay opinion evidence from firefighters about his demeanour at the scene.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the hearsay statements were properly admitted under the state of mind exception, a bad character limiting instruction was unnecessary given the specific directions provided, and the demeanour evidence was admissible lay opinion.

The appellant, a religious teacher, appealed his convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference against a 10-year-old student.

He argued the trial judge erred by failing to address inconsistencies and implausibilities in the complainant's evidence, improperly using a prior consistent statement to bolster credibility, and conflating the absence of a motive to fabricate with positive proof of no motive.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge adequately addressed the evidence, properly used the prior consistent statement as circumstantial evidence, and correctly addressed the motive to fabricate in response to the defence's cross-examination.

The appellant pleaded guilty to assault, being unlawfully in a dwelling house, and criminal harassment against his former intimate partner.

He was given a suspended sentence and 18 months of probation.

He appealed, seeking a conditional discharge and a reduction of the probation term to 12 months, which was the Crown's position at trial.

The Superior Court of Justice upheld the suspended sentence, finding no error in the trial judge's application of the proportionality principle.

However, the court reduced the probation term to 12 months, holding that the trial judge erred by imposing a longer term than the Crown requested without giving the parties notice and an opportunity to make submissions.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on a charge of dangerous operation of a motor vehicle.

The charge arose from the respondent's driving after she crashed into a condominium lobby window.

The Crown argued the trial judge erred in law by conflating the actus reus and mens rea analyses and failing to conduct a proper risk assessment.

The Superior Court of Justice found no error, holding that the trial judge properly assessed the circumstances and correctly concluded the driving was neither dangerous nor a marked departure from the standard of care.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence.

He abandoned the conviction appeal.

On the sentence appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge erred by failing to apply the usual 1.5 to 1 credit rate for the appellant's 152 days of pretrial custody.

The sentence appeal was granted and the sentence was reduced by 76 days.

The appellant appealed his conviction for having care or control of a motor vehicle with excess blood alcohol.

He argued the trial judge erred by using his roadside statement to assess credibility and by finding no breach of his s. 10(b) Charter rights when the arresting officer allegedly steered him to duty counsel instead of facilitating contact with his counsel of choice.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court found the roadside statement was admissible, but concluded the trial judge made palpable and overriding errors in the s. 10(b) analysis, specifically in finding that a second reading of the rights at the detachment cured any defects in the initial roadside explanation.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was convicted of firearms offences and released on bail pending appeal.

He subsequently absconded, failing to reside with his surety or surrender into custody as required by his release order.

His counsel brought a motion to be removed as solicitor of record due to a breakdown in communications, which was granted.

The Crown brought a motion to dismiss the appeal as abandoned.

The Court of Appeal granted the Crown's motion, dismissing the appeal as abandoned and issuing a warrant for the appellant's arrest.

The appellant appealed her conviction for driving with a blood alcohol level over 80 mg/100 ml.

She argued the trial judge erred in finding the roadside screening demand was made forthwith, the breath samples were taken as soon as practicable, and her s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel was not breached.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's conclusions that the six-minute delay for the roadside demand was justified, the 1 hour and 45-minute delay for the breath samples was reasonable, and the appellant had a fulsome opportunity to consult with duty counsel.

The appellant appealed her conviction and sentence for assault arising from an altercation at a shopping mall.

She argued the trial judge erred by inferring her nails caused the complainant's facial injuries, misapprehending her evidence regarding the word 'disengaged', and treating the fact that the parties were strangers as an aggravating factor on sentence.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's inference about the injuries was reasonable, the misapprehension of evidence was peripheral and did not cause a miscarriage of justice, and there was no reversible error in the sentencing analysis.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence, relied on stereotypical reasoning, and failed to properly apply the W.D. framework.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the trial judge erred by relying on generalized assumptions about human behaviour—specifically regarding how a victim would act out of guilt or whether parties would cry during consensual sexual activity—to assess credibility, rather than grounding his findings in the evidence.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, a high school teacher, appealed his convictions for sexual assault and sexual exploitation involving two of his students.

He argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding the physical impossibility of the assaults and applied a stricter standard of scrutiny to his testimony compared to the complainants' evidence.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's credibility assessments were well-reasoned, even-handed, and free from material misapprehension of evidence.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for sexual assault and assault with a weapon against his ex-partner.

The central issue at trial was credibility, with the appellant claiming consensual sexual activity and the complainant denying consent.

The appeal focused on the trial judge's treatment of text messages between the parties, inconsistencies in the complainant's testimony, and the assessment of the appellant's evidence.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge engaged in illogical reasoning regarding the circumstances of the assault, impermissibly dismissed the appellant's evidence as 'self-serving' without proper basis, and failed to adequately address the complainant's potential motive to fabricate related to family law proceedings.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for assault with a weapon, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing the complainant's credibility, compartmentalizing the credibility analysis between the assault and acquitted sexual assault charges, and improperly using the timing of the complainant's call to police as corroboration.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly used the timing of the complaint as part of the narrative to assess credibility, did not compartmentalize the analysis, and made findings of fact that were available on the evidence.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, invitation to sexual touching, and sexual interference.

He argued the trial judge erred in finding the complainant's mother did not adopt portions of her police statement regarding the complainant's sexual knowledge, in using an absence of evidence to corroborate the complainant, and in failing to analyze inconsistencies cumulatively.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings or credibility assessment.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction trial judge's decision to stay charges of impaired driving and over 80 due to unreasonable delay under section 11(b) of the Charter.

The total delay was 17 months, falling just below the 18-month presumptive ceiling for provincial court matters under the new Jordan framework.

The Crown argued the trial judge reversed the onus and failed to consider the defence's lack of initiative.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge correctly applied the transitional framework from Jordan, noting that defence initiative was not required for the period preceding the Jordan decision, and the trial judge properly considered the Crown's delay in disclosure and the overall context.

The appellant appealed his convictions for intimidation, assault, and sexual assault, arguing that the trial judge misapprehended defence evidence and rendered inconsistent verdicts by acquitting him on one count of sexual assault while convicting on others.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's assessment of the defence witness's credibility was justified and did not misapprehend the evidence.

The court also held that the verdicts were not inconsistent, as each sexual assault count related to a distinct event and had to be evaluated individually based on the evidence of consent at the time.

The applicant, appealing his summary conviction, ordered transcripts of his trial proceedings.

The authorized court transcriptionists, acting as independent contractors under the new Ministry of the Attorney General model, refused to provide copies at the $0.55 per page copy rate, insisting on charging the full $4.30 per page rate for a 'first certified copy' because the appeal was a new proceeding.

The applicant brought an application to compel the transcriptionists to produce the transcripts at the copy rate.

The Superior Court of Justice held that it had jurisdiction over the administration of justice to make the order.

The court found that under the Criminal Code and O. Reg. 94/14, transcriptionists do not have the discretion to refuse a transcript order or to charge the first-copy rate for a transcript that was already produced for the trial.

The court ordered the transcriptionists to produce the transcripts at the $0.55 per page rate.