Jessica Smith Joy

The appellant appealed his conviction for historical indecent assault against his stepson, arguing the trial judge engaged in uneven scrutiny of the evidence and provided insufficient reasons regarding the reliability of the complainant's evidence.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence, including the rejection of the appellant's exculpatory explanations.

The court also held that the trial judge's reasons sufficiently addressed the reliability of the complainant's evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, J.P., appealed convictions for three counts of sexual assault.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's credibility assessment of the appellant, particularly regarding inconsistencies in testimony, and the assessment of the complainant's reliability, including the relevance of her failure to call for assistance during the incidents.

The Court found no error in the trial judge's conclusions that the appellant's elaborations were deliberate embellishments and that the complainant's failure to call for help was irrelevant to her credibility in the circumstances.

The appellant, Kirk Williams, sought leave to appeal his dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence for sexual assault causing bodily harm and choking.

He argued the sentencing judge erred in finding the statutory pathways for designation were met and in assessing future harm and treatment prospects.

The Court of Appeal granted leave but dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the sentencing judge's conclusions regarding the dangerous offender pathways, the consideration of medical treatments, or the assessment of recidivism risk.

The court upheld the indeterminate sentence as necessary for public protection.

The appellant, Kristian Jarvis, appealed his sentence of 13 years in custody for multiple firearm-related robberies, aggravated assault, and failing to stop for police.

He argued the sentencing judge erred by imposing consecutive sentences, imposing a harsh sentence, failing to adhere to the principle of restraint, and improperly weighing aggravating and mitigating factors.

The Court of Appeal found no error, upholding the consecutive sentences for flight from police due to the need for deterrence, confirming the sentence was not excessive given the circumstances, and noting the sentencing judge properly considered restraint while prioritizing denunciation and deterrence.

The court also affirmed that reweighing factors is not an appellate function.

The appellant, D.G., appealed his conviction for sexual offences against two foster children, RY and TY, arguing that the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding collusion among complainants, applied uneven scrutiny to Crown and defence evidence, and failed to adequately consider tainting of evidence by police questions.

The Court of Appeal found that while there were minor misapprehensions of evidence, they were peripheral and did not affect the material assessment of credibility or the similar act evidence.

The court also found no error in the trial judge's credibility assessments or application of the burden of proof, and rejected the argument of uneven scrutiny.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Steven Vanroy Browne, appealed his conviction for manslaughter, arguing the verdict was unreasonable and that evidence of phone numbers provided to his probation officer was inadmissible.

The Court of Appeal found the verdict reasonable, supported by DNA evidence, mobile phone records, and association evidence, despite inconsistencies in eyewitness identification.

The court also upheld the admission of phone number evidence, ruling it was not compelled and did not violate Charter rights, as the appellant failed to establish a subjective or objective belief of compulsion.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for five counts of attempted murder and arson, alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

He claimed his counsel failed to challenge the voluntariness of his police statement and failed to prepare him for trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no factual basis for the claims and concluding that, even if there were, the appellant suffered no prejudice given the overwhelming evidence of guilt and the trial judge's detailed reasons for rejecting his testimony.

The appellant, Hussein Kelkas, appealed his conviction for three counts of sexual assault involving two complainants.

The central issue at trial was consent.

The trial judge found the complainants credible and the appellant's evidence incredible.

The appeal grounds included misapprehension of evidence, impermissible judicial notice, improper bolstering of credibility, and a finding of fact without evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's assessment of evidence or credibility, and no impermissible use of judicial notice.

The appellant, an Indigenous man, sought leave to appeal a 30-month sentence for aggravated assault and breach of probation, arguing the trial judge failed to properly apply Gladue principles.

The Court of Appeal granted leave but dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge adequately considered Gladue principles, even without a formal Gladue report, by relying on a s. 21 Mental Health Act report.

The court concluded the sentence was fit given the gravity and escalating nature of the offences and the appellant's history of failed rehabilitation and terrorizing the complainant.

The appellant, Christopher Dockery, appealed his five-year sentence for aggravated assault, arguing the sentencing judge erred by not granting enhanced credit for pre-trial custody spent in lockdown and by failing to assist him as a self-represented party.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal regarding enhanced credit, finding the sentencing judge properly exercised discretion under R. v. Duncan.

However, the appeal was allowed by consent of the Crown regarding the victim surcharge.

The appellant, convicted of aggravated sexual assault and sentenced to ten years' incarceration, appealed both the conviction and sentence.

The conviction appeal was based on claims of ineffective trial counsel, including failures in cross-examination, calling witnesses, eliciting expert opinion, and exploring photo tampering, as well as suggestions of improper discussions and conflict of interest.

The sentence appeal argued the trial judge erred in treating lack of remorse as an aggravating factor and in identifying primary sentencing objectives inconsistent with Gladue factors.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no basis for incompetence and noting the strong Crown case supported by forensic evidence.

It also dismissed the sentence appeal, finding that even if the trial judge erred regarding remorse, it had no impact given other serious aggravating factors, and that deterrence and denunciation were appropriate objectives.

The appellant appealed his convictions on two counts of robbery, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting his videotaped interview without a Prosper warning.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, deferring to the trial judge's factual finding that the appellant had not asserted his right to counsel, thereby negating the requirement for a Prosper warning.

The appellant, Jasfa Brown, appealed his convictions for firearm and drug offences and the imposed sentence.

He challenged the validity of his guilty plea and the amount of enhanced credit for harsh presentence custody conditions (Duncan credit).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal against conviction, finding no basis to interfere with the guilty plea.

Regarding the sentence, the court upheld the sentencing judge's discretion in awarding four months of Duncan credit, despite acknowledging it was at the lower end compared to recent case law concerning conditions at the Toronto South Detention Centre.

The court found the sentence was not demonstrably unfit.

However, leave to appeal the sentence was granted, and the $600 victim fine surcharge was set aside in accordance with R. v. Boudreault.

The appellant, G.W., appealed convictions for multiple sexual offences, arguing that his work schedule and other commitments precluded him from being alone with the child victims.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's rejection of this defence, noting that the trial judge had found the appellant's credibility undermined by his attempts to minimize opportunities and that ample opportunity for the offences existed.

The appellate court found no basis to interfere with the trial judge's factual findings, which were thoroughly grounded in the evidence and owed deference.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction on identity evidence grounds.

The trial judge had found the complainant's identification of the appellant to be reliable despite a minor discrepancy regarding facial hair.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding no error in the trial judge's treatment of identity evidence.

The trial judge had properly considered corroborative evidence, including a witness who confirmed details of the assailant's clothing, and had not placed undue weight on the complainant's confidence in her identification.

The appellant appealed his conviction for importing and possession for the purpose of trafficking cocaine following his third trial.

The appeal raised three grounds: (1) whether the trial judge erred in treating a pre-trial agreement regarding the admission of trucking logs as governed by section 655 of the Criminal Code; (2) whether the trial judge erred in admitting an out-of-court statement by Mr. Jackson; and (3) whether the trial judge erred in refusing to provide a Bosley credit in sentencing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's decisions.

The appellant appealed both his conviction and sentence imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice.

The appellant abandoned his conviction appeal.

On the sentence appeal, the Court of Appeal found that while the sentencing judge correctly identified the appropriate range as four to six years, the imposition of a six-year sentence at the absolute top of the range was too harsh.

Considering significant mitigating factors including a history of sexual assault trauma and the appellant's limited prior criminal record, the court reduced the sentence to five years and set aside the victim surcharge.

The appellant appealed his sentence imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice on multiple offences including theft, threatening, fail to stop, and break and enter.

The sentencing judge accepted the defence range of 18-24 months and imposed a sentence of 21 months after deducting pre-sentence custody.

The Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge made a mathematical error in calculating the sentence and failed to expressly consider the appellant's Indigenous background.

The court reduced the total sentence to 17 months, including five months credit for pre-sentence custody, by reducing the sentences for theft and threats by four months on each count.

The appellant appealed his sentence for impaired driving causing death and criminal negligence causing death.

The sentencing judge imposed a 10-year driving prohibition commencing on the date of sentencing rather than at the end of the period of imprisonment, which constituted an error under R. v. Lacasse.

The Court of Appeal corrected this error by applying the Lacasse formula: subtracting the 5-year term of imprisonment from the 10-year prohibition, leaving a 5-year prohibition to commence upon release.

However, the court exercised discretion to reduce the credit for the presentence driving prohibition period due to the appellant's breach of that condition, resulting in a final 3-year driving prohibition following release.

The victim surcharge was also set aside on consent.

The appellant appealed his sentence for human trafficking, procuring, and intimidation of a justice system participant.

The global sentence was nine years minus 1.5 years for pre-sentence custody.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred by failing to account for a change in the sentencing range that occurred after the offences were committed, from two to seven years to four to eight years due to the imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence.

The appellant contended that using the earlier range would have resulted in a one-year reduction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that regardless of the range used as a starting point, the ultimate sentence was fit given the egregious facts, including the long duration of offences, complete domination and control of the victim, high moral blameworthiness, use of physical violence, and serious psychological impact.