Alfred Schorr

The plaintiff contractor brought an action to perfect a construction lien for unpaid renovation and flood repair work.

The court found that while there was no enforceable contract due to a lack of agreement on scope and price, the plaintiff was entitled to recovery on a contractual quantum meruit basis because the defendant requested and accepted the work.

The court valued the work at $56,554.67 based on the plaintiff's actual costs and dismissed the defendant's claims of deficient work.

The plaintiff was granted damages and a valid lien in that amount.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's action.

The plaintiff claimed entitlement to the proceeds of her deceased husband's investment accounts, alleging an oral agreement that they would remain beneficiaries on each other's accounts, and asserting a constructive trust.

She also sued the investment firm for failing to notify her when the deceased changed his beneficiaries to his children.

The court granted summary judgment, finding the investment firm had no duty to disclose the deceased's personal financial decisions, and the plaintiff failed to establish a constructive trust or agreement, noting she had already received a substantial portion of the estate.

The plaintiff transferred $96,000 to the defendant during their brief intimate relationship.

After the relationship ended, the plaintiff sued to recover the funds, claiming they were a loan, while the defendant argued they were a gift.

The court applied the presumption of resulting trust, placing the onus on the defendant to prove the transfers were gifts.

Finding the defendant's testimony not credible and the text messages equivocal, the court concluded the defendant failed to meet her onus and ordered her to repay the $96,000.

The moving party defendant, a co-owner of a residential property, sought an order for partition and sale under the Partition Act.

The responding parties opposed the motion, arguing the moving party had already extracted her share of equity through a unilateral mortgage refinancing and had unclean hands.

The court granted the motion, finding that the discretion to refuse partition and sale is strictly limited to cases of malice, oppression, or vexatious intent, which were not established here.

The court ordered the property sold and the net proceeds paid into court pending the resolution of the underlying accounting action.

The defendant, having been successful in the underlying action regarding its right to rebroadcast a 1984 interview, sought partial indemnity costs.

The plaintiff argued the defendant should be deprived of costs due to morally offensive conduct in rebroadcasting the program, which posed a safety risk to the plaintiff.

The court found no morally offensive behaviour, noting the defendant acted responsibly by removing the interview once alerted to the plaintiff's concerns.

The court awarded the defendant partial indemnity costs of $9,042.04, holding that sympathy for the plaintiff's situation is not a basis to refuse costs.

The defendants brought a refusals motion arising from the examination for discovery of the plaintiff in a franchise dispute.

The defendants sought answers regarding the plaintiff's prior business experience to test his credibility about whether earnings projections were provided at a crucial meeting.

The court ordered the plaintiff to answer these questions, finding them relevant to what occurred at the meeting.

However, the court upheld the plaintiff's refusals to answer questions regarding discussions with his independent legal advice lawyer, as those questions improperly breached solicitor-client privilege.

The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant, an officer of their corporation, fraudulently and without authorization registered two mortgages against their properties.

They also sued the lawyer who registered the mortgages for negligence and the mortgagees for relying on the mortgages despite alleged red flags.

The court dismissed the action, finding that the officer had actual authority to bind the corporation under its by-laws, the plaintiff was aware of and benefited from the mortgages as part of a scheme to avoid foreign creditors, the lawyer met the standard of care, and the mortgagees were protected by the indoor management rule and the Land Titles Act.

The applicants (Builder) brought a motion under s. 25(7) of the Building Code Act to stay an Order to Comply (OTC) issued by the Chief Building Official (CBO) of the Town of Midland, pending the outcome of a related Licence Appeal Tribunal (LAT) appeal initiated by the respondent homeowners.

The OTC required the removal and replacement of stucco on a newly built house.

The CBO supported the stay, while the homeowners opposed it.

The court found that the RJR-MacDonald test for a stay did not apply because the court was merely deciding not to exercise its jurisdiction until a later time.

Applying the test for a temporary stay pending another proceeding, the court found substantial overlap of issues, shared factual background, and that a stay would prevent duplication of resources.

The motion for a stay was granted, and the OTC appeal was adjourned pending the LAT appeal outcome.

Following a successful summary judgment motion dismissing the plaintiff's claims in one of two proceedings, the court issued a supplementary endorsement to finalize the consolidation order and determine costs.

The court rejected the defendants' request to require pre-clearance of the plaintiff's Consolidated Statement of Defence.

On costs, the court declined to award substantial indemnity costs, finding partial indemnity appropriate.

Considering the plaintiff's financial circumstances and the defendants' over-lawyering, the court fixed costs at $30,000 payable to the defendants.

The plaintiff, former CEO of the defendants, sued for wrongful dismissal and related torts, alleging the defendants were common employers with his bankrupt direct employer and conspired to place it into bankruptcy to avoid paying his severance.

The defendants moved for summary judgment.

The court granted the motion and dismissed the plaintiff's claims, finding the tort claims were an impermissible collateral attack on the bankruptcy orders and lacked evidentiary support.

The court also held that the written employment agreements precluded a finding of common employer liability, and that a release executed by the plaintiff in favour of the bankrupt employer's trustee operated to release the defendants as alleged joint debtors in any event.

Following the granting of summary judgment dismissing a wrongful death action arising from a drowning incident, the court addressed costs.

The plaintiffs argued that no costs should be awarded due to the tragic circumstances and potential financial hardship.

The court held that while tragic circumstances and the losing party’s ability to pay may be relevant considerations, the evidence demonstrated the estate held assets exceeding approximately $1 million and the plaintiffs could reasonably anticipate a costs award.

The court therefore exercised its discretion to award partial indemnity costs for both the summary judgment motion and the action, taking into account the reasonable expectations of the parties and the principles articulated by the Court of Appeal regarding proportional and predictable costs awards.

The defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing a negligence action arising from a drowning at Lake Simcoe during a social visit to their cottage.

The plaintiffs alleged the defendants negligently misrepresented that the lake was safe and failed to warn a non‑swimmer of risks or provide safety equipment.

The court held that no special relationship existed giving rise to a duty of care and that the alleged statements about the lake’s safety did not constitute negligent misrepresentation.

The deceased was an adult who voluntarily entered the water using his own flotation device, and the lake was not part of the defendants’ property.

Applying Hryniak v. Mauldin, the court found no genuine issue requiring a trial.

The applicant sought a declaration that it possessed a prescriptive easement permitting use of a private laneway over the respondent’s property to access parking at the rear of its premises.

The claim relied on alleged continuous and uninterrupted use by the applicant’s predecessors in title for over 20 years before the lands were converted to the Land Titles system.

The court reviewed the principles governing prescriptive easements and the doctrine of lost modern grant, emphasizing the requirement that use be “as of right” rather than permissive.

The evidence established long-standing use of the laneway but did not demonstrate that the use occurred without permission or that the servient owner acquiesced to an asserted right.

The court concluded the use was more consistent with a neighbourly licence than a legally enforceable easement.