K.M. Weiler

The appellant was convicted of possession of heroin for the purpose of trafficking and sentenced to four years' imprisonment.

He appealed the conviction, arguing his arrest was unlawful, evidence should have been excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter, and the trial judge misapprehended evidence.

He also appealed the sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge did not err in concluding there were objective grounds for the arrest based on the totality of circumstances, including a confidential informant tip and police surveillance.

The court also upheld the trial judge's s. 24(2) analysis and found no error in the assessment of evidence.

The sentence appeal was dismissed as the four-year term was fit and within the appropriate range.

The moving party, a debtor company in receivership, sought leave to appeal an order approving the sale of its assets by a court-appointed receiver.

The moving party argued that the receiver acted unfairly, that the debtor's management retained the right to negotiate a restructuring, and that the receiver failed to consult with affected Aboriginal communities.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application for leave to appeal, finding that the debtor's parallel negotiations contravened the receivership order, the receiver had exclusive authority to market the assets, and the Aboriginal consultation issue was raised too late and lacked an adequate evidentiary record.

The appellant appealed his convictions for multiple offences, including assault causing bodily harm and unlawful confinement against his former girlfriend, as well as his designation as a dangerous offender.

He argued the trial judge erred by mischaracterizing defence evidence as an alibi, applying uneven scrutiny to the evidence, and over-relying on similar fact and post-offence conduct evidence.

The Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge erred in characterizing certain evidence as an alibi, the evidence of guilt was overwhelming and the curative proviso applied.

The court also upheld the dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence, finding the trial judge reasonably assessed the psychiatric evidence and the appellant's risk to re-offend.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, who was previously found Not Criminally Responsible for criminal harassment and mischief, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board maintaining his conditional discharge.

He argued that he no longer posed a significant threat to public safety and sought an absolute discharge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's conclusion reasonable given the appellant's active symptoms of schizophrenia, lack of insight, and stated intention to stop taking medication if discharged.

The appellant appealed her conviction for assault causing bodily harm, which was entered following a guilty plea.

The Court of Appeal found the plea was invalid and not unequivocal due to shifting facts presented by the Crown, the appellant's statements suggesting a lack of mens rea, and indications she pleaded guilty primarily to be released from jail where she was allegedly denied HIV medication.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellants appealed their convictions for robbery, attempted robbery, and assault arising from three separate incidents that occurred over a 30-minute period.

They argued the verdicts were unreasonable, challenging the trial judge's findings on self-defence, identity, and common intention.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding that the trial judge's conclusions were amply supported by the evidence, which established that the appellants acted together as common participants in all three incidents.

Leave to appeal sentence was also denied.

The appellant, who was found not criminally responsible for criminal harassment in 2008, appealed a decision of the Ontario Review Board continuing his detention order.

He argued the Board erred in law by equating the harm of criminal harassment with a 'significant threat to the safety of the public' under s. 672.5401 of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board did not focus solely on the index offence but considered all evidence, including the likelihood that the appellant would discontinue medication and engage in physical and aggressive behaviour.

The Board's conclusion that the appellant remained a significant threat was reasonable.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board that directed his detention at a mental health facility, revoking his prior conditional discharge.

The appellant had been returned to the facility after being charged with criminal harassment, which was resolved by a peace bond.

The Court of Appeal found that the Board's conclusion that the appellant continued to pose a significant threat to public safety was reasonable, given his diagnosis, lack of insight, and recent negative interactions.

The Court also upheld the detention order, noting the appellant's lack of stable housing and employment prospects, and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant, who was previously found not criminally responsible due to schizophrenia, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board that changed his status from a conditional discharge to a detention order.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Board's refusal to grant an absolute discharge, as the appellant remained a significant threat to public safety.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding the detention order, finding the Board failed to adequately explain why a detention order was the least onerous and least restrictive disposition given the appellant's compliance with previous conditions.

The conditional discharge was reinstated.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment declaring that a May 2014 agreement between the parties was a binding contract and ordering its rectification to remove a clause requiring a future formal agreement.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's findings that the parties' conduct demonstrated an intention to be bound and that the formal agreement clause was included by mutual mistake.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The deceased, a non-swimmer, drowned in Lake Simcoe while visiting the respondents' cottage.

The appellants brought an action in negligence and negligent misrepresentation, alleging the respondents failed to warn the deceased of the lake's dangers and falsely represented that the lake was safe and shallow.

The motion judge dismissed the action on summary judgment, finding no special relationship or duty of care.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, agreeing that the respondents did not control the lake, did not create a risky situation, and owed no duty to warn the deceased of obvious dangers removed from their property.

The appellants, unsecured creditors, sought to appeal a motion judge's order approving an amended proposal under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and refusing to adjourn the approval motion to allow further examination of the debtor's president.

The Court of Appeal held that leave to appeal was required because the issues were procedural and did not directly involve property exceeding $10,000.

The Court denied leave, finding the proposed appeal lacked merit, raised no issues of general importance, and the motion judge's conclusions on the reasonableness and good faith of the proposal were unassailable.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's order granting summary judgment against them in a debt collection matter.

The motion judge had set aside an initial summary judgment and granted a second one after the appellants failed to file responding materials and were denied a further adjournment.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's refusal to grant an adjournment or in the calculation of the amounts owing.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

Following a successful appeal where the appellant was granted leave to amend his statement of claim, the Court of Appeal determined the issue of costs.

The parties agreed the successful party on appeal should receive $5,000 in partial indemnity costs.

The court awarded the appellant $5,000 for the appeal, but upheld the motion judge's $15,000 costs award in favour of the respondent.

The amounts were set off, resulting in a net payment of $10,000 from the appellant to the respondent.

The appellant appealed his convictions on two counts of assault causing bodily harm relating to his two-month-old infant, who suffered 12 rib fractures on two separate occasions.

The appellant argued the first verdict was unreasonable and the trial judge misapplied the W. (D.) principles, and that the second verdict involved an error in applying the test for implied consent during an attempt to administer CPR.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's factual findings reasonable, the W. (D.) principles properly applied, and that the force used during the alleged CPR was excessive, vitiating any defence of implied consent.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, sexual interference, and invitation to sexual touching in respect of a seven-year-old child.

The appellant argued the trial judge made three errors in assessing the child's credibility, including relying on stereotypical reasoning regarding a sex education book, speculating about the child's ability to operate a camera, and improperly assessing the child's motive to fabricate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's inferences were grounded in the specific evidence and correctly applied a common sense approach to assessing the child's evidence without rigid stereotypes.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his action against the Law Society of Upper Canada after his statement of claim was struck out as disclosing no reasonable cause of action and being an abuse of process.

The appellant alleged a long history of unfair treatment, including administrative suspensions, disciplinary proceedings, and bankruptcy opposition.

The Court of Appeal agreed that the individual acts did not give rise to viable causes of action as pleaded and that many claims were settled by prior releases.

However, the Court found the motion judge erred in refusing leave to amend the pleading to properly allege the tort of misfeasance in public office based on a cumulative pattern of bad faith conduct.

The appeal was allowed in part to grant leave to file a fresh as amended statement of claim.

The appellant employer appealed a summary judgment decision awarding the respondent employee six months' reasonable notice.

The employer argued the notice period was too long and that the motion judge failed to deduct mitigation income.

The Court of Appeal upheld the six-month notice period, finding it was not outside the acceptable range despite the motion judge's emphasis on the availability of comparable employment.

On consent, the court reduced the award by $1,634.62 to account for mitigation income earned during the notice period.

The appeal was otherwise dismissed.

The receiver of the appellant appealed a motion judge's interpretation of an accounts receivable insurance policy with the respondent insurer.

The motion judge found that buyers' claims for set-off against amounts owing to the appellant constituted a 'dispute' under clause 7 of the policy, which deferred the insurer's liability to pay claims.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding no ambiguity in the clause and confirming that a dispute is not restricted to claims arising out of the unpaid shipment of goods.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, a permanent resident, pleaded guilty to robbery and was subsequently deported.

He appealed his conviction, arguing his guilty plea was uninformed due to ineffective assistance of counsel, as his lawyer allegedly failed to advise him of the immigration consequences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant was already subject to a stayed deportation order and knew that further criminal convictions could lead to deportation.

Even if counsel's performance was deficient, there was no miscarriage of justice because the appellant understood deportation was a potential consequence of his plea.