James Lockyer

The appellant appealed her conviction for second degree murder arising from a home invasion during which her uncle was fatally stabbed.

The Crown's theory was that the appellant organized the break-in intending for the deceased to be killed by her co-accused.

The Court of Appeal found two errors in the jury charge: first, the jury was not adequately instructed about the limited probative value of the appellant's after-the-fact conduct if they rejected the Crown's theory that the killing was planned; second, the jury was not properly instructed that the appellant's partially exculpatory police statements could contribute to a reasonable doubt even if not affirmatively believed.

The curative proviso was not applied, as the Crown's case on murder was not overwhelming.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial on second degree murder was ordered.

The Minister of Justice referred the appellant's 1990 second-degree murder conviction to the Court of Appeal after it was discovered that police failed to disclose an audio recording of an interview with an alternate suspect.

The Crown conceded the non-disclosure constituted a miscarriage of justice, requiring the conviction to be quashed.

The appellant sought an acquittal, arguing a police conspiracy to frame him and that his confession was false.

The Court of Appeal declined to enter an acquittal, finding that a properly instructed jury could still convict based on the appellant's voluntary confession and new DNA evidence linking him to the victim's clothing.

The Court ordered a new trial rather than a judicial stay of proceedings.

The appellant appealed his first-degree murder conviction, arguing that his confession, obtained during a 13-hour police interrogation using the Reid Technique, should have been excluded.

The appellant and an intervener argued for a new common law rule creating a rebuttable presumption of involuntariness for confessions elicited via the Reid Technique.

The Court of Appeal declined to amend the confessions rule, finding the existing framework sufficient.

However, the Court allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge erred by failing to assess the cumulative effect of the prolonged, aggressive questioning and by making a palpable and overriding error of fact in concluding the appellant had not fallen asleep during the interrogation.

The accused was charged with first-degree murder in the death of her 16-year-old daughter, who suffered from severe cerebral palsy.

The Crown alleged the accused smothered the victim and staged a home invasion to cover it up.

The accused testified that two armed intruders entered the home searching for a package, and that one of them remained with the victim while the other searched the house.

The court applied the W.(D.) principles and found that the evidence of the home invasion, while containing some inconsistencies, raised a reasonable doubt.

The court also acquitted the accused of manslaughter, finding insufficient evidence that she was capable of assisting the victim after the intruders left.

The accused was acquitted of all charges.

The applicants, including several current and former sex workers and a sex worker advocacy organization, brought a constitutional challenge against several provisions of the Protection of Communities and Exploited Persons Act (PCEPA), which criminalized the purchase of sexual services and related activities.

The applicants argued that the provisions violated sections 7, 2(b), 2(d), and 15 of the Charter by replicating the harms of the previous prostitution laws struck down in Bedford.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding that the provisions did not violate sections 7, 2(d), or 15 of the Charter.

While the Attorney General conceded that certain provisions violated section 2(b) freedom of expression, the court found these limits were demonstrably justified under section 1 of the Charter as a proportionate response to the pressing and substantial objective of reducing the demand for sex work and protecting vulnerable persons from exploitation.

The accused and a co-accused were convicted of first degree murder by a jury.

The accused appealed on the basis that the trial judge's failure to leave included offences with the jury with respect to the co-accused undermined his defence and tainted the verdict.

The majority of the Court of Appeal held that the trial judge's error narrowed the jury instructions in the case of the accused and set aside the conviction, ordering a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that the trial judge's instructions properly left the reasonably available verdicts with the jury, and that the trial judge had explicitly instructed the jury to consider the accused's case separately from the co-accused's.

Applying the presumption that juries follow explicit instructions, the conviction for first degree murder was restored.

The appellant media organization sought to set aside an indefinite publication ban ordered by the Manitoba Court of Appeal in connection with a sealed affidavit filed in criminal proceedings involving an alleged miscarriage of justice.

The Court of Appeal declined to hear the motion, holding that its jurisdiction was exhausted after it entered its formal judgment on the merits.

The majority of the Supreme Court held that courts retain supervisory jurisdiction over their court records — including the power to vary or set aside publication bans and sealing orders — even after entering formal judgment on the merits, as this authority exists independently of the doctrine of functus officio.

The majority allowed the appeal from the 2019 Jurisdiction Judgment and remanded the matter to the Court of Appeal to decide the motion on its merits.

The appeal from the 2018 Publication Ban Judgment was adjourned sine die pending that determination.

Abella J. dissented, concluding that the appellant's undue delay in bringing its motion was determinative and both appeals should be dismissed.

The applicants, arrested in a large-scale police investigation, brought an abuse of process motion seeking a stay of proceedings due to systemic delays in holding their special bail hearings.

They argued that their section 11(e) Charter rights were violated, similar to the applicants in a previous case where a stay was granted.

The court found that while the applicants' rights were violated by the delays, the systemic problem in the jurisdiction had been largely rectified following the previous decision.

As the ongoing systemic delay had been addressed, a stay of proceedings was no longer necessary to protect the integrity of the justice system.

The application was dismissed, though the court noted the Charter violations could warrant a sentence reduction if the applicants are convicted.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first-degree murder, arguing the trial judge erred by refusing to grant an adjournment to retain new counsel after he discharged his trial lawyer mid-trial, and that the Crown's cross-examination and closing address rendered the trial unfair.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly exercised her discretion to refuse a lengthy adjournment, as the discharge was an attempt to derail the trial, and the appointment of amicus curiae ensured trial fairness.

The Court also held that while some of the Crown's conduct was improper, the trial judge's corrective instructions neutralized any prejudice.

The Crown applied for an order permitting a surviving victim of a shooting to testify behind a screen pursuant to s. 486.2 of the Criminal Code.

The witness suffered from paranoid schizophrenia and experienced significant anxiety about facing the accused.

The court granted the application, finding that the witness's mental disorder would make testifying difficult and that a screen would facilitate a full and candid account without interfering with the proper administration of justice.

The appellant appealed his sentence for assault causing bodily harm, seeking an absolute or conditional discharge instead of the 12-month conditional sentence imposed at trial.

The appellant had joined a group assault on an unconscious victim but did not cause the bodily harm.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court considered the appellant's lack of prior record, his mental health struggles, his successful completion of a university degree while on bail, and the potential impact of a conviction on his career prospects.

The court found that a conditional discharge was in the appellant's best interests and not contrary to the public interest.

The appeal was allowed, and a conditional discharge with 15 months' probation was imposed.

The plaintiff brought a motion for an interlocutory injunction to preserve $2 million seized by the RCMP in related criminal proceedings, which had previously been ordered paid into court in the civil proceedings.

The defendants brought a motion to strike the plaintiff's counterclaim under Rule 21.

The RCMP brought a motion to quash a summons directed at an RCMP officer to provide evidence for a pending contempt motion.

The court granted the interlocutory injunction, dismissed the motion to strike the counterclaim, and dismissed the RCMP's motion to quash the summons, providing directions for obtaining the necessary documents.

The Court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction, and ordered a new trial because errors in assessing the defence and credibility caused a miscarriage of justice.

In a manslaughter appeal, the Crown challenged an order for a new trial based on alleged misdirection to the jury concerning post-offence photographs and characterization of a school conversation as a confession.

The Court held the photographs were admissible on identity because appearance at the time of the offence was in dispute and any prejudice was manageable through limiting instructions.

Reading the charge as a whole, the Court found no realistic risk that jurors would reason impermissibly from broad eyewitness descriptions.

The Court also held that referring to confession in recounting the Crown's submissions was not a toxic instruction where the jury was repeatedly cautioned to assess the actual words and context.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction restored, and sentencing issues were remitted.