Ildikó Erdei

The court granted the applicant’s Charter application, finding that the police used their Highway Traffic Act powers as a pretext to stop the applicant’s vehicle to investigate a possible drug transaction, resulting in arbitrary detention contrary to section 9.

The subsequent search and seizure of drugs and a firearm were not justified under the plain view doctrine and violated section 8.

The applicant’s right to counsel under section 10(b) was also breached due to an unreasonable delay in facilitating access to duty counsel.

The court excluded the evidence under section 24(2), concluding that admitting it would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appellant pleaded guilty to possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking and other offences, receiving a net sentence of four years and seven months.

On appeal, he sought to introduce fresh evidence and argued the sentencing judge failed to adequately consider his drug addiction and harsh pre-sentence custody conditions as mitigating factors.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge properly elicited information from the self-represented appellant, who had stated his addiction did not motivate the offence.

The court also held the sentencing judge appropriately weighed the harsh pre-sentence conditions against the seriousness of the offence.

The court considered an application by Adrian Davey to stay proceedings on the ground of entrapment after he pleaded guilty to trafficking cocaine and possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The court reviewed the sufficiency of disclosure to the defence and whether police had reasonable suspicion before offering Davey the opportunity to commit the offence.

The application was dismissed, with the court finding that the police had reasonable suspicion at the relevant time and that the defence was able to make full answer and defence.

Adrian Williams pleaded guilty to possession of Fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking.

The court considered sentencing principles including proportionality, parity, and totality, as well as an Enhanced Pre-Sentence Report detailing the offender's background, including experiences with anti-Black racism and systemic discrimination.

The Crown sought a four-year consecutive sentence, while the defence proposed three years, arguing the Fentanyl was diluted.

The court imposed a four-year sentence, consecutive to a prior manslaughter conviction, finding the Crown's proposal fit after weighing aggravating factors (subsequent manslaughter conviction, criminal record, institutional misconduct) against mitigating factors (guilty plea, family support, job offer, and social context as it relates to moral culpability).

Kevin Tran appealed his convictions for narcotics, proceeds of crime, and firearm offences.

He argued that the verdicts were unreasonable, the trial judge erred in not excluding evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, and the trial judge erred in not staying proceedings due to unreasonable delay under s. 11(b).

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding the verdicts reasonable, the s. 24(2) decision correct (despite an unconstitutional warrant, evidence was admissible due to good faith), and the s. 11(b) delay justified by exceptional circumstances related to a joint trial.

The appellant, Thanh Nguyen, appealed his convictions for several possession for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime offences.

He argued that the verdicts were unreasonable, alleging that the trial judge erred by convicting him on circumstantial evidence that supported innocent inferences, engaged in illogical reasoning, and that the verdicts were inconsistent with his acquittal on a firearm charge.

He also contended that the trial judge erred in admitting unqualified opinion evidence from a police officer.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the verdicts reasonable and any error in admitting opinion evidence harmless under the curative proviso.

The appellant appealed her conviction for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel due to a conflict of interest.

Trial counsel had previously represented the appellant's co-accused (her former husband), who was discharged after providing a statutory declaration denying knowledge of the drugs.

Counsel then represented the appellant, despite her denial of guilt and desire to plead not guilty.

Counsel conceded that the case's outcome hinged solely on a search warrant challenge, without consulting the appellant.

When the challenge failed, counsel proceeded with a nolo contendere procedure, resulting in a finding of guilt without a guilty plea.

The Court of Appeal found a clear conflict of interest, as counsel's duty to the former co-accused was adverse to the appellant's interests, rendering the verdict unreliable and a miscarriage of justice.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered, with the Crown indicating no re-prosecution.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of a certiorari application challenging her committal for trial on charges of possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking and cultivating marijuana.

The Court of Appeal upheld the committal, finding that there was evidence capable of supporting the inference that the appellant was working at the commercial grow-operation on the day of her arrest and that the evidence, considered as a whole, constituted some evidence of her involvement as a party in the alleged offences.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant challenged the issuance of a DNA warrant on the grounds that the Information to Obtain contained inaccurate information regarding observations of the applicant engaging in drug trafficking activity and exiting a specific unit.

The court found that two aspects of the ITO should be excised as they were not supported by the original surveillance evidence.

However, the court determined that even with these excisions, there remained sufficient basis to authorize the seizure of the applicant's DNA based on other evidence, including CCTV footage showing the applicant using a fob associated with the unit, observations of the applicant leaving with a suspected drug trafficker, and possession of a key to the unit where a firearm was found.

The application was dismissed.

Three defendants applied for orders staying criminal proceedings on the grounds that their right to be tried within a constitutionally tolerable time had been breached.

The applicable ceiling for Ontario Court of Justice cases is 18 months.

The Crown argued that when defence delay periods were subtracted, the total delay did not exceed the ceiling.

The court found that two applicants' delay did not exceed the 18-month threshold after deducting defence delay caused by their decision to change counsel.

For the third applicant, although the delay exceeded the Jordan guidelines by nine days, the court found exceptional circumstances existed that rebutted the presumption of unreasonable delay.

All three applications were dismissed.

The defendants brought applications under section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms to challenge the lawfulness of search warrants executed on three apartment units.

Thanh Nguyen lacked standing to challenge the search of the Sherway location as he had no reasonable expectation of privacy in a unit he was merely permitted to use as a guest.

Catherine Vu and Kevin Tran challenged the search of the Lakeshore location where Vu was the tenant.

The court found the warrant for the Lakeshore location was issued without reasonable grounds to believe evidence would be found there, as the connection between Tran and the residence was insufficient to establish more than occasional guest status.

The search violated section 8 rights.

However, under the R. v. Grant analysis, the evidence was admitted as the police acted in good faith, the state conduct was not improper, and society's interest in adjudication on the merits outweighed the privacy breach.